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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation, based on interviews with over 40 managers and longitudinal data from 
over 1,900 foreign subsidiaries, develops new insights regarding subsidiary general manager 
(GM) changes in multinational enterprises (MNEs).  
Essay 1 addresses whether GM successions accelerate or decelerate the momentum for 
further GM change, and improve or disrupt subsidiary performance. I show that MNE managers 
learn from prior GM change in order to appoint a right candidate, thus improving subsidiary 
performance and decelerating the momentum for further succession. But the reduced marginal 
costs of making succession decisions increasingly render GM change more likely. The 
accumulated shocks ultimately translate into poor subsidiary performance and lower subsidiary 
survival likelihood. To improve survival, I show that the subsidiary can deploy a parent country 
national (PCN) GM at its founding, followed by host country national (HCN) successors.  
Essay 2 provides a more accurate account of subsidiary GM successions when subsidiary 
performance disappoints. It challenges the strategic contingencies perspective, which holds that 
GMs can accrue power from strategic configurations to weaken the existing association between 
performance and GM succession. Taking the MNE attention perspective, I show that some 
strategic configurations that increase subsidiary GM power can also enhance MNE monitoring, 
thus strengthening rather than weakening the subsidiary performance–subsidiary GM succession 
link. I conceptualize this as the performance–attention–succession model. I also show that GM 
succession is an effective subsidiary turnaround strategy.  
Essay 3 elaborates a nuanced categorization of subsidiary GM successors. Extant studies 
suggest that to better address host country business practices and cultures, it is sensible to deploy 
HCN subsidiary GMs. The data, however, show that using HCN GM successors is not always 
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the best strategy. For HCN GMs promoted from within the subsidiary, ex post opportunism may 
arise, resulting in unsatisfactory subsidiary performance. Appointing HCN GMs from outside the 
subsidiary may limit opportunism, but it can entail divided engagement. Expatriating PCN 
subsidiary GMs, on the other hand, may beget over-reliance on existing practices. I reveal two 
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE 
This dissertation, based on interviews with over 40 managers and quantitative data from 
over 1,900 foreign subsidiaries, aims to provide new insights regarding the subsidiary general 
manager (GM) changes in multinational enterprises (MNEs).  
Essay 1 focuses on continual GM changes. While with every succession, MNE managers 
learn more about how to select the right candidate, thus reducing the need to change the 
subsidiary GM again, I found that from a threshold onward, the reduced marginal costs of 
making succession decisions increasingly render succession more likely. The accumulated 
shocks ultimately lead to poor subsidiary performance and higher subsidiary exit rate. As a 
remedy, I show that the subsidiary can deploy a parent country national (PCN) GM at its 
founding, followed by host country national (HCN) successors. 
Essay 2 focuses on the performance–succession relationship. While existing studies hold 
that GMs can leverage strategic configurations to defer succession when firm performance 
disappoints, I show that in the presence of structural factors that enhance the subsidiary GM 
power, the poor performance-succession relationship is not necessarily decreased. However, in 
the presence of structural factors that enhance MNE monitoring, the poor performance-
succession relationship will be strengthened. This model thus provides a more accurate account 
of subsidiary GM successions when subsidiary performance disappoints. I also show that 
changing GMs can effectively turn around the ailing subsidiary.  
Essay 3 focuses on subsidiary GM successor origin. Although it seems sensible to deploy 
HCN GMs in market-seeking subsidiaries in order to better address host country environment, I 
show that using HCN GM successors is not always the best strategy. HCN GM successors 
promoted from within the subsidiary may pursue self-interest with deceitfulness, resulting in 
 v 
unsatisfactory subsidiary performance. Appointing HCN GMs from outside the subsidiary may 
address the problem, but it can lead to identity-based discordance. Expatriated PCN subsidiary 
GMs, on the other hand, may surrender to the force of old habit. The data delineate several 
managerial tools that can address these issues.   
Overall, this dissertation underscores the complexity of subsidiary GM succession, bridges 
succession strategy with implementation, and provides a springboard for future studies on this 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL MANAGER SUCCESSION IN MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE SUBSIDIARIES  
INTRODUCTION 
The general manager (GM) role in foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) is important to subsidiary-level development and performance (Björkman, Fey, & Park, 
2007; Meyer, Li, & Schotter, 2020; O’Brien, Scott, Andersson, Ambos, & Fu, 2019). The 
staffing of this position is thus a critical decision in MNEs (Beechler, Bird, & Taylor, 1998; 
Dowling, Welch, & Schuler, 1999). A sizeable body of literature on international human 
resource management (IHRM) in subsidiaries of MNEs exists (Delios & Björkman, 2000; Fang, 
Jiang, Makino, & Beamish, 2010; Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Tarique, Schuler, & 
Gong, 2006). However, by mainly adopting a nationality-based view (e.g., Harzing, 2001; 
Kessapidou & Varsakelis, 2003; Peng & Beamish, 2007; Schotter & Beamish, 2011; Thompson 
& Keating, 2004), these existing studies paint a snapshot of the talent management within 
subsidiaries and are overly simplistic (Meyer et al., 2020).  
Thus far, there is a paucity of theoretical and empirical research on subsidiary GM 
successions (For exceptions, see Bebenroth & Froese, 2020; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000; 
Selmer & de Leon, 1997; Selmer & Luk, 1995), despite the fact that IHRM systems are 
inherently dynamic (Rees & Smith, 2017; Taylor, Beechler, & Napier, 1996) and that the 
replacement of GMs can occur in the history of any organization (Haveman, 1993). There are 
two possible reasons for this substantial gap in the literature. First, the theoretical development 
on the dynamic relationships between foreign subsidiary-level variables in general is limited 
(Riaz, Rowe, & Beamish, 2014). Second, empirically investigating complex issues over time and 
data collection in this regard is intricate and challenging (Brewster, Mayrhofer, & Smale, 2016). 





potential to strongly impact a subsidiary outcomes (Colakoglu, Tarique, & Caligiuri, 2009). 
Decision makers in many MNEs still do not know how and where to find the best GM 
candidates (Collings, Scullion, & Morley, 2007; Tarique & Schuler, 2010), thus failing to 
identify, deploy, and manage talent for this position effectively (Mellahi & Collings, 2010). As 
the risk of selecting the wrong manager is greater than any time in the past (Donatiello, Larcker, 
& Tayan, 2018), there is need for a systematic understanding of subsidiary GM successions. The 
task is particularly pressing in this challenging time, given that the COVID-19 pandemic spurs 
MNEs’ strategic reorientation (and thus GM change) in many host countries but it also renders 
sending managers on international assignments difficult (Caligiuri, De Cieri, Minbaeva, 
Verbeke, & Zimmermann, 2020). Meanwhile, the pandemic exposes an old problem, that is, 
there are talented managers as well as poor performers in foreign subsidiaries remaining in 
“blind spots” (Mellahi & Collings, 2010), which then has pushed many MNE decision makers to 
reconsider whether they indeed have the right people in the right places. 
In contrast to the limited succession literature within the field of international management 
(IM), the managerial succession problem has been studied widely in strategic leadership (Berns 
& Klarner, 2017; Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia, 2017; Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; 
Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, & Greger, 2012; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Schepker, Kim, Patel, 
Thatcher, & Campion, 2017). Considerable evidence exists that the characteristics of the 
incumbent GM (e.g., tenure, skills, prestige) (Boeker, 1992), the composition of the board of 
directors (Shen & Cannella, 2002), the firm’s performance and characteristics (Kesner & Sebora, 
1994), and the environmental dynamics (Friedman & Singh, 1989) all affect the change in GMs.  
 In this parallel domain, three types of models may hold the potential to inform subsidiary 





(acceleration or deceleration) momentum of repeated GM changes (Amburgey & Miner, 1992; 
Beck, Brüderl, & Woywode, 2008); (II) the power model, which is built on the premise that the 
existing GM in a poorly performing organization can use strategic configurations to gain power 
in order to defer succession (Boeker, 1992; Drazin & Rao, 1999); and (III) the contingency 
model, which primarily focuses on whether the new GM is externally or internally appointed, 
and when the benefits of each successor type are likely to occur (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2009; Georgakakis & Ruigrok, 2017). These models, though insightful, have been 
developed in domestic settings. Managing human resources within MNEs, however, is “more 
than a matter of scale and presents the field with unique and complex challenges” (Collings, 
Scullion, & Curran, 2018: 378). This suggests that insights drawn from the strategic leadership 
literature may warrant theoretical adaptations in order to inform subsidiary GM changes.  
This dissertation is aimed as a step towards uncovering and explaining these adaptations in 
order to inform subsidiary GM successions in a coherent manner. Essay 1 focuses on the 
evolution of MNE subsidiaries by exploring how multiple GM changes unfold in the setting of 
foreign subsidiaries. By drawing on evolutionary theory (Kogut & Zander, 1993, 1995, 1996, 
2003) and empirical observations, I argue that: first, the deceleration and acceleration momentum 
for further GM change can take place sequentially; and second, the continual GM change can be 
both adaptive and disruptive, depending on the pace and path of change. Essay 2 aims to explore 
how each succession event is triggered or impeded by specifying the process through which 
MNE attention and subsidiary GM power jointly affect subsidiary GM succession. By 
contrasting the MNE attention perspective (Ambos, Andersson, & Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Monteiro, 2015) with the strategic contingencies perspective (Drazin & Rao, 





from which GMs of foreign subsidiaries may accrue power to defer succession in a poorly 
performing organization (Boeker, 1992), can also enhance MNE monitoring, thereby facilitating 
subsidiary GM changes. Essay 3 aims to explore the micro-process through which different types 
of subsidiary GM successors are selected and managed, and how these succession decisions link 
to subsidiary performance. Through considering the nationality-based strategy and the origin-
based strategy together, this qualitative inquiry reveals that effective GM successors for local-
market-seeking subsidiaries need to be able to simultaneously confront various facets of bounded 
reliability (BRel) (Kano & Verbeke, 2015, 2019; Lumineau & Verbeke, 2016; Verbeke & 
Greidanus, 2009). Essay 3 delineates several safeguards that can economize on BRel effectively.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I first briefly review the managerial succession research. 
Next, I discuss how this dissertation addresses the theoretical and empirical gaps in existing 
studies on subsidiary GM succession. To that end, I also present a short overview of the afore-
mentioned essays. I then briefly touch upon this dissertation’s contributions. 
MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION RESEARCH 
 
The nationality-based view 
 
Existing subsidiary staffing studies mainly argue that subsidiaries can choose between 
host-country nationals (HCNs), parent-country nationals (PCNs), and third-country nationals 
(TCNs) to staff managerial positions (Gaur et al., 2007; Shin, Hasse, & Schotter, 2017). Each of 
these nationality-based staffing choices may serve a unique strategic purpose. PCNs may possess 
a greater understanding of the MNE’s culture, and thereby can facilitate communication with the 
headquarters and align the subsidiary’s operations with the interests of the MNE (Tarique et al., 
2006). Moreover, the role of PCNs in controlling the subsidiary on behalf of the headquarters is 





researchers view HCNs as being more familiar with the host-country environment, and thus 
being more effective in localizing the subsidiary’s operations (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991).  
More recently, researchers have begun to fine-tune the nationality-based staffing 
framework by either expanding the category of subsidiary GMs or bringing to the fore the 
importance of organizational and environmental contingencies (for a detailed list, see McNulty 
& Brewster, 2017). Examples demonstrating the former endeavor include studies on expatriates 
of host-country origin (Thite, Srinivasan, Harvey, & Valk, 2009), the local employment of ex-
HCNs (Tung & Lazarova, 2006), the localization of expatriates (Tharenou & Harvey, 2006), and 
the employment of migrants (Ariss, 2010); whereas the latter is mainly manifested in studies on 
the moderating effects of institutional distance, cultural difference, headquarters and subsidiary 
characteristics, and intraorganizational relationships on the utilization of various nationality-
based staffing strategies (e.g., Boyacigiller, 1990; Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003; Peng & 
Beamish, 2014; Rickley & Karim, 2018; Schotter & Beamish, 2011a). 
This research agenda has been established as one of the cornerstones of the field of IHRM 
(Thomas, Lazarova, & Inkson, 2005) and some studies also began to adopt this nationality-based 
view to investigate subsidiary GM successions (e.g., Bebenroth & Froese, 2020). However, 
research on subsidiary GM successions is only at a rather nascent stage. In a parallel fashion, 
strategic leadership researchers have investigated this topic extensively within a domestic 
context and formulated several insightful models, to which I now turn.  
The longitudinal model 
 
Key personnel succession is one of the most critical managerial issues for a firm (Schepker 
et al., 2017), and often an ongoing concern at the leadership level (Friedman, 2017). Extensive 





which two competing lines of inquiry have stimulated a fruitful conversation. First, some 
researchers argue that organizational change is a self-reinforcing process (Amburgey & Miner, 
1992), such that prior change accelerates the momentum of further change (Amburgey, Kelly, & 
Barnett, 1993). In the present context, I call it the acceleration model. Second and more recently, 
other researchers found that after controlling for firm-level heterogeneity, prior change in GMs 
reduces the likelihood of subsequent change such that the multiple changes demonstrate a 
deceleration pattern (Beck et al., 2008). Accordingly, I call it the deceleration model.  
Because the foregoing acceleration–deceleration models suggest different paces of change, 
and the pace of change is found to be a major contingency factor that moderates the succession–
performance relationships (Klarner & Raisch, 2013; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005), 
it follows that the momentum of continual GM changes may have implications for firm 
performance. However, theoretical and empirical inconsistencies also exist among the 
organizational studies on the consequences of GM change (Giambatista et al., 2005; 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Common-sense theory (and the 
succession-adaptation model), for example, suggests that managerial successions, as a reflection 
of the firm’s adaptive nature, contribute to performance improvement (Grusky, 1963; Huson, 
Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004). In contrast, vicious cycle theory argues that successions disrupt 
routines (Grusky, 1960; Klarner & Raisch, 2013), thus worsening firm performance. 
The power model 
Concurrently, the performance–power–succession model has emerged to investigate the 
factors contributing to GM change (Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; 
Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980). The central premise is that when decision makers do not like a 





outcome (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Thus, poor firm performance, for example, will likely result 
in the dismissal of the GM (Boeker, 1992; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). However, the relationship between performance and succession is 
not as direct and simple as it seems (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980), given 
that a variety of sociopolitical forces may intervene between performance and the change of GM 
(Fredrickson et al., 1988). When an incumbent controls critical resources, for example, the GM 
in a poorly performing organization can gain power to avert replacement (Boeker, 1992). This 
performance–power–succession model has also been applied to the study of other types of 
executive roles such as strategic business unit managers (Drazin & Rao, 1999). 
The contingency model 
A third well-researched topic is GM successor origin. As the selection of a new GM offers 
a great opportunity for decision makers to align their organizations with the environment and the 
interests of the board of directors (Friedman, 2017; Ocasio, 1999), considerable evidence exists 
that decisions on whether the new GM comes from outside or inside the firm can impact firm 
performance (Finkelstein et al., 2009). The mechanisms of this impact are threefold. First, 
outsiders are normally conceived of as change agents such that external successors tend to pursue 
more strategic change (Wiersema, 1992), while internal promotion may indicate the board’s 
preference to broadly maintain the current strategic thrust (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Second, 
insiders possess more firm-specific knowledge and more established social ties to employees 
(Berns & Klarner, 2017) and managerial-level political coalitions (Wiersema, 1992). Third, to 
the extent that the organization has more detailed information about insider successors, 
information asymmetry is less severe (Zajac, 1990). These mechanisms have also been 





study of DeOrtentiis et al. (2018) on subunit managers in domestic firms. Their results showed 
that internal candidates demanded lower starting salaries, even though their performance ratings 
were higher and their probability of promotion was lower. Consequently, the authors suggested 
that firms staff the subunit manager position with internal candidates whenever possible. 
MNE EVOLUTION AND SUBSIDIARY GM SUCCESSION IN CHAPTER 2 
 
Levitt and March (1988) view organizations as a multilevel learning system where 
inferences are encoded from history into routines that independently guide future organizational 
actions. Within such a framework, researchers have established that repetitive momentum can 
occur when firms keep repeating a specific action (Amburgey et al., 1993; Amburgey & Miner, 
1992). This is because the efficiency of any particular procedure increases with use, which then 
results in the more frequent use of the procedure (Levitt & March, 1988). In this light, Ocasio 
(1999) found that as the rules of succession are established, a momentum is created such that 
firms likely repeat CEO succession of the same type. Repetitive momentum is also found 
elsewhere (Greve, 2013). Within IM, for example, studies have shown that multiple changes 
during the evolution of international equity joint ventures (IJVs) can trigger more changes 
(Chung & Beamish, 2010). Also, decision makers in MNEs are likely to repeat the mode of 
internationalization they have used in the past (Oehme & Bort, 2015).  
However, the momentum argument builds on some behavioral assumptions that have been 
challenged. Beck et al. (2008) argue that as organizations learn to change by changing over time, 
the need to replace GMs again should decline. Through the accumulation of experience in 
changing GMs, decision makers can refine their succession routines, aspirations, and search and 
attention rules. As such, this argument contrasts squarely with the momentum hypothesis, but 





and available and that feedback is prompt and non-random. Realistically, however, when the 
organizational structure and environment are complex, key outcome information may remain 
unclear (Bazerman, 2006). 
 In parallel, evolutionary theorists also highlight MNEs’ superior efficacy in learning and 
knowledge transfer. But the distinctive features of MNEs and their environments render the 
preceding acceleration–deceleration models less applicable to the setting of subsidiaries. First, 
the acceleration pattern may prevail because the environment facing MNEs is much more 
complex than that facing domestic firms (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). As noted by Cooke et 
al. (2019), MNEs have to grapple with more complex and challenging contexts within and 
outside the organization as well as within and across national borders. Second, the deceleration 
pattern may prevail, as MNEs specialize in the creation and internal transfer of knowledge 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). These features therefore lead to the following 
puzzle: Will the complexity of environments impede MNEs from refining their subsidiary GM 
succession routines, or will MNEs’ superior efficiency in knowledge creation and transfer 
facilitate the refinement of succession routines? Investigating the momentum of GM successions 
is important, because it might lead to organizational inertia or lock the subsidiary into continual 
GM change, which will in turn affect subsidiary performance and survival.  
Essay 1 
The first essay (Chapter 2) is entitled “Antecedents and consequences of general manager 
successions in foreign subsidiaries”. It examines the longitudinal dynamics of subsidiary GM 
succession over the MNE’s evolution process. Specifically, it aims to address whether GM 
successions accelerate or decelerate the momentum for further GM change, and improve or 
disrupt firm performance. I argue that while MNE managers can learn from prior GM change in 





decelerating the momentum for further GM change, the reduced marginal costs of making 
succession decisions may increasingly render GM change more likely. The accumulated shocks 
with every change may ultimately translate into poor subsidiary performance and lower survival 
likelihood. To improve survival, I suggest that the subsidiary can deploy a PCN GM at its 
founding, followed by HCN successors, as this sequencing logic maximizes the value of 
knowledge recombination.  
I develop a mixed-methods approach (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela, 2006; Watkins 
& Gioia, 2015). In the first stage, I formulate a preliminary analytical framework based on the 
existing succession literature. I then collect qualitative data through in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews. In total, I have prepared over 550 pages of transcriptions and over 140 pages of 
notes. I then constantly go back and forth between theory and data, through systematic 
combining (Dubois & Gadde, 2002), to explore which theories can better explain the succession 
phenomenon in the setting of foreign subsidiaries. In the second stage of the investigation, I use 
quantitative hypothesis testing to better inform the subsidiary GM successions. Fixed effects 
logit regression is employed to control for subsidiary heterogeneity in the propensity to change 
the GM (Beck et al., 2008). In a similar vein, the performance and survival models also address 
firm heterogeneity. The quantitative analysis combines the Toyo Keizai NEEDS Merged 
Database (Shin et al., 2017) with the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer., 2015).  
MNE ATTENTION AND SUBSIDIARY GM SUCCESSION IN CHAPTER 3 
 
Rooted in a power-dependence view (Emerson, 1962), Hickson et al. (1971) focused on 
structural sources of intra-organizational power and pointed out that the centrality of workflows, 
the substitutability of activities, and the ability to cope with critical uncertainties in an integrative 





firms (hereafter subunits). Building on the ideas advanced by Hickson and his colleagues, Drazin 
and Rao (1999) found that the availability of viable candidates and the critical contingencies 
(e.g., revenue and market share) controlled by the incumbent subunit manager interact with poor 
subunit performance to either increase or decrease succession probability. In parallel with the 
development of the interdependence-based approach, more recently, a market dependence-based 
approach to identify subunit power has emerged (Xia, Yu, & Lin, 2019). The central thesis of 
this new strand of research is that the exchange of resources (Jacobs, 1974) is not viewed as a 
necessary condition for subunits to shape their power bases. Instead, the relative importance of 
the market in which the subunit operates will suffice to determine its power (Xia et al., 2019).  
Drawing on the same structural perspective (Hickson et al., 1971), Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw (2008: 582) pointed out that “the more powerful the subsidiary… the greater the 
amount of attention… from corporate headquarters.” The structural determinants of power and 
thus the MNE’s positive attention to the subsidiary are the subsidiary’s relative strength within 
the MNE and its local market significance. As a result, strategically important subsidiaries will 
gain more recognition from their headquarters. But the authors also stressed that the attention 
from headquarters is not always positive. It may lead to interventions from the MNE and the 
replacement of management when subsidiary performance disappoints, which is contrary to the 
performance–power–succession model based on domestic subunit studies (Drazin & Rao, 1999). 
The foregoing inconsistency suggests that the extant model might need theoretical 
extensions in order to account for foreign subsidiary GM successions. However, there is a lack of 
international examination of the power–succession link (Pi & Lowe, 2011). To develop a more 
predictive theory and better utilize the distinctiveness of the MNE context for theory building, I 





Monteiro, 2015) with the strategic contingencies perspective (Drazin & Rao, 1999; Hickson et 
al., 1971) to investigate the relationship between foreign subsidiary performance and subsidiary 
GM succession. Therefore, the question which guides my research in Essay 2 is: How do 
strategic configurations that potentially affect MNE attention and foreign subsidiary GM power 
moderate the relationship between poor subsidiary performance and subsidiary GM succession? 
Essay 2 
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) is entitled “MNE attention and general manager succession in foreign 
subsidiaries”. Although the strategic contingencies perspective holds that GMs can accrue power 
from strategic configurations to weaken the poor firm performance–GM succession association, I 
argue that, in the context of MNEs, when strategic configurations such as the presence of 
country-of-origin competitors in the host country and the flows of revenue controlled by the 
foreign subsidiary simultaneously enhance subsidiary GM power and MNE monitoring, MNE 
managers’ hierarchal power can outweigh subsidiary GM power and strengthen the 
performance–succession link. I term this the performance–attention–succession model, which 
can also explain why a high expatriate ratio in the subsidiary strengthens the performance–
succession link. Only when structural factors impede MNE monitoring, will the performance–
power–succession model prevail. I also show that changing the GM in a poorly performing 
subsidiary can effectively turn around the subsidiary’s performance, but it is contingent upon the 
successor’s tenure.  
This study employs a mixed-methods approach. Along with the literature review and 
deductive theorizing process, I conduct over 45 semi-structured interviews with MNE decision 
makers, subsidiary GMs, and the members of the top management who are well-positioned to 
offer detailed knowledge of the subsidiary GM successions. The relevant quotes and important 





deeper understanding of the phenomenon to better inform the hypotheses development. I then 
quantitatively test the hypotheses by employing a fixed-effects logit model. Panel data on the 
FDI inflows is collected from the Balance of Payments Database (1991–2013) (World Bank, 
2019), and merged with a longitudinal dataset of Japanese FDI: the Toyo Keizai NEEDS Merged 
Database (Shin et al., 2017). 
SUCCESSOR ORIGIN AND SUBSIDIARY GM SUCCESSION IN CHAPTER 4 
As mentioned previously, although existing nationality-based studies add greatly to our 
knowledge of subsidiary GM staffing, they only tell half of the story. We still know little about 
how MNE decision makers choose internal or external subsidiary GM successors (For 
exceptions, see Sonkova, 2015). The lack of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence is 
surprising, given that whether to fill job openings through internal or external hires “is one of the 
most fundamental staffing decisions organizations must make” (DeOrtentiis, Van Iddekinge, 
Ployhart, & Heetderks, 2018: 916). 
Some scholars within international management argue that HCNs can better respond to 
local demands, that PCNs perform better at integration (e.g., Harzing, Pudelko, & Reiche, 2016; 
Shin et al., 2017; Tarique et al., 2006). Implicit is the assumption that HCNs generally align 
more with the expectations of subsidiaries, and that PCNs tend to be closer to headquarters 
(Michailova, Mustaffa, & Barner-Rasmussen, 2016). It therefore seems that the nationality-based 
staffing strategy might be used to partly inform the internal–external categorization.  
However, in the setting of MNEs, there is a notion of nestedness of agency relationships 
(Hoenen & Kostova, 2015) such that there are two types of insider GM successors, one is from 
within the subsidiary, and the other expatriated from within the MNE but outside the subsidiary. 





(Gregersen & Black, 1992) if they are promoted within the host country (Tharenou & Harvey, 
2006) or become localized expatriates or permanent transferees who are directly hired by the 
subsidiary and will not return to the MNE’s home country (McNulty & Brewster, 2017; Tait, De 
Cieri, & McNulty, 2014). On a similar note, HCNs cannot automatically be equated with 
subsidiary insiders either. HCNs might also be expatriates from the headquarters (Thite et al., 
2009) or locally hired from rival firms in the host-country (Morris, Snell, & Björkman, 2016). 
The theoretical–empirical divide implies that the nationality-based categorization needs 
extension (Meyer et al., 2020). To add to this topic, Essay 3, based on a qualitative research 
methodology, seeks to develop a new and enhanced model for subsidiary GM successor origin.  
Essay 3 
The third essay (Chapter 4) is entitled “General manager successors in local-market-
seeking subsidiaries of MNEs: A multiple-case analysis”. In order to explore how decision 
makers of MNEs appoint GM successors in their local-market-seeking foreign subsidiaries and 
how these succession decisions link to subsidiary performance, this qualitative inquiry adopts 
micro-foundational theorizing (Foss & Pedersen, 2019), and uses BRel as both the micro-
foundation and the theoretical thread throughout the theory elaboration process. Although extant 
literature suggests that to better address host country business practices and cultures, it is 
sensible to deploy a HCN subsidiary GM, I found that using HCN GM successors is not always 
the best strategy. For HCN GM successors promoted from within the subsidiary, ex post 
opportunism is likely to arise, which may result in unsatisfactory subsidiary performance. 
However, while I concur that agency and transaction costs minimization can play an important 
role in influencing the international staffing decision (Tan & Mahoney, 2006), I argue that 
opportunism in the present context is only a situational occurrence (Lumineau & Verbeke, 2016). 





divided engagement. Expatriating PCN subsidiary GMs, on the other hand, may also reducing 
opportunism, but it may simultaneously lead to over-reliance on existing practices. To 
economize on these facets of BRel, Essay 3 reveals several effective managerial safeguards.  
Methodologically, I adopt the theory building from cases approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gehman et al., 2018). It has a multiple-case design and treats each 
case as an experiment (Yin, 1994). I use the series of cases, collected in a theoretical sampling 
manner (Eisenhardt, 1989), to test the observations. The unit of analysis is nine wholly-owned 
foreign subsidiaries with a local-market-seeking motive. These subsidiaries are from four large, 
established manufacturing MNEs that are technical and market leaders. Moreover, I conduct 
additional interviews with managers from 11 other foreign subsidiaries to assess the analytical 
power and the external validity of the model formulated here (Yin, 1994). The qualitative 
analysis, consistent with constant comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989), is based on around 350, 000 
words transcriptions of 36 formal one- to two-hour interviews (and nine follow-up interviews), 
120 pages of notes, and secondary sources such as published cases, annual financial reports, 
media reports, and subsidiary GM resumes from LinkedIn. The results reported in Essay 3 are 
six propositions complementing and challenging the traditional views of the nationality-based 
staffing decision.  
The dissertation overview, shown in Table 1, illustrates the inter-links among these three 
integrated essays. Specifically, Essay 1 develops a temporal model that investigates long-term 
issues in subsidiary GM staffing and explores the path-dependent nature of continual GM change 
within the organization. Thus, the focus of Essay 1 is process. Essay 2 complements Essay 1 by 
delving into the individual triggering event that is likely to set the path-building process in 





environment can influence organizational decision making in relation to GM successions. The 
focus of Essay 2 is therefore the contextualized event. Essay 3 further delves into the micro-
foundations of subsidiary GM successors. It thus complements Essays 1 and 2 by providing 
detailed descriptions of succession decision making. The focus of Essay 3 is people. 
Table 1: Dissertation Overview 
  Essay 1 Essay 2 Essay 3 
Essay Title Antecedents and 
consequences of 
general manager 
successions in foreign 
subsidiaries: A mixed-
methods approach 
MNE attention and 
general manager 












or decelerate the 
momentum for further 
GM change, and 
improve or disrupt 
subsidiary 
performance?  
How do strategic 
configurations that 
potentially affect MNE 
attention and foreign 
subsidiary GM power 
moderate the relationship 
between poor subsidiary 
performance and 
subsidiary GM change? 
How are subsidiary GM 
succession decisions 
made by MNE decision 
makers, and how do the 





Evolutionary theory of 
the MNE 
The MNE attention 




perspective on bounded 
reliability 






Empirical Setting Qualitative data based 
on 45 interviews with 
MNE and subsidiary 
managers; Quantitative 
data of subsidiary GM 




and relevant quotes) 
based on interviews with 
MNE managers; 
Quantitative data of 
subsidiary GMs of 
Japanese MNEs 
Qualitative data regarding 
GM succession decision-
making in nine wholly 
owned local-market-
seeking subsidiaries of 
four large, manufacturing 
MNEs 
 
Essay 1: The pace and path of continual GM change
GM # 2 GM # 3GM # 1 GM # 4 GM # 5 GM # 6
Essay 2: The trigger and consequence of individual GM change







This dissertation aims to produce knowledge that can both advance the scientific enterprise 
and enlighten a community of practitioners (Van de Ven, 2007).  
Essay 1 aims to call attention to the dynamic nature of foreign subsidiary GM staffing 
strategies (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Riaz et al., 2014). To the best of my knowledge this is 
among the first to investigate the longitudinal dynamics of subsidiary GM successions, thus 
improving our knowledge of the broader succession process (Berns & Klarner, 2017). Essay 1 
leverages the distinctiveness of MNEs to address the inconsistencies in the extant succession 
literature and provides a more predictive theory of continual subsidiary GM change. Essay 1 also 
brings to the fore the parenting role of MNEs, which seems arguably more or less absent in 
evolutionary theory (Forsgren, 2017; Foss & Pedersen, 2019). 
Essay 2 aims to challenge the performance–power–succession model by demonstrating the 
intriguing double effect of strategic configurations, which will lead to disparate succession 
consequences. Essay 2 extends the succession theory by using the MNE attention perspective as 
an alternative explanatory mechanism (Roth & Kostova, 2003) to explain more fully the 
performance–succession association in the unique context of MNEs. Also, Essay 2 addresses the 
call to empirically investigate the issue of negative headquarters’ attention (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). By using temporal progressions of activities as elements of explanation 
(Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013), Essay 2 shows the long-term gains of this 
attention. 
Essay 3 produces detailed descriptions of succession decision making. Focusing on micro-
processes enables this study to move away from the narrow category of expatriate managers to a 





of subsidiary GMs, which are often oversimplified or obscured by GMs’ nationalities (Meyer et 
al., 2020). Moreover, Essay 3 addresses the call by Kano and Verbeke (2015) to examine the 
various expressions of BRel in large MNEs, focusing on both their antecedents and 
consequences. In so doing, Essay 3 corroborates the value of BRel as a standard micro-
foundation in international management research, and makes a strong case for the need to 
consider the different facets of BRel in an integrated manner, because the succession strategy to 
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CHAPTER 1: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF GENERAL MANAGER 
SUCCESSIONS IN FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES: A MIXED-METHODS APPROACH 
(ESSAY 1) 
INTRODUCTION 
Key personnel succession is a critical managerial issue in a firm’s lifecycle (Friedman, 
2017; Schepker, Kim, Patel, Thatcher, & Campion, 2017). Therefore, it has been subjected to 
great scrutiny (Berns & Klarner, 2017; Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia, 2017; Farah, Elias, De 
Clercy, & Rowe, 2020; Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). But only 
modest attention has been paid to investigating changes in foreign subsidiary GMs of MNEs. 
Meanwhile, the theoretical development on the dynamic relationships between foreign 
subsidiary-level variables in general is also limited (Riaz, Rowe, & Beamish, 2014). I view it as 
a substantial gap in the literature, as the subsidiary GMs are crucial to subsidiary-level 
performance (Meyer, Li, & Schotter, 2020; O’Brien, Scott, Andersson, Ambos, & Fu, 2019) and 
changing these managers may materially impact subsidiary performance (Bebenroth & Froese, 
2020; Beechler, Bird, & Taylor, 1998). The need for a systematic understanding of subsidiary 
GM successions is also pressing, given that the COVID-19 pandemic has spurred MNEs’ 
strategic reorientation in many host countries at a time when sending managers on international 
assignments is difficult (Caligiuri, De Cieri, Minbaeva, Verbeke, & Zimmermann, 2020). 
Concurrently, two competing lines of inquiry adopting a dynamic perspective have 
emerged in the organizational studies literature to investigate the factors contributing to GM 
change. First, some researchers highlight the recursive nature of organizational practices by 
arguing that organizational change is considered a self-reinforcing process (Amburgey & Miner, 





accelerates the momentum for further change (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993). In the present 
context, I call it the acceleration model. But more recently, other researchers have argued that 
organizational practices possess adaptive characteristics, as they are prone to learning and 
thereby refinement (Jarzabkowski, 2004). Accordingly, empirical evidence from this line of 
inquiry reveals that managers can learn to change by changing, therefore earlier changes in GMs 
decelerates the momentum for further change (Beck, Brüderl, & Woywode, 2008). I call it the 
deceleration model.  
The distinctive features of MNEs, however, may render the preceding acceleration or 
deceleration models less directly applicable to the setting of foreign subsidiaries. The 
acceleration pattern may prevail because the environment facing MNEs is much more complex 
than that facing domestic firms (Cooke, Wood, Wang, & Veen, 2019; Kano & Verbeke, 2019), 
rendering bounded-rational senior MNE managers more prone to solutions with lower marginal 
costs (i.e., making similar changes). However, the deceleration pattern may also prevail when 
considering MNEs’ superior capabilities in the creation and internal transfer of knowledge 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993). These brief considerations suggest that the acceleration-deceleration 
arguments warrant theoretical adaptations in order to inform subsidiary GM change. 
Theoretical and empirical inconsistencies also exist among the organizational studies on 
the consequences of GM change (Giambatista et al., 2005; Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, & 
Greger, 2012; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Common-sense theory, for example, suggests that 
managerial successions, as a reflection of the firm’s adaptive nature, contribute to performance 
improvement (Allen, Panian, & Lotz, 1979; Grusky, 1963; Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004). 
In contrast, vicious cycle theory argues that successions disrupt routines (Grusky, 1960; Klarner 





existing succession-performance theories to the setting of foreign subsidiaries may also present 
challenges, because these models were developed within a domestic setting, where no role exists 
for the nationality of the GM (Müllner, Klopf, & Nell, 2017). But for MNEs, the nationality of 
the subsidiary GM is crucial.  
This essay addresses two questions: Will subsidiary GM successions accelerate or 
decelerate the momentum for further GM change, and will this improve or disrupt subsidiary 
performance? I first draw upon field research to juxtapose my empirical observations against the 
extant succession theories. Following the qualitative inquiry, I then ground this study in 
evolutionary theory (Kogut & Zander, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2003), central to which is that MNEs 
are social communities wherein knowledge can be efficiently created and internally transferred. 
It is also inherently dynamic. As the knowledge is routinized from past experiences and can be 
recombined with newly acquired knowledge for value maximization (Verbeke, 2003), this theory 
enables me to explore long-term issues in subsidiary GM deployment. I finally formulated 
hypotheses based on an expanded theory of subsidiary GM successions and draw on Japanese 
longitudinal data to test the hypotheses.  
I argue that senior MNE managers can draw lessons from past succession experiences to 
refine succession routines in order to appoint an appropriate GM successor, thus decelerating the 
momentum for further GM change. Concurrently however, with every GM change the marginal 
costs of making succession decisions will also decline. This may increasingly result in subsidiary 
GM change, as a means of realigning with the external environments and with the interests of the 
board of directors (Friedman, 2017; Ocasio, 1999), more attractive (and yet more suboptimal). 
From a threshold onward, therefore, prior GM successions can accelerate the momentum for 





investigation of the strategic value of subsidiary GM successions. I argue that the number of 
successions may show a curvilinear association with firm performance. Also, shocks associated 
with each implementation of the GM succession will accumulate and ultimately translate into 
lower survival likelihood. I suggest that MNEs can reduce the survival risk by appointing a PCN 
GM at subsidiary founding and change to HCN GMs in the later stage, because this specific 
sequencing logic maximizes the value creation potential of knowledge recombination.  
This study aims to make the following contributions. I call attention to the dynamic nature 
of foreign subsidiary GM staffing strategies (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Riaz et al., 2014). By 
exploring the antecedents of subsidiary GM changes, it shows that the deceleration and 
acceleration momentum take place sequentially within the organization. By investigating the 
consequences of subsidiary GM changes, it shows that subsidiary GM successions can be both 
adaptive and disruptive, depending on the number and pattern of change. As such, it leverages 
the distinctiveness of MNEs to address the inconsistencies in the extant succession literature and 
provides a more predictive theory of foreign subsidiary GM successions. Next, I review the 
extant literature on GM successions, and juxtapose empirical observations in the setting of 
foreign subsidiaries against the existing succession theories. I then use an international business 
(IB) theory to theoretically re-ground this study and develop hypotheses. Following this, the 
data, the measures, and the empirical strategy are outlined. Finally, I present my results and their 
implications for theory and practice. 
BACKGROUND 
The managerial succession problem has been studied widely in the organizational studies 
literature (Berns & Klarner, 2017; Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia, 2017; Giambatista, Rowe, 





Kim, Patel, Thatcher, & Campion, 2017). In this body of work, several dynamic models inform 
continual GM change, which I will introduce next.  
Succession Antecedent: Acceleration–Deceleration Debate  
Levitt and March (1988) conceive of organizations as learning systems where inferences 
are encoded from history into routines that independently guide future organizational actions. 
Within such a framework, scholars have established that repetitive momentum, defined as the 
tendency to adhere to the previous direction of actions in current behaviors (Kelly & Amburgey, 
1991), can occur when organizations keep repeating a specific action (Amburgey et al., 1993; 
Amburgey & Miner, 1992). One reason for the acceleration tendency is that experiential learning 
processes are strongly path-dependent (Baum & Ingram, 2002; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 
2009). The efficiency of any particular procedure increases with use, which then results in the 
more frequent use of the procedure, irrespective of whether or not the procedure is inferior 
(Levitt & March, 1988). Decisions are repeated simply because they were made before (March, 
Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991). As firms become more prone to following their own “wisdom,” 
repetitive momentum arises (Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2003).  
In support of this view, Ocasio (1999) found that as the rules of succession are established, 
momentum is created. As a result, organizations are likely to repeat CEO succession of the same 
type. Repetitive momentum also exists elsewhere (Greve, 2013). IB studies, for example, have 
shown that MNEs are likely to repeat the internationalization mode they have used previously 
(Oehme & Bort, 2015). Research has also revealed that multiple equity ownership structure 
changes inside IJVs will trigger more ownership structure changes (Chung & Beamish, 2010).  
The key to the acceleration argument lies in the idea that accelerated activities may occur 





stronger, given that some host countries have a legal requirement (e.g., maximum validity of 
work permits or intra-company transfer visa) to limit the terms of expatriate managers to three to 
five years. If the subsidiary GM is an expatriate, a change is required. However, this acceleration 
model builds on some assumptions that have been challenged. Specifically, it assumes away the 
facilitating role of the environment and implies the automaticity of learning. But when the 
context facilitates or encourages performance feedback and evaluation, learning behavior can 
also be “cognitively rich” (Posen, Keil, Kim, & Meissner, 2018).  
Rooted in the same Carnegie School tradition (Cyert & March, 1963) as the foregoing 
acceleration argument, Beck et al. (2008) pointed out that as organizations learn to change by 
changing over time, the need to replace CEOs again should lessen. Therefore, prior changes 
decelerate the momentum for further change. Through the accumulation of experience in 
changing GMs, firms will refine their succession routines and aspirations, and modify search and 
attention rules. Cyert and March (1992) view such dynamics as one of the fundamental 
properties of organizations. Thus, this argument contrasts squarely with the acceleration model, 
but underneath this argument also lies some strong assumptions: e.g., that information is rich and 
available, and feedback is prompt and non-random. Realistically, however, when the 
organizational structure and environment are complex or when the decision makers pay only 
limited attention to the means-end relationships, key outcome information may remain unclear 
(Bazerman, 2006), rendering the refinement of the routines less likely. Within IB, there are also 
empirical observations illustrating the boundary conditions of the deceleration argument. For 
example, Hébert, Very, and Beamish (2005) argued that theoretically MNEs can learn from past 
cross-border merger and acquisition experience to improve their management of similar future 





Succession Consequence: Adaptation–Disruption Paradox  
The foregoing acceleration–deceleration models suggest different paces of change, and the 
pace of change is found to be a major contingency factor that moderates the succession–
performance relationships (Klarner & Raisch, 2013; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005). 
Efforts to address the acceleration–deceleration debate, therefore, can also lay the theoretical and 
empirical foundation for examination of the consequence paradox–the intriguing double effect of 
GM successions. Results from two recent meta-analyses (Bilgili et al., 2017; Schepker et al., 
2017), for example, primarily support the disruption perspective, which considers managerial 
succession as a destabilizing factor and associated with significant disturbances. Other research 
(e.g., common-sense theory and the succession-adaptation model), however, characterizes 
managerial succession as an adaptation mechanism (e.g., Grusky, 1963; Huson et al., 2004).  
There have been efforts to resolve the inconsistency. For instance, Rowe et al. (2005) deal 
explicitly with the topic of time. It indicates that due to time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989), new leaders will take time to accumulate organization-specific 
knowledge before they can take actions that will positively affect performance. Therefore, if 
firms give new leaders time to learn, it is more likely to result in a positive succession-
performance relationship. Soebbing and Washington (2011) offered similar theorization and 
corroborative findings in the college football context. The authors noted that when new leaders 
are given time to turn around the program, performance will increase.  
Underpinning this line of inquiry is a notion that too many changes are disruptive 
(Amburgey et al., 1993; Giambatista et al., 2005), thus time is primarily an opportunity. Yet time 
can also be portrayed as a threat (Berends & Antonacopoulou, 2014). Because changes in the 





irrelevant (Berends & Antonacopoulou, 2014), and because managers take time to learn in order 
to bring about the “real change” (Mitchell & James, 2001), the depreciation of knowledge may 
also ensue. Indeed, over time incumbent GMs might be unwilling or unable to make significant 
changes (Barner-Rasmussen, 2003; Shen & Cannella, 2002). Thus, to reduce the organizational 
inertia, MNEs may consider the subsidiary GM succession as a possible solution. The question 
which still remains, then, is how many successions subsidiaries should undertake. Klarner and 
Raisch (2013) conceptualize a curvilinear relationship to answer this question. They argued that 
strategic changes are beneficial at first but will become detrimental to the firm performance from 
a threshold onward. Their empirical analysis, however, did not support this argument.  
Mixed-Methods Approach 
The theoretical and empirical inconsistencies indicate that more contingency thinking with 
respect to GM successions may be needed (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Given the 
inherent links between the acceleration–deceleration debate with the adaptation–disruption 
debate, I investigate these two theoretical inconsistencies simultaneously. However, considering 
the current theoretical puzzles, coupled with the complex context of this study, a narrow 
methodological approach might only reveal a small slice of the reality. I thus utilize a mixed-
methods approach (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela, 2006; Watkins & Gioia, 2015). First, I 
formulate a preliminary analytical framework based on the foregoing succession theories. I then 
collect qualitative data through interviews, and constantly go back and forth between theory and 
data to explore which theories can better explain the succession phenomenon in the setting of 
foreign subsidiaries. The goal in this stage of research is to strike a balance between rigor, 
creativity, and open-mindedness (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Through systematic combining 





qualitative inquiry reveals that the antecedents as well as consequences of GM successions 
within foreign subsidiaries hinge on the evolution of the MNEs’ knowledge about successions 
and the combination of the knowledge brought into the subsidiary by GM predecessors and 
successors. In the second stage of the investigation, therefore, I ground the study in an 
evolutionary perspective (Kogut & Zander, 1993) and use quantitative hypothesis testing to 
better inform the subsidiary GM successions. I introduce the qualitative research first.  
STAGE 1: EXPLORATORY STUDY AND QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
Methods 
Within IB, while a sizeable body of literature on international human resource management 
in subsidiaries of MNEs exists in general (Delios & Björkman, 2000; Fang, Jiang, Makino, & 
Beamish, 2010; Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Tarique, Schuler, & Gong, 2006), 
little nuanced theoretical attention has been paid to subsidiary GM successions (for exceptions, 
see Bebenroth & Froese, 2019; Selmer & de Leon, 1997; Selmer & Luk, 1995; Sonkova, 2015). I 
thus first ground this study in emprical observations in the setting of foreign subsidairies.  
From a reflexivity perspective (Bansal & Corley, 2011; Van de Ven, 2007), it should be 
noted that I used to be a foreign subsidiary GM. I therefore developed the preliminary interview 
outline not only based on the extant literatures, but also on my personal experiences. Mentioning 
this is important, as I believe that, though grounded in extant theory, what I will observe is also a 
function of who I am and what I hope to see (Suddaby, 2006). I conducted 37 formal interviews 
(and eight follow-on interviews) with members of the top management team of foreign 
subsidiaries and their MNEs. Given my previous subsidiary GM experiences, I intentionally 
remained less predetermined during all the interviews in order to come across the “active” data 





that are supervising the subsidiary, subsidiary general manager successors, and other members of 
the top management team who witnessed the succession process. Similar to prior research (e.g., 
Gilbert, 2005; Schotter & Beamish, 2011b), the rationale to involve multiple informants 
(whenever possible) is to triangulate the data (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Flick, 2014).  
To gain access to the MNEs, I relied on my personal network of professionals working in 
these MNEs. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I was not able to conduct close-up field 
observations or to participate in management meetings on site. The main data source was semi-
structured interviews, which are deemed suitable for interviewing managers who cannot be 
reached on many separate occasions (Bernard, 2000). The interview format is based on the 
foregoing interview outline, in which I have an open-ended sequence of questions. I promised 
confidentiality to motivate informants’ accuracy and used the secondary sources such as annual 
reports, published cases, media reports, and subsidiary GM resumes from LinkedIn to cross-
check information. I prepared the detailed interview notes after each interview following the “24-
hour rule” (Eisenhardt, 1989). These notes, summarizing the interviews in a logical manner, can 
help me to bring the raw data into a manageable form. The length of each note was three to five 
pages. I also video- or audio-recorded most of the interviews, the length of which was 30 to 150 
minutes. In order to preserve the specificity and meanings, I followed the approach of Caprar 
(2011) and transcribed all recorded interviews in the original language with no immediate 
translation. In total, I have over 650 pages of transcriptions, of which around one third are 
transcribed in English. In addition, I have over 140 pages of notes, which were taken in English.  
My theorizing is an example of “disciplined imagination” (Gehman et al., 2018). Before 
the field work, I tentatively formulated a set of propositions based on both my emic views on 





the qualitative exploration unfolded, my research questions were refined and I developed a new 
set of formally stated observations that were empirically grounded. Along with the continuous 
modifying and updating processes, my direction for data collection also evolved accordingly 
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Table 2 describes these data sources.  











Directors 3(1) 3 3 69 
Regional CEOs 6(1) 2 2 64 
Subsidiary GMs 9(2) 3 4 71 
HR Managers 2 1 2 59 
Sales Managers 4(2) 1 4 43 
CFOs 2(1) 1 2 60 
PR Managers 3(1) 1 1 56 
Other functions 7 2 6 62 
Global Leadership Experts 1 1 1 60 
Note:  The follow-on interviews are shown in parentheses. 
 
Next, I present these observations, which reveal the inherent links among the extant 
literatures. Table 3 provides selective qualitative evidence from the field according to five 
themes. I then elaborate each theme respectively.  






Succession is a 
learning process  
China The US HR manager 1: "No MNEs think that it is easy to find an 
appropriate GM for their subsidiaries."  
Asia  China Regional CEO 4: "At the beginning, changing GMs is very 
difficult. We have very limited experience in doing so, and 
often times changing a GM will bring about many other 
complex issues."  
Asia  Israel Regional CEO 2: "The succession success ratio is only 
50%...I trust my own feelings…every succession is 
unique." 
 APEC Israel Regional CEO 6: "I chose many wrong candidates 






China Singapore PR manager 1: "Our president definitely thought about the 
succession lessons and adjusted his succession strategies 
over time." 





Sales manager 2: "They changed GMs very frequently. 
One-year tenure, a KPI review, and then a succession if 
performance is suboptimal."  
China The US Sales manager 3: "Expatriate GMs normally have a pre-
specified length of stay abroad, for example three 
years…So succession occurs when the assignment is due."  
Asia  China Regional CEO 4: "Changing GMs now becomes a quite 
routinized process…We purposefully prepared a pool of 
internal GM candidates."  
Europe China Regional CEO 3: "We have a very close cooperation with 
executive recruiting companies in the local labor 
market...We have a systematic talent training and 
development system to prepare the GM candidate 
internally."  
General  The US Subsidiary GM 8: "Every year, the HR Global and the 
HQs management will evaluate the performance of 
succession management by assessing the quality of the 
successor candidate and also the motivation of the 
candidate to be the subsidiary head in the future...the 
succession will occur smoothly." 




China The US HR manager 1: "Our MNE managers prefer to use 
Americans, who understand the culture in the local market. 
They only localize their subsidiary gradually after 2-3 
years." 
China Israel Regional CEO 1: "Before 2008, all GMs were from Israel. 
After 2008, all GMs in China were Chinese." 
Asia  China Regional CEO 4: At the outset, we used HCN 
GMs…because many PCN managers lacked the 
management skills then…Now, all GMs are PCNs.  
China Singapore PR manager 1: "The two most recent GMs are local, as we 
gradually realized the value of using local managers in 
business development."  
China The US Sales manager 3: "Our MNE expatriated GM to lead the 
company. But gradually, they started to use local GMs... 
The reason for the change is that from the outset, we were 
very strong in terms of product and technology...So in the 
first period of time, internal control was way more 
important ...And localization only gained little attention 
then. However, as time went by, Chinese companies began 
to catch up. The competition in China became cut-throat. "  
 China Singapore PR manager 3: "We don’t use foreigners now. Only at the 





and stabilize the operation first, and then they went back to 








Sales manager 1: "Changing subsidiary GMs too quickly 
does not help. It may even worsen the problem. Now, the 
subsidiary has shrunken a lot. The more often they change 
managers, the worse the business becomes." 
 
China Finland Service manager 1: "The performance was not very good, 
and the GMs’ tenures were too short for them to learn how 
to do business in China."  
Pakistan  China Regional CEO 4: "After the first succession…the sales 
turnover increased three-fold ...and became 
profitable…After the second succession…ten-fold."  
China Israel Subsidiary GM 3:"My return to Israel accelerated the 
whole subsidiary exit process."  
The UK China Deputy GM 1: "The incumbent subsidiary GM took office 
2 years ago, the performance got better now."  
China South 
Korea 
Sales manager 2: "While poor performance led to the 
change of the GM, the new GM made the performance 
even worse, and eventually led to the exit of the 
subsidiary." 
The tenure of the 
subsidiary GM 





Sales manager 1: "Often times, the manager knows what is 
going on and where the problem is, but they don’t have 
time to fix the problem. It is a failure trap." 
China Finland Service manager 1: "At least 5 years tenure is needed for 




Sales manager 2: "They gave the general managers too 
little time to turn around the performance of the 
subsidiary."  
China Israel Regional CEO 2: "As time went by, the GM also became 
difficult to change."  
China US Sales manager 4: "At the beginning the trust was 
good...The relationship with the HQs deteriorated in the 
past two years. The GM is building her empire now."  
China Israel Deputy GM 2: "The GM stayed in China for too long…He 
really lost his passion in the market." 
  China Switzerland Expert 1: "Long tenures would lead to fraud issues." 
Notes: the full list of quotes is available upon request.  
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1993). I therefore was not surprised that most respondents in this study have experienced or 
witnessed the change of the subsidiary GMs. However, the data confirm that many MNE 
decision makers still do not know where to find the best subsidiary GM successor candidates 
(Collings, Scullion, & Morley, 2007). Some informants told me that they learned how to manage 
subsidiary GM successions in a trial and error manner. When experience is limited, MNE 
decision makers rely more on their own feelings, and are concerned about complex issues 
associated with the successions. For these MNEs, successions are goal-based behaviors in the 
sense that different attempts are made to reach the goal (Rasmussen, 1983). 
Subsidiary GM Successions as Routines  
Concurrently, however, the data also indicate a contrasting view where subsidiary GM 
successions can be best described as “routines” (Ocasio, 1999). In these observations, the change 
of subsidiary GMs seems to occur often, easily, and smoothly. One subsidiary has even changed 
GMs 17 times in the past 20 years. Successions may also take place for various reasons, such as 
when a new assignment is due, the performance is poor, or the GM did not follow the code of 
conduct. Some successions even occurred because the subsidiary GMs could not meet the 
expectations of the MNE managers, though they did turn around the subsidiary performance. 
Successions in these MNEs are rule-based in a sense that they are controlled by a set of stored 
rules. As noted by Rasmussen (1983), this kind of human activity will be more likely to occur in 
a familiar environment while goal-based behaviors are more likely to be observed in unfamiliar 
situations. In combination, therefore, the data sensitize me to maturity effects in social systems 
where time as a context can prompt nonlinear effects (Johns, 2006).  
Nationality of Subsidiary GM Successors 





decision making (Bebenroth & Froese, 2020). The informants see the value in the PCN’s 
knowledge about the MNE and products, and the value in the HCN’s local knowledge, but they 
do not evaluate the efficacy of each succession event in isolation. Rather, MNE decision makers 
also look at the sequencing logics underlying the continual change. In general, these MNEs are 
following several specific patterns. There are subsidiaries which never change the staffing 
strategies; gradual integrators which use an HCN GM first but change to PCN GMs gradually; 
and gradual localizers which employ a PCN GM initially but change to HCN GMs in the later 
stage. The implication of these patterns is that effective succession decision making needs to take 
into account the path-dependent nature of successions.  
Successions and Subsidiary Performance  
The data reveal that GM successions will not only greatly influence subsidiary 
performance, but also the survival of the subsidiary. The nature of the effect, however, can be 
both adaptive and negative. While some informants viewed the continual GM change as a failure 
trap, or experienced the closure of the subsidiary after many successions, there are also some 
succession-adaptation cases in the data. For example, one subsidiary GM successor not only 
increased the sales volume three-fold relative to that of his predecessor, he even managed to 
enhance the company’s profitability during the pandemic. However, the succession-adaptation 
link was not salient at the outset, as he spent the first one and half years of his tenure getting 
familiar with the subsidiary and the business environment.  
Tenure of Subsidiary GM Successors  
The maximum validity of work permits or intra-company transfer visa seems to play a less 
important role here, as many PCN GMs’ tenure in my sample can reach to over 10 years. There 





data include contrasting views on the effect of the subsidiary GM successor’s tenure. Some 
informants believe that the subsidiary GM successor should be given enough time to learn. For 
them, patience is a virtue (Levitt & March, 1988). But others emphasized the negative impact of 
a long tenure, such as inertia, fraud, and loss of passion. Meanwhile, one subsidiary GM told us: 
“No matter how long you have been there, you are still a foreigner”, implying the upper bond of 
the knowledge acquisition.  
In sum, what emerged out of my interview data are two overarching themes: the 
knowledge about successions; and the knowledge held by the subsidiary GM predecessors and 
successors. Both are path-dependent and evolve over time. To systematically investigate the 
inherent links between the foregoing coexisting logics, therefore, I adopt a knowledge-based 
view of the MNE. Next, I move to the second stage of the study and ground my work in an IB 
theory that informs knowledge transfer and creation.  
STAGE 2: EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Evolutionary Theory  
The evolutionary theory of the MNE (Kogut & Zander, 1993) is rooted in the behavioral 
theory of the firm (Kano & Verbeke, 2019; Verbeke, 2003), sharing the same bounded-
rationality behavioral assumption with the extant succession theories. In this tradition, MNEs are 
viewed as a value maximizing social community that serves as an efficient mechanism for 
knowledge creation, internal transfer, and recombination. This core theoretical underpinning 
suggests that there is a potential to adapt the deceleration model as well as the succession–
adaptation model into the MNE contexts, because the knowledge creation aspect implies the 
possibility of routine refinement.  





opposite. Routinization through knowledge codification can lead to a repetitive momentum such 
that internal knowledge transfers will encourage more internal knowledge transfers (e.g., Kogut 
& Zander, 2003). But often times the knowledge transferred to the host country has been found 
to be inappropriate (Zander & Kogut, 1995). In effect, suboptimal knowledge transfer persists in 
many organizational practices (Kogut & Zander, 1996). As the value of such repetitive 
momentum primarily lies in the economizing on bounded rationality, the inertial qualities of 
routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) are prevalent in this tradition. I extend this theoretical framing 
by arguing that prior knowledge, once translated into routines, can not only facilitate knowledge 
transfer across subsidiaries within an MNE, but can also facilitate future knowledge application 
within the subsidiary. Thus, if developing routines can mitigate bounded rationality problems in 
a spatial sense (Kano & Verbeke, 2019), I may presumably see the same effect of routines in a 
temporal sense. This implies that the logic of evolutionary theory can also incorporate the 
acceleration model as well as the succession–disruption model.  
Meanwhile, it is important to note that the development of a path, along which routine is 
emerging, is embedded and connected with other developments (Sydow et al., 2009). Therefore, 
after exploring the knowledge creation and transfer activities that influence the forgoing 
momentum of successions, I will look at the knowledge recombination possibilities that GM 
successions can detail. Specifically, I consider the knowledge carried by GM predecessors and 
successors, an organic recombination of which will have strategic value. Through the knowledge 
recombination, MNEs evolve (Kogut & Zander, 1996). Indeed, the value of the existing 
knowledge base in the MNE can be enhanced by recombining it with location-specific factors in 
the host country (Verbeke, 2003). However, as I argue, there is also a sequencing logic 





The Number of Subsidiary GM Successions and Subsequent GM succession 
Beechler et al. (1998) pointed out that one of the most important decisions an MNE’s 
decision makers can make is in the selection of subsidiary GMs. Indeed, the role of subsidiary 
GMs appears to be more intricate and challenging than the role of managers in a domestic setting 
(Bartlett & Beamish, 2018). O’Brien et al. (2019) note that there are at least three types of 
responsibilities that subsidiary GMs must assume: enabling embeddedness in the host country, 
facilitating adaptability in the subsidiary, and championing alternatives within the MNE. In sum, 
subsidiary GMs are at the forefront of many international management challenges (Meyer et al., 
2020).  
Therefore, the strategic importance of and challenges imposed on the GM role may also 
render GM succession a difficult task to manage. But if the management of MNEs can correctly 
draw lessons from past succession experiences in the focal subsidiary, they will be better able to 
maintain or modify search and attention rules, and refine aspirations about the availability of 
human capital and the needed capabilities of the candidates (Beck et al., 2008). As a result, the 
management of MNEs would be better able to find a GM whose skills would be a satisfactory 
match with the needs of the subsidiary. Thus, the need to change subsidiary GMs again declines. 
In this regard, continual subsidiary GM change can usefully be viewed as a knowledge creation 
process (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003; Feldman, 2000) or, in Greve’s (2013) terms, a “feedback 
strategy” in that it extends current actions when they are associated with success and looks for 
other solutions when the outcomes are unsuccessful.  
As already pointed out, to enable the refinement of succession routines requires an 
environment where information is rich and available, and feedback is prompt and non-random. 





Dacin, 2008) and the relationships between an MNE and its subsidiaries are characterized by 
separation through time, space, culture, and language (Ambos & Ambos, 2009), it follows that 
bounded-rational senior MNE managers will not be able to always attend to all GM changes in 
their subsidiaries. When there are no succession routines specific to that subsidiary in place yet, 
senior MNE managers might have to pay more attention to the choice of the subsidiary GM. In 
this stage, new routines are selected and carried out in a trial and error manner until a good 
enough solution is found (Rerup & Feldman, 2011). The new routine creation process can be 
viewed as a form of higher-level learning (Saka-Helmhout, 2010) because new beginnings are 
powerful incentives to establish or change the way work is accomplished (Feldman, 2000), and 
because in the beginning the path formation process is flexible (Sydow et al., 2009). When senior 
MNE managers attend to the details of the situation, the performative aspect of routines will 
prevail (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Thus, I argue that MNE managers are more likely to 
materially refine succession routines based on the first few successions, which in turn will 
decelerate the momentum for further subsidiary GM succession events.  
But there are also contexts that enhance self-reinforcing dynamics (Sydow et al., 2009). 
For instance, if the means-end relationships are ambiguous or the senior MNE managers only 
pay limited attention to such relationships, correctly drawing lessons from past succession 
activities will be challenging. I argue that this may occur when MNE managers gradually encode 
the subsidiary GM succession practices over time into processes and documents of succession 
planning and implementation by succession staff (Friedman, 2017) or a standing board 
committee (Dimma, 1999), as a means of economizing on the bounded rationality and costs of 
change. The routinization may also result in the concrete performance goals of GMs in a specific 





then bring about an overarching action pattern, or in Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) term, “an 
ostensive form of routines” to guide future subsidiary GM change. From then on, it can be 
argued that a lower-level learning (Saka-Helmhout, 2010) will tend to prevail, where routines 
will render the GM change easier (Ocasio, 1999).  
Indeed, routinization can increase the competence in making specific kinds of changes, 
which in turn reduce the marginal costs of making these changes (Amburgey et al., 1993). Chung 
and Beamish (2010) argued that the reduction in marginal costs will result in two things. First, it 
will make changes with fewer benefits more attractive. Second, it will increase the likelihood 
that further, similar changes will be repeatedly enacted. But routinization as such has an inherent 
problem. That is, tacit knowledge is context specific (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003) and some of it is 
not amenable to systematic codification (Forsgren, 2017; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus, the 
established succession routines may become less likely to accommodate the current situations. 
Instead, self-reinforcing dynamics may lead to increasing simplicity (Sydow et al., 2009). As a 
consequence, changing a subsidiary GM may ultimately become an easier decision to make, but 
at the same time a less effective means of realigning the subsidiary with the environment and the 
MNE. As unsuccessful changes can lead to failure traps, in which failure leads to change, which 
leads to failure, which leads to change again (Levinthal & March, 1993), it follows that an 
accelerated pace of change may ultimately arise. Based on the “within-theorization” (Haans, 
Pieters, & He, 2016), I thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: The number of GM successions in the foreign subsidiary shows a curvilinear 
association (U-shape) with the likelihood of subsequent GM succession.  
The Number of Subsidiary GM Successions and Subsidiary Performance 





succession activities may also change from functional, implied by the deceleration model, to 
dysfunctional, implied by the acceleration model. Specifically, I argue that GM successions can 
improve subsidiary performance when the number of GM successions is kept low, as they allow 
the MNE to find the appropriate candidate to improve the subsidiary’s adaptability over time. 
Moreover, the decelerated momentum for further change can also offer the new GM the 
opportunity to incrementally learn suitable ways to “do things here” (Rowe et al., 2005). 
Therefore, reducing the number of changes is “often an aid to comprehension” (Levitt & March, 
1988) not only to the senior MNE managers who make succession decisions but also to the 
newly appointed subsidiary GM who needs time to learn in order to achieve strategic renewal. 
This is critical because knowledge dispersion, as a basic attribute of MNEs (Tippmann, Scott, & 
Mangematin, 2012), may render the time compression diseconomies a much more serious 
problem to managers in MNEs than to managers in a domestic setting.   
In contrast, too many GM successions can lead to failure traps as previously mentioned. It 
may accelerate the momentum for further change, which then indicates that the time between 
changes will become increasingly short for GMs to process information (Hale, Ployhart, & 
Shepherd, 2016; Kunisch, Bartunek, Mueller, & Huy, 2017). As a result, information overload 
and ineffective decision making may ensue (Klarner & Raisch, 2013). Moreover, given paucity 
of time, it is likely that there exists information asymmetry between the firm and the candidate, 
which may further lead to a less-than-optimal selection (Zhang, 2008). Consequently, using such 
a candidate might be detrimental to the adaptability of the organization. Taken together, I thus 
follow Klarner and Raisch (2013) to conceptualize a curvilinear relationship such that continual 
subsidiary GM change is beneficial at first but will become detrimental to the subsidiary 





Hypothesis 2: The number of GM successions in the foreign subsidiary will have a 
curvilinear association (inverted U-shape) with the subsidiary performance.   
The Number of Subsidiary GM Successions and Subsidiary Survival 
As it takes time to transfer learning from individuals to the organization (Crossan, Lane, & 
White, 1999), too many GM succession events may render effective actions initiated by new 
subsidiary GMs difficult to integrate and institutionalize as formal rules, procedures or routines. 
Consequently, the larger part of the firm may remain the same while CEO changes become more 
frequent (Elosge, Oesterle, Stein, & Hattula, 2018). More importantly, too many changes can 
cause a flux in coordination (Hale et al., 2016). Here, I define flux as “an unstable, unbalanced, 
or changing pattern of interaction in a collective” (Summers, Humphrey, & Ferris, 2012: 315). 
The flux may take the form of short-term shocks which, through the creation of new routines, 
can decline over time. But forming new routines can be costly and time-consuming (Klarner & 
Raisch, 2013). Therefore, given too many GM changes, the short-term shocks that arise from 
each implementation of GM succession will be less likely to decline. Following the logic of 
Chung and Beamish (2010), one possible consequence is that these short-term shocks will 
accumulate and ultimately translate into higher likelihood of foreign subsidiary exit. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: The more frequently GM successions have occurred in the foreign 
subsidiary, the higher the likelihood of subsidiary exit.   
The Pattern of Subsidiary GM Successions and Subsidiary Survival 
Tarique et al. (2006) argue that PCNs may know more about the MNE’s culture, and 
thereby can more effectively facilitate communication with the headquarters and align the 
subsidiary’s operations with the interests of MNE headquarters. They are “value-seeking” 





are viewed as being more familiar with the host-country environment, and hence more effective 
in localizing the subsidiary’s operations (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). Based on these insights, 
I would anticipate that continued deployment of PCN GMs can facilitate knowledge transfer to 
the focal subsidiary, and strengthen knowledge exploitation. Yet it may discount the advantage 
of localization over time (Bebenroth & Froese, 2020). Continued deployment of HCN GMs, on 
the other hand, can help the subsidiary to localize the operation, but it may limit the subsidiary’s 
capability to fully exploit the MNEs’ firm specific advantages (FSAs).  
Thus, to capture the upside potential of each staffing strategy, MNEs may design their 
succession strategies along two distinct trajectories: gradual localization or gradual integration, 
as I observed. This is in line with evolutionary theory, which highlights that the knowledge 
transfer process within an MNE is itself a learning process in which the MNE’s existing 
knowledge base is combined with (host country) location specific factors, as one illustration of 
MNE’s combinative capability (Verbeke, 2003). Although some non-location bound (i.e., can be 
exploited globally) FSAs can be transferred to the host country market by PCN GMs, without 
accessing complementary resources in the host country or without country specific advantages 
(CSAs), it is less likely that FSA exploitation leads to superior performance (Rugman, Verbeke, 
& Nguyen, 2011). I argue that although both paths appear to be capable of realizing the 
knowledge recombination goal, they are not equifinal. There are several reasons for this. 
Because the history of a firm’s strategic moves will affect the operational effectiveness of 
their subsequent moves (Tan & Mahoney, 2005), I anticipate that the initial conditions 
established by the PCN GM at subsidiary founding can work as a blueprint that guides 
subsequent actions. Collectively these factors constitute, in Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1987) terms, 





dynamics of expatriate deployment (Riaz et al., 2014), which suggests that a higher proportion of 
expatriates deployed at subsidiary founding can enable knowledge transfer, coordination, and 
control between the subsidiary and the parent MNE (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005). The initial 
personnel decisions will then “provide the trigger for the path-building process by developing an 
organization’s combination of resources and capabilities” (Riaz et al., 2014: 2). Thus, I concur 
that deploying PCN GMs at subsidiary founding suggests a high level of administrative 
capacities available for knowledge transfer, control, and coordination (Sekiguchi, Bebenroth, & 
Li, 2011).  
Administrative heritage can endure long after any structural change has been made and that 
over time the employees in the subsidiary will become socialized to the point where PCN GM 
control is less needed (Welch, 1994). Thus, I suggest that for gradual localizers, the close 
coordination between the subsidiary and the MNE and between the subsidiary and its peers can 
be sustained after the PCN GM’s departure. As a result, along with the improvement of the 
subsidiary’s local embeddedness facilitated by the HCN GM successor, the MNE can still 
leverage the administrative heritage built by the PCN predecessor to transfer knowledge, and 
maintain coordination. This succession pattern, therefore, may allow the subsidiary to 
simultaneously gain acceptance from the external environment in the local host country and 
acceptance from the MNE, both of which are needed for subsidiary survival (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). As this is an effective way to develop MNEs into a harmonious social community (Kogut 
& Zander, 1996), I see gradual localization as a value maximization path.  
I argue that this might not be the case with gradual integrators. Prior studies argued that 
using HCN GMs at subsidiary founding may reduce the subsidiary’s risks in a new environment 





Accordingly, I view this succession pattern as a cost-minimization path. However, the critical 
distinction made by the evolutionary perspective is that the primary competitive advantage an 
MNE can bring to the host country is its possession of superior knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 
2003). Here, value creation, not cost efficiency, is the core element (Forsgren, 2017). Employing 
an HCN GM at subsidiary founding, however, will be less likely to enable the subsidiary to fully 
take advantage of the MNE’s superior knowledge during the HCN GM’s tenure. Moreover, there 
are also enduring problems after the HCN GM’s departure, as PCN successors who replace a 
HCN GM may encounter subtle and overt resistance by middle and lower HCN managers of the 
subsidiary (Bebenroth & Froese, 2020). The rationale is that the “glass-ceiling” may reduce 
morale and commitment among these managers (Hitotsuyanagi-Hansel, Froese, & Pak, 2016), 
leading to identity-based discordance (Kano & Verbeke, 2019). For gradual integrators, I thereby 
argue that the dynamic adjustment costs, incurred when hiring a new manager will disrupt 
current operations (Tan & Mahoney, 2005), to a greater extent than other patterns of succession. 
This will potentially temper the knowledge transfer benefit that the PCN successors can bring to 
the subsidiary. I thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: The exit likelihood of gradual localizers is lower than that of subsidiaries 
that only deploy PCN GMs or only use HCN GMs.   
QUANTITATIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Data 
I use the Toyo Keizai NEEDS Merged Database (1991–2013) to quantitively test my 
hypotheses. Toyo Keizai’s overseas Japanese companies’ database is the largest database in 
Japan about Japanese companies’ overseas expansion. It is based on an annual questionnaire 





Electronic Databank System (NEEDS) offers over 50 years of financial and operating data on 
Japanese parent firms. Hundreds of prior studies have been published using this database (e.g., 
Shin, Hasse, & Schotter, 2017). To ensure the panel data’s consistency, I restrict my attention to 
foreign subsidiaries in which there is no change in parent firm and have only one Japanese parent 
throughout their development. I do so in order to maintain the consistency of data and to control 
for influence due to conflicts within Japanese parent firms. Consistent with FASB protocols, I 
define a foreign subsidiary as a firm in which the Japanese parent has at least a 20 percent 
ownership stake.  
Some of the subsidiaries were started 10 to 15 (or even more) years ago in the host 
countries before they were first recorded in the dataset. Obviously, in those subsidiaries I cannot 
examine the full process of continual GM change because I have no data about the subsidiaries’ 
initial development stage. To ensure this study identifies the full process of MNE evolution 
(starting from the first possible GM change), I exclude subsidiaries that had already operated for 
more than two years in the host countries when they were first recorded in the dataset.  
Further, I exclude subsidiaries that have never had more than nine employees to ensure the 
database does not include small representative offices or agencies. Ensuring the database does 
not include small representative offices or agencies has become a common practice for IB 
researchers leveraging this specific dataset (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; Chakravarty, Hsieh, 
Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; Shin et al., 2017). In total, the treatments resulted in a dataset of 
1,945 subsidiaries with 7,866 yearly observations.  
Variables 
Dependent variable. The data-set contains information on the names of subsidiary GMs. 





to trace the managerial succession events at each observation. I use a binary variable, 
Successions, to denote the change in subsidiary GMs; 1 refers to the observation that a subsidiary 
GM succession occurs, and 0 means otherwise. Samples at the end of the observation period are 
viewed as censored data. 
With respect to the consequences of subsidiary GM successions, in the Toyo Keizai 
database, there is a categorical variable representing the annual assessment of the subsidiary’s 
financial performance, which is argued to be an appropriate measure (Delios & Beamish, 2001; 
Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2000). As the measure has ordinal but not ratio-scaled properties 
(Dhanaraj, 2000), I recode this profit measure into a binary variable termed Profitability, where 1 
is high performance, and 0 means otherwise.   
Consistent with previous research (Delios & Beamish, 2001), a subsidiary that ceased to 
appear in a particular year’s directory after being listed continuously for years, is regarded as an 
exit from the market. I use a dummy variable Exit to refer to a subsidiary’s cessation of 
operation. Following Lu and Xu (2006), 0 is a subsidiary that remains in the market in a year, 
and 1 is a subsidiary that exits in that year. Subsidiaries that are listed at the end of the 
observation period are viewed as censored data. Toyo Keizai dataset also contains the address 
information of the subsidiaries. While I have subsidiaries that moved to different locations, the 
address change of the subsidiaries will not change the ID code of the subsidiaries. Thus, I do not 
code the observations as exit if the subsidiaries only changed the address. Meanwhile, in my 
coding process, I make sure that the observations coded as exit are not from those subsidiaries 
that ceased to appear but then reappeared in the dataset. 
Independent variables. Prior Change denotes a subsidiary’s total number of managerial 





changed their GM, 1 for an observation where only one subsidiary GM in previous years is not 
the same as the incumbent, 2 for a subsidiary where the GM successions have occurred twice, 
and so forth. I use the quadratic term of Prior Change to account for the non-linear effects of 
prior succession events on subsequent GM change and subsidiary performance.  
I use the subsidiary GM’s name to check for PCN identification (Bebenroth & Froese, 
2020). Following prior studies (Bebenroth & Froese, 2020; Schotter & Beamish, 2011b), I use 
the classification as non-PCN to measure HCNs because Japanese companies use very few TCNs 
(0.5%) in their foreign subsidiaries (Tungli & Peiperl, 2009). On this basis, I create a categorical 
variable Succession Patterns to measure the patterns of subsidiary GM changes: Unchanged are 
subsidiaries that keep employing HCN GMs or only staff PCN GMs; Gradual Integrators use an 
HCN GM at subsidiary founding, but change to PCN GMs gradually; and Gradual Localizers 
employ a PCN GM at subsidiary founding, but change to HCN GMs in the later stage. As this 
variable is time-invariant, it is only analyzed in the survival model. To make sure that the 
survival model estimates the change dynamics, all observations in this particular model have 
experienced at least one succession event. 
Control variables in the succession antecedent model. First, following Beck et al. (2008), 
Tenure is the logarithm of the total number of years the subsidiary GM has been in office. Once 
a subsidiary appoints a new GM, it resets the tenure clock.  
Second, as larger organizations may experience more succession occasions than smaller 
firms (Kesner & Sebora, 1994), I control for Subsidiary Size, which corresponds to the number 
of subsidiary employees. As log-transformation cannot be applied to zero values, I take the 
square root of this variable to reduce right skewness. I also control for the MNE Size. It is the 





Third, I control for the logarithm of Subsidiary Age, because older organizations might be 
less likely to engage in change (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2004). I then use the quadratic term of 
Subsidiary Age to control for the non-linear effects of firm age on GM change. This is because at 
the start of a new organization, there is a fair degree of good will, resulting in a honeymoon 
period. During this period of time, the relationship can be relatively shielded from negative 
outcomes (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991).  
Fourth, following Beck et al. (2008), I control for the performance of the subsidiary, as 
poor performance will likely lead to the change of GMs (Boeker, 1992; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
Also, because Frazee (1998) argued that with a local partner one may have a better chance of 
making the right GM choice in the beginning, I control for the ownership structure of the 
subsidiary. Entry Mode is a categorical variable denoting a firm’s mode of entry. I use 1 to 
denote a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS), 2 as an MNE Majority Owned IJV, 3 as an Equally 
Owned IJV, and 4 as a Minority Owned IJV. 
To further account for the effect of host-country attractiveness (Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002) 
on the likelihood of subsidiary GM turnover, I utilize GDP Growth data from World Bank 
National Accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (World Bank, 2019). For the 
same reason, I use Unemployment Ratio data from the International Labour Organization’s 
ILOSTAT database, Human Capital Index data from the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, & 
Timmer., 2015), and Tax Rate data from TaxFoundation.org (Farah, Elias, Chakravarty, & 
Beamish, 2021).  
I also account for the effect of competition in the host country on the likelihood of 
subsidiary GM change. Competitors is a variable referring to the number of country-of-origin 





These country-of-origin competitors share the same four-digit sector code with the focal 
subsidiary. This study takes the square root of the number of country-of-origin competitors to 
reduce right skewness. Relatedly, I also control for the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Based on the definition from the World Bank, FDI Inflow refers to direct investment equity 
flows in the reporting country. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other 
capital, and is reported in current U.S. dollars.  
Meanwhile, I use a variable called Expatriate Ratio to represent the expatriate ratio in the 
focal subsidiary. This variable is used to control for the MNE’s ability to find a GM candidate 
from within the subsidiary, which then potentially affect the probability of further GM change in 
the focal subsidiary. Relatedly, I also control for the number of Sister Subsidiaries in the host 
country. This is because when the MNE looks for a new subsidiary GM, it might be more willing 
and able to first look at whether there are candidates within their sister subsidiaries. This variable 
is the square root of the number of sister subsidiaries in the host country where the focal 
subsidiary operates. Also, because many PCN GMs are expatriates (Harvey & Moeller, 2009), 
who may have a pre-specified length of stay abroad (Takeuchi, Marinova, Lepak, & Liu, 2005), I 
control for the effect of the PCN identification on the change of the incumbent GM. 
I use a categorical variable called Strategic Motives, which is coded into a series of (16) 
dummy variables, to account for the heterogeneous impact of FDI motives on the change 
probability of subsidiary GMs. Relatedly, I use a binary variable, Regional HQs, to control for 
the impact of being an RHQ on GM succession in the focal subsidiary. 
Finally, I control for the period from Year 1991 to 2013. This variable is coded into a series 






Control variables in the succession consequence model. The following control variables 
are used in the performance and survival models. I use Subsidiary Age to account for the effect 
of subsidiary’s stage of development on its performance and survival probability (Josefy, 
Harrison, Sirmon, & Carnes, 2017). Following Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), I use the 
quadratic term of Subsidiary Age to account for the nonlinear effects of firm age on firm 
performance and survival.  
Meanwhile, I control for the Tenure of the subsidiary manager, as long-tenured CEOs are 
found to be less likely to achieve the match between their organizations and the environment 
(Miller, 1991). I also control for the effect of the GM’s PCN identification on subsidiary 
performance. Because the pattern of subsidiary GM changes is the key independent variable in 
the survival model, I do not control for the PCN identification in the survival model in order to 
avoid Type 1 error (Kalnins, 2018). 
Furthermore, consistent with prior research on subsidiary performance (e.g., Dhanaraj & 
Beamish, 2004; Makino, Chan, Isobe, & Beamish, 2007), I control for the size of the subsidiary 
and the MNE. Meanwhile, given the mode of entry may influence the stability and performance 
of the subsidiary (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Murray, Ju, & Gao, 2012), I also control for Entry 
Mode.  
As RHQs are expected to perform HQs functions (Chakravarty et al., 2017), they may 
receive more resources and support from the HQs. I therefore also account for the effect of being 
an RHQ on subsidiary performance and survival. Relatedly, I control for Sister Subsidiaries in 
the performance and survival models. I expect that the more sister subsidiaries operating in the 
host country, the less likely the focal subsidiary will gain the needed resources and support from 





(Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010).   
Following prior studies (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2010; Farah et al., 2021), I account for 
the macro-level host country variables such as the human resource development, the labor 
market environment, and the economic environment by including Unemployment Ratio, GDP 
Growth, Human Capital Index, and Tax Rate. Also, I account for the impact of host country 
competitions by including FDI inflows and Competitors. 
Finally, a series of Year dummy variables are used to partial out time-specific effects on 
firm performance and survival, and a series of Strategic Motives to account for the impact of FDI 
motives on firm performance and survival. The following descriptive statistics in Table 4 show 





Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Successions 0.25 0.44 1.00         
2.Profitability 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00        
3.Subsidiary Exit 0.06 0.23    n.aa -0.05 1.00       
4.Prior Change 1.20 1.48 0.08 0.11 0.02 1.00      
5.Succession Patterns (1=unchanged 2=gradual 
localizer, 3=gradual integrator) 1.34 0.66 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 1.00     
6.Entry Mode (1=WOS, 2=majority owned IJV, 
3=equally owned IJV, 4=minority owned IJV) 1.64 1.08 -0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.10 1.00    
7.Expatriate Ratio (%) 0.13 0.18 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.21 1.00   
8.MNE Size (log) 7.82 2.38 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.05 -0.11 1.00  
9.Subsidiary Size (sqrt) 9.47 10.20 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.06 -0.36 0.29 1.00 
10.Tenure (log) 0.91 0.74 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.15 -0.05 0.04 -0.12 -0.13 0.05 
11.Subsidary Age (log) 1.91 0.70 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.64 0.09 -0.05 -0.16 0.07 0.18 
12.Competitors (sqrt) 5.09 3.12 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.18 
13.FDI Inflow (10 billion) 8.18 9.69 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.02 -0.13 0.05 -0.04 0.00 
14.GDP Growth (%) 5.75 4.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.07 -0.13 -0.05 0.09 
15.Human Capital Index 2.75 0.54 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.19 0.04 -0.20 0.20 0.03 -0.16 
16.Unemployment (%) 4.88 2.46 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.08 0.06 -0.11 
17.PCN 0.78 0.41 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.09 -0.26 -0.41 0.20 -0.03 -0.02 
18.Tax Rate (%) 29.57 7.20 -0.07 -0.13 0.02 -0.15 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 
19.Regional HQs 0.04 0.19 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.09 0.19 0.14 -0.04 
20.Sister Subsidiaries (sqrt) 1.35 0.66 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.07 0.40 0.10 
 
  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
10.Tenure (log) 1.00           
11.Subsidary Age (log) 0.44 1.00          
12.Competitors (sqrt) 0.06 0.06 1.00         
13.FDI Inflow (10 billion) 0.08 0.14 0.45 1.00        
14.GDP Growth (%) -0.02 -0.14 0.37 0.20 1.00       
15.Human Capital Index 0.05 0.23 -0.16 0.14 -0.57 1.00      
16.Unemployment (%) -0.01 0.01 -0.19 0.01 -0.33 0.36 1.00     
17.PCN -0.08 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 1.00    
18.Tax Rate (%) -0.07 -0.17 -0.03 0.04 -0.15 0.21 0.33 -0.05 1.00   
19.Regional HQs -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.03 1.00  
20.Sister Subsidiaries (sqrt) -0.09 -0.03 0.19 0.21 0.17 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.05 1.00 
Notes: a. When an observation exits, GM Change is viewed as censored data. Therefore, no correlation between Successions and Exit is calculated; b. Year Dummies and Strategic 





In line with Beck et al. (2008), I do not assume that recurrence times within each 
subsidiary are independent. To control for firm heterogeneity in the propensity to change (Haans 
et al., 2016), this essay employs the following fixed-effects logit regression to explore the 
antecedents of subsidiary GM succession (Allison, 2009):  
Pr($!" = 1	|	)!" , +, ,!) =
1
1 + /#$!"%#&! 					with									$!" = 1[)!"+ + ,! + 5!" > 0] 
where 9 denotes a subsidiary and : denotes time, ;!" is a change of subsidiary GM at each 
observation, )!" refers to the vector of independent variables and control variables, and 
+	represents the coefficients associated with these variables. In the fixed effects model, the errors 
5!" are assumed to be exogenous to all independent variables, whereas ,! is the time-invariant 
unobserved firm-specific variance (i.e., incidental parameter) that is assumed to be correlated to 
the independent variables. As I condition the density of ;!" on ∑";!" (which is a sufficient 
statistic for the fixed effects) to derive the objective function of the estimator, I can eliminate the 
incidental parameters, thus yielding consistent estimators (Chamberlain, 1980).  
Also, to control for the unobserved firm-specific variance in order to get consistent 
estimators, this study employs fixed-effects logit regression to explore the performance 
consequences of continual subsidiary GM change. Finally, with respect to the relationship 
between subsidiary survival and subsidiary GM succession, as the predictors were recorded 
annually, I can only assess exit on an annual basis. Therefore, continuous-time Cox models are 
not applicable. Furthermore, I cannot use the foregoing fixed-effects model due to the “complete 
separation” issue (Allison, 2009: 81). To calculate the continuous-time hazard rate, I apply a 
discrete-time event history model (Stern, Dukerich, & Zajac, 2014). Such model uses a 




of actual exit processes and the discrete nature of the data (Allison, 1995). In this model, I cluster 
the standard errors at the subsidiary level and use robust variances to address heteroscedasticity. 
 RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Table 5:  Empirical Results for Hypothesis 1  
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable: Successions  
Regressors:        
Prior Change     -1.95 (0.000)   -3.63 (0.000) 
Prior Change Squared                      0.27 (0.000) 
PCN    0.29 (0.043)    0.32 (0.034)    0.32 (0.034) 
WOS Reference category 
Majority Owned IJV   -0.02 (0.921)   -0.03 (0.902)   -0.06 (0.794) 
Equally Owned IJV    0.25 (0.526)    0.20 (0.643)    0.23 (0.607) 
Minority Owned IJV    0.70 (0.023)    0.48 (0.138)    0.39 (0.231) 
Expatriate Ratio    0.07 (0.835)   -0.24 (0.485)   -0.01 (0.979) 
MNE Size    0.08 (0.225)   -0.04 (0.599)   -0.03 (0.684) 
Subsidiary Size    0.01 (0.259)   -0.00 (0.990)    0.00 (0.785) 
Tenure    1.38 (0.000)    0.27 (0.000)   -0.24 (0.002) 
Profitability   -0.05 (0.595)   -0.10 (0.255)   -0.09 (0.358) 
Subsidiary Age   -0.72 (0.247)    0.77 (0.295)    1.07 (0.186) 
Subsidiary Age Squared   -0.03 (0.930)    0.06 (0.883)    1.15 (0.008) 
Competitors   -0.02 (0.542)    0.02 (0.622)   -0.00 (0.938) 
FDI Inflow   -0.01 (0.338)   -0.00 (0.893)   -0.00 (0.870) 
GDP Growth    0.01 (0.334)    0.02 (0.124)    0.01 (0.257) 
Human Capital Index    0.38 (0.535)    1.55 (0.027)    0.79 (0.263) 
Unemployment   -0.05 (0.120)   -0.05 (0.133)   -0.04 (0.176) 
Regional HQs   -0.87 (0.086)   -1.22 (0.044)   -1.00 (0.087) 
Tax Rate    0.02 (0.215)   -0.01 (0.480)   -0.01 (0.697) 
Sister Subsidiaries    0.07 (0.762)    0.01 (0.964)    0.11 (0.678) 
Strategic Motives Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations    8,864          8,864          8,864         
Number of subsidiaries 1,328  1,328  1,328  
Chi-squared  800.77         1412.72         1612.72         
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 .122  .214  .245  
Notes: P-values in parentheses of coefficients; Meanwhile, it is important to note that the fixed-effects logit 
model is a conditional logit, thus estimating the marginal effects is not meaningful (because the marginal 
effects depend on the value of the fixed effects) (Allison, 2009). This suggests that I cannot simply follow 
the existing approach (e.g., Wiersema & Bowen, 2009) to graphically demonstrate the result, though the 
marginal plot in STATA did show a clear U-curve here. Based on Model 3, I also plotted the fitted values of 
the predicted probabilities of GM successions, where the predicted probability of GM change is conditional 
on one positive outcome (i.e., one succession event) within a subsidiary. I found a clear U-curve again, 
where the predicted probability of further GM change will decline by around 8% after the first succession 
and will further decline by another 5% after the second succession. The effect continues to decline along 
with every GM change and eventually the sign is shifted from the sixth succession onward. These plots are 
available upon request. Nonetheless, I can use a method to calculate the average elasticity using the 
consistent estimator of the parameter of interest and the average of binary dependent variable (Hoetker, 
2007). This method was first brought to light mathematically by Kitazawa (2012). To apply this method, I 
applied the analytical program written by Kemp and Silva (2016) and found that the “turning point” (Haans 
et al., 2016) in this case is the global extremum at −"!/2"" where "" is 0.22 and highly significant while "! 
is -2.96 and highly significant. Thus, the results suggest that after the sixth successions, the momentum will 
shift from deceleration to acceleration. In a separate analysis, I did not transform Tenure, Competitors, Sister 




Models 1 to 4 in Table 5 examine the antecedents of subsidiary GM successions. Model 1 
only uses control variables, where the McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is .122. In model 2, I added Prior 
Change into the regression and found that the McFadden’s pseudo-R2 went up to .214. Relative 
to the controls-only model, therefore, Model 2 represents a substantial improvement (Hoetker, 
2007). Meanwhile, in Model 2, the coefficient of Prior Change is negative (Beta = -1.95) and 
highly significant (p-value < .001), supporting the deceleration argument that prior GM 
successions in the focal subsidiary reduce the likelihood of subsequent succession. In Model 3, 
however, I found that the coefficient of the quadratic term (i.e., Prior Change Squared) is 
positive (Beta = 0.27) and highly significant with a p-value below .001. Also, in Model 3, the 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 went up to .245. The results lend strong support to the argument that 
from a threshold onward, prior subsidiary GM successions in the focal subsidiary operations will 
increase the likelihood of subsequent succession in the subsidiary, accelerating the momentum 
for further change. Taken together, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Model 4 examines the performance consequence of subsidiary GM successions, and Model 

























In Model 4, I found that the coefficient of Prior Change is positive and significant (p-value 
= .017) while its quadratic term is negative and highly significant (p-value = .017). This pattern 
supports Hypothesis 2. Based on the coefficients in Model 4, for example, the turning point 
suggests that from the fifth subsidiary GM onward, the subsidiary performance will be more 





Dependent Variable: Profitability Subsidiary Exit 
Regressors:     
Prior Change   0.34 (0.017) 0.42 (0.018) 
Prior Change Squared -0.05 (0.017) -0.04 (0.189) 
Gradual Localizer   -0.59 (0.003) 
Gradual Integrator   -0.30 (0.085) 
WOS Reference category  
Majority Owned IJV 0.19 (0.456) 0.30 (0.129) 
Equally Owned IJV 0.46 (0.332) 0.48 (0.062) 
Minority Owned IJV 0.24 (0.513) 0.74 (0.000) 
Expatriate Ratio -1.05 (0.009) -0.31 (0.456) 
MNE Size 0.03 (0.661) -0.07 (0.026) 
Subsidiary Size 0.08 (0.000) -0.01 (0.526) 
Tenure 0.15 (0.068) 0.19 (0.058) 
Subsidiary Age 1.75 (0.001) -0.02 (0.985) 
Subsidiary Age Squared -0.16 (0.615) -0.02 (0.953) 
Competitors 0.01 (0.720) -0.07 (0.007) 
FDI Inflow 0.02 (0.015) 0.02 (0.105) 
GDP Growth 0.04 (0.004) 0.00 (0.961) 
Human Capital Index 0.34 (0.626) 0.20 (0.217) 
Unemployment  -0.04 (0.303) 0.07 (0.033) 
Tax Rate 0.04 (0.007) 0.00 (0.873) 
Regional HQs 2.19 (0.005) -0.20 (0.745) 
Sister Subsidiaries -0.18 (0.493) 0.54 (0.000) 
PCN 0.16 (0.357)   
Profitability   -0.47 (0.000) 
Strategic Motives  Yes  Yes  









Chi-squared  516.23          238.95  
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 .110  n.a.  
Notes: P values in parentheses of coefficients; I led with the dependent variable 
Profitability in Model 4 by one year (the results remained consistent when all 
independent variables in Model 4 were lagged by one year). For ease of 
interpretation, I then used a linear probability model to test Model 4. The coefficient 
of Prior Change is 0.045 (p-value = 0.002) and the coefficient of Prior Change 
Squared is -0.006 (p-value = 0.003). Therefore, the findings remained consistent. In 
particular, the first succession event increases the subsidiary’s probability of being 
profitable by 4% and the second succession event increases the subsidiary’s 
probability of being profitable by 3%. The effect with every succession continues to 




likely to disappoint. Meanwhile, the positive (Beta = 0.42) and significant (p-value = .018) 
coefficient of Prior Change in Model 5 lends a strong support to Hypothesis 3. In this case, by 
calculating the odds ratio, I found that the odds of subsidiary exit with every GM change will 
increase by a factor of 1.52. Taken together, I can conclude that the continual subsidiary GM 
change can improve subsidiary performance in the short term, but will be detrimental to firm 
performance and survival in the long term.  
With respect to the strategic value of succession patterns, I found that the coefficient of 
Gradual Localizers is negative (Beta = -0.59) and significant (p-value = .003) in Model 5, 
lending support to Hypothesis 4 that the exit likelihood of gradual localizers is lower than that of 
subsidiaries only deploying HCN GMs or only using PCN GMs. Specifically, by calculating the 
odds ratio, the result shows that there is a 45 percent decrease in the odds of subsidiary exit with 
this specific succession pattern. Gradual integration does not provide the same result in terms of 
the effect size and t statistics, though it is still marginally meaningful in a statistical sense. To 
test the effect of succession patterns on subsidiary profitability, I changed Model 4 into a 
random-effects model and replaced PCN with Succession Patterns. The separate analysis showed 
that the coefficient of Gradual Integrators is negative (Beta = -0.50) and significant (p-value 
= .056). Taken together, these findings support that gradual integration and gradual localization 
are not equifinal.  
DISCUSSION 
My analysis showed that the evolutionary perspective can be usefully extended to the 
subsidiary GM’s value creation potential through a focus on the GM succession dynamics. In so 
doing, I develop a temporal model1 that investigates long-term issues in subsidiary GM staffing. 
 




I therefore extend the extant research on foreign subsidiary GM staffing (e.g., Harzing, 2001; 
Peng & Beamish, 2007; Schotter & Beamish, 2011b) towards a dynamic perspective. 
Concurrently, I also bring to the fore the parenting role of MNEs, which seems more or less 
absent in evolutionary theory (Forsgren, 2017; Foss & Pedersen, 2019), thus further enhancing 
evolutionary theory’s relevance to practice.   
I address two theoretical inconsistencies in current succession research and bring to light 
the intrinsic compatibility among them. The results showed that as decision makers in MNEs 
accumulate succession experience within a subsidiary, the probability of further GM change 
decreases. This empirically confirms that MNEs are adaptive and learning institutions, where 
changes initiate learning (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003) and (higher-level) learning in turn reduces 
the need for further changes (Cook & Yanow, 1993). But at the same time, the findings also 
showed the dynamic nature of learning within MNEs. As prior change within a subsidiary 
concurrently reduces the marginal costs of making similar change decisions, organizational 
learning can shift from higher-level to lower-level. As a result, the momentum for further change 
will be accelerated. Taken together, the results enabled me to address the call to investigate the 
direction of endogenous change (Feldman & Pentland, 2003), and empirically corroborate the 
supposition that as path dependence evolves, the positive dynamics continue until self-
reinforcing process winds up in a lock-in trap (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2020).  
Meanwhile, my analysis links organizational learning and strategy research (Crossan & 
Berdrow, 2003) and provides a step forward in resolving the succession adaptation-disruption 
 
importance of the role of spatial dimension in knowledge creation and transfer (Kogut & Zander, 1995) and the 
behavioral implications (Foss & Pedersen, 2019). Empirically, I found that general succession experience 
accumulated outside the subsidiary but within the MNE will also accelerate the momentum for further GM change 
in the focal subsidiary. This further corroborates the notion that an integration scheme that overlooks context can be 




paradox. On one hand, the results demonstrated that replicating a behavioral pattern can damage 
the organization in the future (Sydow et al., 2009) and continual GM change has a disruptive 
nature (Schepker et al., 2017). But I do not take an overly-negative stance here. Instead, the 
longitudinal analysis showed that there exists a middle ground where inertia is countered and 
learning is sustained. 
The results also highlighted the importance of succession patterns. The findings revealed 
that the localization of an integrated subsidiary and the integration of a localized subsidiary are 
not equifinal. My theory is that the administrative heritage formed at subsidiary founding can be 
either a great asset or a significant liability, depending on both the initial subsidiary GM staffing 
decision and subsequent adjustments. In so doing, the analysis can simultaneously extend the 
study of Beamish and Inkpen (1998) by investigating “when” deploying HCN GMs is 
beneficial2; the work of Hébert et al. (2005) by furthering the contingency thinking on “when” 
using PCN managers can enhance subsidiary survival; the work of Sekiguchi et al. (2011) by 
providing longitudinal evidence for the advantage of using PCN GMs at subsidiary founding; 
and the work of Riaz et al. (2014) by differentiating the role of dynamically deploying high-level 
managers from that of other subsidiary employees in organizational performance.  
Managerial Implications 
This study has several ramifications for practitioners. Increasingly, some new narratives 
seem to support the notion of boss-less organization (e.g., Hamel, 2011). To answer the question 
about whether leaders matter (Friedman, 2017), my answer is yes. However, in an era when the 
risk of selecting the wrong candidate is greater than any time in the past (Donatiello, Larcker, & 
 
2 I concur that opportunism of HCN GMs is an important micro-foundational assumption (Müllner et al., 2017). But 





Tayan, 2018), overly relying on GM succession routines, though enabling MNE managers to 
economize on the costs of change, can be problematic. They may ultimately lock the focal 
subsidiary into a continual GM change process. MNEs thus need to know when associated 
problems will outweigh the benefits of relying on succession routines.  
Understanding the succession momentum issue is crucial, as continual GM change can 
harm subsidiary performance and reduce the likelihood of subsidiary survival. To avoid the 
downside risk and capture the upside potential of successions, there are two possible solutions: 
keeping the number of succession events in the focal subsidiary low; or, following the gradual 
localization trajectory. Such a succession strategy is also timely, given that the COVID-19 
pandemic renders the idea of an upward trajectory of international assignments highly unlikely 
(Caligiuri et al., 2020). Therefore, gradually shifting to HCN GMs makes good business sense. 
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
This study is not without limitations, and therefore raises many new research issues. First, 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I am not able to conduct close-up field observations or to 
participate in management meetings on site. Future research may apply more refined and 
contextualized qualitative research methods to depict a fuller picture of succession decision 
making. Meanwhile, to continue with this line of inquiry quantitively, I suggest that researchers 
could test how other contingencies moderate the factors underlying my conceptualization. 
Contingent factors, for example, might include the subsidiary GM’s turnover reason, time 
horizon, entrepreneurial leadership, managerial discretion, and compatibility (Chen & Hambrick, 
2012; Georgakakis & Ruigrok, 2017; Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; Karaevli, 2007; Matta & 
Beamish, 2008; Sarabi, Froese, Chng, & Meyer, 2020). All of these are useful to address the 




quantitative inquiry (Meyer et al., 2020). At a more macro level, future work can incorporate 
power and attention dynamics, the subsidiary’s network structure and its content. All of these 
factors can facilitate or impede learning, and thus influence the change in routines (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012; Reagans & McEvily, 2003).  
Second, this study assumes that exit from a foreign market is a manifestation of firm 
instability, as exit usually indicates a failure in achieving management’s original goal for the 
business (Murray et al., 2012), where almost 90% of exits are unplanned (Makino et al., 2007). 
In some cases, however, non-survival does not indicate failure (Mata & Portugal, 2015). 
Therefore, it would be fruitful for future studies on this topic to investigate the micro-
foundations underlying subsidiary exit and failure. 
Third, the large-sample quantitative analysis only focused on a single home country, Japan. 
Similar to previous studies (Delios & Makino, 2003), the use of a single-nation sample may limit 
the generalizability of the findings. As a country with one of the oldest populations in the world, 
Japan is struggling with its ability to find sufficient numbers of expatriates (Beamish & Inkpen, 
1998; Briscoe, Schuler, & Claus, 2009) and is reluctant to use TCNs (Tungli & Peiperl, 2009). 
Also, for some Japanese employees, the intended length of stay abroad can be longer than most 
expatriates stay abroad (McNulty & Brewster, 2017). Meanwhile, the nature of the employment 
relationship and the collectivist sociocultural orientation all result in much more incremental 
evolutionary changes within Japanese organizations (Beechler et al., 1998; Sakano & Lewin, 
1999). This implies that the influence of previous GM successions may not be as strongly 
manifest as otherwise expected in the change of incumbent GMs. 
CONCLUSION 




with Schepker et al. (2017), I concur that the theoretical fragmentation in current succession 
research is not problematic but an opportunity. In this spirit, I leveraged the distinctiveness of 
MNEs and a micro-foundational mixed-methods approach to address inconsistencies in the 
extant GM succession literature. I then took an evolutionary perspective to extend the theory of 
subsidiary GM successions and develop a process-based theoretical argument that links 
individuals in leadership with various subsidiary-level outcomes (Meyer et al., 2020). I found, 
first, the deceleration and acceleration momentum for further GM change can take place 
sequentially; and second, the continual GM change can be both adaptive and disruptive. The 
central message from these higher-order relationships is that the pace and path of foreign 
subsidiary GM successions matter, as they can affect the future succession dynamics in the 
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CHAPTER 3: MNE ATTENTION AND GENERAL MANAGER SUCCESSION IN 
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES (ESSAY 2) 
INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 crisis has pushed senior managers in multinational enterprises (MNEs) to 
reconsider the key questions as to whether they have the right people in the right places 
(Caligiuri, De Cieri, Minbaeva, Verbeke, & Zimmermann, 2020). The pandemic exposed an old 
problem, that is, there are talented managers as well as poor performers in foreign subsidiaries 
remaining in “blind spots” (Mellahi & Collings, 2010), which in turn impacts the subsidiary 
competitive advantages (Meyer, Li, & Schotter, 2020; O’Brien, Scott, Andersson, Ambos, & Fu, 
2019). One underlying cause of this problem is that an MNE is usually unable to attend to all of 
its foreign subsidiaries (Belenzon, Hashai, & Patacconi, 2019; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a), 
as the intra-organizational networks of the MNE are characterized by separation through time, 
space, culture, and language (Ambos & Ambos, 2009).  
Gaining MNE attention, which is a reflection of foreign subsidiaries’ power (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008a, 2008b) and more expansive roles (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010), enables 
foreign subsidiaries to obtain more resources (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000). On the other hand, 
however, gaining MNE attention may also increase headquarters’ monitoring (Andersson, 
Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Mudambi & Pedersen, 2007). Here, monitoring refers to the 
implementation of routinized control mechanisms, such as replacing managers (Ambos, 
Andersson, & Birkinshaw, 2010) who are viewed as important attentional carriers (Ocasio, 
2011). Indeed, anecdotal evidence indicates that the efforts of the foreign subsidiary to gain 
power and attention may lead to MNE intervention and the replacement of management when 




Concurrently, however, considerable evidence in the strategic management literature exists 
that managerial power is one of the central elements in the succession decision-making process 
(Finkelstein, 1992). Specifically, researchers have shown that a downturn in performance may 
trigger GM turnover in domestic subsidiaries (Blackwell, Brickley, & Weisbach, 1994; McNeil, 
Niehaus, & Powers, 2004) and that power-dependence is a major source of indeterminacy that 
affects the performance–succession link (Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 
1988; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980). The central argument in this line of 
research is that the existing GM in a poorly performing organization in a domestic setting can 
leverage strategic configurations in order to defer succession. Rooted in the strategic 
contingencies perspective of subunit3 power (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 
1971), Drazin and Rao (1999) term this the performance–power–succession model. 
The foregoing inconsistency suggests that the extant models based on single-country 
studies may need adaptation in order to inform foreign subsidiary GM succession (Müllner, 
Klopf, & Nell, 2017). However, there is a lack of international examination of the power–
succession link (Pi & Lowe, 2011). To develop a more predictive theory and better utilize the 
distinctiveness of the MNE context for theory building, I use a pluralistic methodology (Van de 
Ven, 2007) to contrast the MNE attention perspective (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008a; Monteiro, 2015) with the strategic contingencies perspective (Drazin & Rao, 
1999; Hickson et al., 1971) to investigate the relationship between foreign subsidiary 
performance and subsidiary GM succession. Therefore, the question which guides this research 
is: How do strategic configurations that potentially affect MNE attention and foreign subsidiary 
 





GM power moderate the relationship between poor subsidiary performance and subsidiary GM 
succession?  
International business (IB) scholars have stressed that one advantage that MNEs have over 
single country firms is that they can tap into a globally diverse pool of talent (Mellahi & 
Collings, 2010). This defining feature implies that the substitutability of incumbent subsidiary 
GMs is higher than that of general managers in a domestic setting. In actuality, however, not all 
senior MNE managers can leverage such substitutability advantage to facilitate GM successions 
in their foreign subsidiaries. Premised on the notion that knowledge is crucial for the exercise of 
power (Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 2005), I suggest that only MNEs that have effective 
monitoring channels may better exploit their hierarchical power to outweigh the moderation 
effect of subsidiary GM power on the performance–succession link. Following prior research 
(Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Monteiro, 2015), I adopted a mixed-methods approach. In 
parallel with the literature review and deductive theorizing process, I conducted 39 formal 
interviews (and six follow-up interviews) with MNE decision makers, subsidiary GMs, and the 
members of the top management. This qualitative inquiry (described in Appendix) enabled me to 
use the deeper understanding of the phenomenon to better inform my hypotheses development.  
I argue that while GMs of foreign subsidiaries may accrue power from their subsidiaries’ 
relative strength within MNEs and the strategic significance of the host country market, the 
strong strategic position of the foreign subsidiary may also enhance MNE monitoring, which in 
turn facilitates subsidiary GM changes. I term this the performance–attention–succession model. 
This model can also be used to explain why the high expatriate ratio in a subsidiary strengthens 
the link between poor subsidiary performance and GM change. I show that only when there are 




performance–power–succession model work (but the effect size here appears to be small). I test 
the hypotheses, which are both theoretically derived and empirically informed, by using a fixed-
effects longitudinal analysis of 1,153 Japanese subsidiary firms between 1991 and 2013. I also 
show that changing the GM in a poorly performing subsidiary can effectively turn around the 
subsidiary’s performance.  
This study aims to make the following contributions to research and practice. First, it 
challenges the performance–power–succession model by demonstrating the intriguing double 
effect of strategic configurations, which can lead to disparate succession consequences. Thus, it 
enables me to advance the theory by using an alternative explanatory mechanism (Roth & 
Kostova, 2003) to explain more fully the performance–succession association in the unique 
context of MNEs. Second, it addresses the call to theoretically and empirically investigate the 
issue of negative headquarters attention (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). Also, by using 
temporal progressions of activities as elements of explanation (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & 
Van de Ven, 2013), I show the long-term gains of this negative intervention.  
Next, I first review the literature on GM succession. I then present my framework and 
hypotheses. After discussing the quantitative data, the measures, and the model, I present my 
quantitative analysis results and their implications for theory and practice. 
THEORY BACKGROUND  
Performance–Power–Succession Model 
Poor organizational performance will likely lead to a change in corporate GMs (Boeker, 
1992; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Li, 2018; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) 
and to a change in GMs in domestic subsidiaries (Blackwell et al., 1994; McNeil et al., 2004). 




2009), and firm performance maintains its heritage as a critical succession antecedent 
(Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005).  
However, the relationship between performance and succession is not as direct as it seems 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980). The source of indeterminacy derives from 
a variety of sociopolitical forces that intervene between performance and the change of GM 
(Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, & Bresser, 2016; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Examples in this regard 
may include the entrenchment of the incumbent and the availability of candidates. In brief, when 
an incumbent controls critical resources, or candidates are not readily available, the GM can 
proactively accrue power in order to defer succession in a poorly performing organization 
(Boeker, 1992).  
This performance–power–succession model has also been applied to the study of other 
types of executive roles. For example, Drazin and Rao (1999) explored the power bases of 
strategic business unit (SBU) managers. Specifically, the authors built their model around the 
strategic contingencies perspective of subunit power to highlight the implications for succession 
research at a subunit level (Hickson et al., 1971).  
Strategic Contingencies Perspective Versus MNE Attention Perspective 
Hickson et al. (1971) focused on structural sources of intra-organizational power. 
Grounded in a power-dependence view (Emerson, 1962), the authors argued that the centrality of 
workflows, the substantiality of activities, and the ability to cope with critical uncertainties 
determine the variation in interdependence between subunits. In a sense, power is the ability of 
one subunit to affect organizational decisions in ways that lead to outcomes favorable to the 
subunit (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Such subunit power can also result in more conservative 




ideas advanced by Hickson and his colleagues, Drazin and Rao (1999) found that the critical 
contingencies (e.g., revenue or market share) controlled by the incumbent SBU manager interact 
with poor subunit performance to either increase or decrease the probability of GM succession.  
The similar power bases have also been tested in studies of other political dynamics inside 
multiunit firms, such as the divestiture of formerly acquired subunits (Xia & Li, 2013). Along 
with the development of the interdependence-based approach, a market-dependence-based 
approach to identifying subunit power has begun to gain momentum (e.g., Xia, Yu, & Lin, 
2019). In this new strand of research, the exchange of resources (Jacobs, 1974) is no longer 
viewed as a necessary condition for a subunit to shape its power base. Instead, the relative 
importance of the market in which the subunit operates suffices to determine its power (Xia et 
al., 2019). 
Integrating the foregoing two approaches and in the setting of MNEs, Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw (2008a) pointed out that both the host-country market significance and the 
subsidiary’s relative strength within the MNE can confer power to the subsidiary. In turn, this 
power can enable the subsidiary to gain parental attention. However, the authors also used the 
example of 3M Canada to stress that attention from headquarters is not always positive, as it may 
lead to drastic interventions from MNEs such as the replacement of management when a 
subsidiary’s performance disappoints. Subsidiaries can also gain power and thus attention by 
taking initiatives (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b; Delany, 2000). But Ambos et al. (2010) 
stressed that MNEs might also be more likely to replace managers in the subsidiaries that took 
initiatives (and therefore are closely monitored by their MNEs). These arguments stand in sharp 
contrast with the predictions based on the performance–power–succession model. As I discuss in 




influences of structural determinants, which will lead MNE attention and subsidiary GM power 
to co-vary. However, MNE attention and subsidiary GM power will result in different GM 
succession consequences in poorly performing foreign subsidiaries. To gain a more complete and 
accurate understanding of the performance–succession relationship in the setting of foreign 
subsidiaries, this study theorizes about these opposing mechanisms simultaneously. These two 
mechanisms share a same baseline, which I will introduce in the next section.  
Foreign Subsidiary Performance and Subsidiary GM Succession  
IB scholars argue that the role of foreign subsidiary GMs is intricate and challenging 
(Bartlett & Beamish, 2018). To form routines that are the crucial determinant of firms aligning 
with a new environment, foreign subsidiary GMs should simultaneously understand the MNE’s 
agenda in the host country and the local business culture (Elg, Ghauri, Child, & Collinson, 
2017). The strategic value of foreign subsidiary GMs, coupled with the challenges imposed on 
the subsidiary GM role, may subject the performance of foreign subsidiary GMs to great 
scrutiny by MNEs. Indeed, decision makers at the headquarters are found to be more sensitive 
to subsidiary GM performance than board members are to CEO performance in standalone 
firms (McNeil et al., 2004).  
When the performance turns subpar, foreign subsidiary GM succession will offer the 
MNE a great opportunity to regain fit between the environment and the subsidiary and between 
the MNE and the subsidiary (Friedman, 2017; O’Brien et al., 2019; Ocasio, 1999). As regional 
CEO 2 of a large Israeli MNE explained: “I use subsidiary GM successions as a way to grow.” 
At the same time the poorly performing subsidiary will be more vulnerable to pressure from the 
MNE to conform (Ferner, Edwards, & Tempel, 2012). Therefore, GM succession is found to be 




reveal that poor subsidiary performance did lead to the change of the subsidiary GM in MNEs 
from Finland, Sweden, South Korea, The US, China, Israel, and Singapore. The director of the 
Singapore MNE said: “The poor performance is the top reason to change the subsidiary GM.” 
Also, the subsidiary HR manager from a US MNE told us: “When performance was poor…it is 
normal that the GM would be changed.” Taking previous empirical findings and the qualitative 
data as the starting point, therefore, I treat the higher GM succession probability in poorly 
performing foreign subsidiaries as the baseline going forward.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Following Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008a), I integrate the market-based approach with 
the interdependence-based approach to argue that two types of structural factors may impact 
MNEs’ attention and subsidiary GM power, which will in turn affect subsidiary GM succession. 
They are the structure of the host-country market in which the subsidiary operates (hereafter, the 
external structure) and the structure of the MNE’s intra-organizational network (hereafter, the 
internal structure). Figure 1 demonstrates the organizing framework of this essay. Through a 




Figure 1: Organizing Framework
 
The external part of the subsidiary network can be used to form the base for the 
subsidiary’s influence within the MNE (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Andersson et al., 2007). 
By definition, an MNE “is an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
owns or, in some way, controls value-added activities in more than one country” (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008: 3). It has been established that FDI will be directed to host countries where the 
market is large, resources are rich, or assets are strategically important (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Narula, 2015). The extent of capital flows from the MNE tend to be greater for subsidiaries 
operating in larger national markets (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991), for which the MNE may 
have high hopes (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). As criticality measures the organization’s ability 
to continue functioning in the absence of the market (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), I would expect 
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MNEs. I concur that the MNE is likely to put more weight on subsidiaries that are currently 
operating in the most important markets (Xia et al., 2019), but this does not preclude the 
possibility that the MNE will keep a close eye on those subsidiaries operating in high-FDI 
countries, which hold great potential to develop into the new core of the MNE’s portfolio. 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008a) suggest that the presence of other foreign MNEs may signal an 
agglomeration effect that can enhance the MNE’s competitiveness in the future or may signal the 
availability of critical location-specific advantages. On this basis, the strategic contingencies 
perspective may thus posit that a subsidiary GM can accrue power from the market criticality 
and thus be more likely to remain in office when the subsidiary performance disappoints.   
At the same time, however, some MNEs in my data have developed a pool of subsidiary 
GM candidates over time. For example, subsidiary GM 8 said, “When the next succession is 
needed and when we do have available and qualified candidates on hand, the succession will 
occur smoothly.” Occasionally MNEs also expatriate GM candidates internally. As Regional 
GM 3 noted, “When internal candidates within the subsidiary are not readily available, we will 
transfer some GM candidates from other subsidiaries to the focal subsidiary.” Therefore, given 
the MNE’s inherent advantage in tapping into a globally diverse pool of talent (Mellahi & 
Collings, 2010), the higher substitutability of the incumbent subsidiary GM relative to general 
managers in a domestic setting suggests that MNEs may possess the hierarchical power or a 
“parenting advantage” which outweighs the power of the subsidiary GM, facilitating subsidiary 
GM succession when the subsidiary performance disappoints. To successfully exercise such 
power, however, I argue that the means-end relationship needs to be clear and unambiguous. 
But an MNE may encounter difficulties in monitoring the subsidiary’s operation in a high-




2001; Kano & Verbeke, 2019), the subsidiary as a knowledge broker can sustain its power by 
leveraging the market knowledge gap (Griffith & Harvey, 2001; Holm, Johanson, & Thilenius, 
1995). This gap refers to the knowledge difference between the subsidiary and the MNE in 
relation to the host-country market and local business networks. As HR manager 1 explained: “It 
is natural that GMs who have power, can prolong their tenures…The GM in China, though 
disengaged for quite a while, can still remain in office…because he has channel information that 
the HQs has no clue about.” When MNE managers know little about the subsidiary’s local 
networks and its business environment, the MNE is not in a strong position to act hierarchically 
(Andersson et al., 2007; Vahlne, Schweizer, & Johanson, 2012). I therefore argue that when a 
subsidiary performs poorly in a host-country market that attracts a large amount of FDI, the 
existing subsidiary GM is less likely to be replaced and the MNE is more likely to attribute the 
subsidiary’s problems to market conditions. This is because high FDI inflows into a host country 
stimulate competition (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Caves, 1971), which may result in three 
outcomes: the complexity of the host-country environment will increase, rendering local 
knowledge even more critical (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994, 1997); the MNE will be more likely to 
receive noisy information, thus the ambiguity of the means–ends relationship will be greater; and 
more spaces are left for “skillful interpretations” by subsidiary GMs. Therefore:   
Hypothesis 1: Host country FDI inflows will moderate (decrease) the performance–
succession relationship such that GM succession is less likely to occur in the poorly performing 
subsidiary when the host country receives high FDI inflows. 
Implicit in the above theorizing is an assumption that decision makers with bounded 
rationality and limited attentional capacity may only be able to closely monitor a specific 




1989). Indeed, in the host country context, an MNE may pay more attention to the actions of 
other MNEs from the same nation (Chang & Park, 2005). MNEs from the same home 
country represent a distinct organizational population (i.e., country-of-origin 
agglomeration), as they share the same language, culture, and institutional background. The 
linkages lead to interorganizational effects, encouraging imitative behavior (Guillén, 2002) 
and inferential (or vicarious) learning (Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2014; Yang, Li, & 
Delios, 2015). To illustrate how MNEs scan the host-country environment, Tan and Meyer 
(2011) found that the country-of-origin agglomeration, relative to the industry 
agglomeration, is more likely to provide an effective channel for the sharing of knowledge. 
Similarly, co-ethnic support (i.e., support from country-of-origin MNEs that operate in the 
same host country) is found to significantly affect MNEs’ location choices, expansion speed, 
and survival (Kalnins & Chung, 2006; Stallkamp, Pinkham, Schotter, & Buchel, 2017). At a 
micro level, research has also shown that the concentration of same-nationality immigrants 
can influence an MNE’s operations (Hernandez, 2014). The underlying mechanism shared 
by these studies is that homophily or affiliation ties resulting from a common nationality can 
facilitate knowledge exchanges (Lawrence & Shah, 2020; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & 
Cook, 2001).  
Meanwhile, many studies have found that the industrial background is the defining 
feature of reference groups in the business world (e.g., Chang & Park, 2005; Chen & Miller, 
2007; Greve, 1998; Posen, Keil, Kim, & Meissner, 2018). Similarities in the industrial 
knowledge base can help the focal organization measure and value knowledge from other 
companies more effectively (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Combining this argument with the 




host country (i.e., competitors sharing the same industry background and country of origin 
as the focal subsidiary) positively influences the MNE’s ability to acquire critical knowledge 
about the host-country market situation and the relevant business networks (customers or 
suppliers). The reason is that the activities of these competitors collectively provide detailed 
information about the underlying reality. As supply chain manager 1 of a US MNE noted: 
“Our MNE mainly competes in China with other US companies. AD, TX…So, telling a false 
story about the China market is very difficult (for the subsidiary managers).”  
HR manager 2 also told me that her MNE focuses more on the country-of-origin 
competitors, because “the technology started from the US…So there are similarities 
between us… Our (country-of-origin) competitor is number one in this field...and we are 
number two.” Similarly, the interview data show that an Israeli irrigation MNE chooses 
other Israeli companies to compare in the host country “because Israeli products have high 
quality, we focus more on Israeli competitors, and then local ones.”  
As a result, while the presence of country-of-origin competitors might also signal the 
criticality of the host country market from which the subsidiary GM can accrue power, it can 
simultaneously broaden the MNE’s information channel that is used to monitor the 
subsidiary. This theoretically derived and empirically grounded argument is consistent with 
Foss and Pedersen’s (2019) micro-foundational theorizing that stimuli embedded in the 
more proximal context have stronger behavioral implications. The second hypothesis reads,  
Hypothesis 2: The country-of-origin competitors in the host country will moderate 
(increase) the performance–succession relationship such that GM succession is more likely to 
occur in the poorly performing subsidiary when the number of country-of-origin competitors in 




I turn my attention now to the internal structure of MNEs by adopting an interdependence-
based approach. The relative strength of the foreign subsidiary compared to the rest of the MNE 
positively affects the subsidiary’s ability to obtain resources from the environment (Andersson & 
Forsgren, 2000), as it increases the amount of the MNE’s positive attention that follows in its 
direction (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Collings, Mellahi, & Cascio, 2019). As the stock of 
distinctive resources increases in the subsidiary, the relative power of the subsidiary further 
increases (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). In this regard, if I follow the 
logic of strategic contingencies perspective, I can then posit that the relative strength of the 
subsidiary in the form of revenue controlled by the subsidiary can be leveraged by the subsidiary 
GM to gain power in order to mitigate the turnover risks when the subsidiary performance 
becomes poor (Drazin & Rao, 1999). 
However, my empirical observations suggest a different view. As subsidiary PR manager 1 
of the Singapore MNE noted: “Due to the importance of the market (because of the high 
revenue) and the company’s role inside (the MNE)…our subsidiary’s performance is under great 
scrutiny from HQs…The financial reports are reviewed (by the HQs) on a daily basis…We have 
changed 16-17 subsidiary GMs in the past 17 years.” 
Indeed, prior studies have also shown that a large operation might increase the parent’s 
influence over the subsidiary’s personnel policies (e.g., Youssef, 1973). Given the 
interdependencies between powerful subsidiaries and MNEs (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991), it 
seems likely that the flipside of possessing a conspicuous position within an MNE is that when 
the performance of the important subsidiary is poor, the MNE will also have a great deal at stake. 
Meanwhile, as powerful subsidiaries may engage in rent-seeking behaviors (Mudambi & 




to undermine such subsidiaries’ influence (Andersson et al., 2007), or to tap into the subsidiaries’ 
store of specialized knowledge (O’Donnell, 2000). Also, it seems likely that the relative strength 
of the subsidiary will render its operations more observable, which will in turn facilitate the 
MNE’s scrutiny. This suggests that subsidiary visibility has a double-edged nature (Yamin & 
Andersson, 2011). In contrast with Drazin and Rao (1999), I therefore argue that when the poorly 
performing subsidiary controls a high portion of the MNE revenue, the MNE will be more likely 
to replace the subsidiary GM in order to turn the subsidiary’s performance around. Formally: 
Hypothesis 3: The foreign subsidiary revenue will moderate (increase) the performance–
succession relationship such that GM succession is more likely to occur in the poorly performing 
subsidiary when the subsidiary controls a high portion of MNE revenue.  
The second factor in the internal structure dimension is the deployment of expatriate in 
the foreign subsidiary. Considering the role of expatriates in controlling the subsidiary on 
behalf of MNE headquarters (Collings, Scullion, & Dowling, 2009; Shin, Hasse, & Schotter, 
2017), the relative use of expatriates might also indicate the importance of the subsidiary. As 
sales manager 1 explained: “(The host country) is the largest overseas market for our T 
product... Expatriates can make up to 70 % of the staff.” In contrast, the deputy GM based in 
the UK noted, “This subsidiary used to be a small subsidiary (and thus had very few 
expatriates), so we just let it grow freely. We didn’t have any requirements.” In this case, then, 
the strategic contingencies perspective may posit that the power of the GM when the subsidiary 
has more expatriates might be higher than that of GMs when the subsidiary has fewer 
expatriates, thus potentially weakening the poor performance–succession link.  
However, the deployment of expatriates can also directly strengthen MNE monitoring 




expatriates may know more about the MNE’s culture, and thereby can more effectively 
facilitate communication with the headquarters and align the subsidiary’s operations with the 
interests of the MNE. Relatedly, prior studies have shown that expatriates as trusted informants 
can enable the MNEs’ gathering of information and active learning (e.g., Plourde et al., 2014). 
My empirical observations support this view. As an expatriate explained, “The subsidiary GM 
got involved in many fraud issues, which remained unnoticed until I was expatriated to the UK 
office.” Similarly, as sales manager 1 of a Korean MNE noted, “expatriates have direct 
communications with the HQs”, indicating the smooth flow of information. More than that, the 
accuracy of information is also enhanced with the use of expatriates. As Regional CEO 3 noted: 
“If the outcome is poor, then the deputy GM (who is an expatriate) will check with the 
subsidiary CEO about whether the process follows the HQs’ guidelines.” Based on extant 
literature as well as my empirical data, therefore, I anticipate that the higher the expatriate ratio 
in the foreign subsidiary, the more effective the MNE monitoring can be. Derived from the 
MNE attention perspective, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: The expatriate ratio in the foreign subsidiary will moderate (increase) the 
performance–succession relationship such that GM succession is more likely to occur in the 
poorly performing subsidiary when the subsidiary’s expatriate ratio is high. 
QUANTITATIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Data 
For the quantitative analysis, I use the Toyo Keizai NEEDS Merged Database (1991–
2013). Same as in Essay 1, to maintain the consistency of data and to control for influences due 
to conflicts within Japanese parent firms, I only study foreign subsidiaries in which there is no 




Consistent with FASB protocols, a foreign subsidiary here refers to a company in which the 
Japanese MNE has at least a 20 percent ownership stake. Some subsidiaries have operated in the 
host countries for many years before they first appeared in the dataset. Same as in Essay 1, I drop 
subsidiaries that had already operated in the host countries for more than two years when they 
first appeared in the dataset. Finally, I remove subsidiaries in which the number of employees 
has never exceeded nine to ensure the database does not include small representative offices or 
agencies.  
Model 
Because recurrence times within each subsidiary should not be modelled as independent 
(Beck, Brüderl, & Woywode, 2008), I use a fixed-effects logit model4 to partial out the 
unobserved subsidiary heterogeneity in the propensity to change the GMs. The succession of 
each subsidiary GM is assumed to follow the function below: 








	$!" = 1[)!"+ + >! + 5!" > 0] 
In the foregoing function, 9 represents a subsidiary, : refers to time. I use ;!" to mean a 
succession event in the subsidiary, )!" as the vector of independent variables and control 
variables, and +	as the coefficients associated with these variables. In this model, the errors 5!" 
are assumed to be exogenous to all independent variables and >! is the time-invariant unobserved 
firm-specific variance that can be correlated to the independent variables, i.e., Cov	(>! , )!") ≠ 0. 
By using a fixed-effects model, I can partial out the unobservable variance >! (Allison, 2009). 
 






Dependent variable. Same as in Essay 1, I follow the approach of Beck et al. (2008) to 
identify the successions at each observation. The binary variable, Succession, represents the 
change of subsidiary GMs. 1 means that a GM change takes place, and 0 otherwise.  
Independent variables. The annual assessment of the subsidiary’s financial performance is 
from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran. This variable is argued to be an appropriate performance 
indicator (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2000). I recode this profit measure into a binary 
variable termed Subpar Performance, where 1 means low performance, and 0 means otherwise.   
Competitors is a discrete variable referring to the number of country-of-origin competitors 
(i.e., Japanese subsidiaries with different parents) in the host country where the focal subsidiary 
operates. These country-of-origin competitors use the same industry (four-digit) code as that of 
the focal subsidiary. Because log transformation cannot be applied to zero values this essay takes 
the square root of the number of country-of-origin competitors to reduce right skewness. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Shin et al., 2017) and same as in Essay 1, Expatriate Ratio is 
the number of expatriates in a subsidiary divided by the total number of employees in the 
subsidiary. 0 means there is no expatriate in the subsidiary while 1 suggests that all employees in 
the subsidiary are expatriates. 
I use the intensity of FDI Inflow as a proxy for the market dynamism in a host country. I 
utilize panel data on FDI inflows from the Balance of Payments Database (1991–2013) reported 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This data has been supplemented by data from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources. The World 
Bank defines FDI inflow as direct investment equity flow in the reporting country. Specifically, 




capital, and other capital. In order to provide a more straightforward interpretation, I divide the 
value of this variable by 10 billion. 
Similar to the approach of Drazin and Rao (1999), the relative Revenue Flows controlled 
by the subsidiary is the revenue of the focal subsidiary divided by the total revenue received by 
all subsidiaries of the MNE. This measure denotes the strategic importance of the subsidiary 
within the MNE. The higher the value, the more important the subsidiary is deemed to be.  
Control variables. First and as mentioned earlier, when given alternatives, an MNE can 
undercut the unique value of the subsidiary GM, and thus reduce the power of the subsidiary GM 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). The power of the incumbent will in part depend on the availability of 
suitable substitutes (Drazin & Rao, 1999), as power will not organize around abundant resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Therefore, when there is a lack of supply of GM candidates, it is 
expected that incumbents will be less likely to leave office (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer & 
Moore, 1980). Because MNEs may prefer to internally transfer rather than newly hire a 
subsidiary GM for the focal subsidiary (Kopp, 1994), and internal turnover is apparently more 
common in MNEs than in domestic firms (Naumann, 1992), I would expect that the number of 
subsidiaries belonging to the same MNE in a host country will influence the substitutability of 
the subsidiary GM. When the MNE looks for a new subsidiary GM to turn a poorly performing 
subsidiary around, it might be more willing and able to first look at whether there are candidates 
within the intra-firm subsidiary grouping. Logically, the larger the intra-firm subsidiary 
grouping, the more likely the MNE will find an internal successor. To measure the size of the 
intra-firm subsidiary grouping, I create a variable called Sister Subsidiaries, which is a discrete 
variable denoting the number of sister subsidiaries in the host country where the focal subsidiary 




Second, in line with Drazin and Rao (1999), I control for subsidiary GM’s Tenure. It refers 
to how many years the subsidiary GM has been in office. I use this variable to control for the 
subsidiary GM’s entrenchment, because new subsidiary GMs may face a higher risk of power 
contests in the early years of their tenure (Pi & Lowe, 2011; Shen & Cannella, 2002a), thus being 
more likely to leave office. In this essay, this variable is log-transformed.  
Third, as mentioned in Essay 1, the mode of entry may affect the availability of GM 
candidates, and thus affecting GM succession. I control for Entry Mode which is a categorical 
variable denoting a firm’s mode of entry. Same as in Essay 1, 1 here denotes a WOS, 2 is a 
Majority Owned IJV (i.e., MNE dominated IJV), 3 means an Equally Owned IJV, and 4 a 
Minority Owned IJV. I define a subsidiary as a majority owned IJV when the Japanese partner 
holds more than 50 percent of the IJV’s equity ownership while the local partner holds more than 
20 percent of the IJV’s equity ownership. Consistent with FASB protocols, I define a subsidiary 
as a WOS when the MNE holds more than 80 percent of the subsidiary’s equity ownership. 
Fourth, the origin of the existing GM may influence the succession probability because the 
length of stay abroad of many expatriates has been specified a priori (Harvey & Moeller, 2009; 
Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2008). Therefore, I control for the subsidiary GM’s origin. 
PCN GM is a binary variable, where 1 refers to a GM who is a Japanese, and 0 means otherwise.  
Fifth, prior studies showed that the number of subsidiary employees might also influence 
the importance of the subsidiary (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). I thus use the number of 
subsidiary employees as a proxy for Subsidiary Size and take the square root of the variable to 
reduce right skewness. Similarly, I control for the size of the MNE. Based on the European 
Commission’s definition, I regard a firm as a Large MNE if it has more than 500 employees. 




2004), I control for the logarithm of Subsidiary Age. Meanwhile the quadratic term Subsidiary 
Age Squared is added here in order to identify the potential curvilinear relationship between 
subsidiary age and subsidiary GM change. As mentioned in Essay 1, both younger and older 
subsidiaries, albeit for different reasons, might be less likely to change the GMs. I also control 
for the period from Year 1991 to 2013. I code this variable into a series of dummy variables to 
account for the influence of aggregate time series trends. 
I then use the categorical variable Strategic Motives to account for the heterogeneous 
impact of FDI motives on the change of subsidiary GMs. This variable is coded into 16 dummy 
variables. Relatedly, given that dedicated regional headquarters (RHQs) are also expected to 
perform HQ functions while exercising more extensive mandates (Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, 
& Beamish, 2017), I anticipate that they would gain more attention from the MNE (Belenzon, 
Hashai, et al., 2019). I use a binary variable, Regional HQs, to control for the impact of being an 
RHQ on subsidiary GM succession.  
Finally, to account for other macro-level factors of the host country, I utilize 
Unemployment Ratio data from the International Labour Organization’s ILOSTAT database, the 
Human Capital Index data from the Penn World Table (1991-2013) (Feenstra, Inklaar, & 
Timmer., 2015), and GDP Growth data from World Bank national accounts data and OECD 
National Accounts data files (World Bank, 2019). Also, given that MNEs may shift profit from 
one subsidiary to another in order to reduce their overall tax burden, I account for the effect of 
host country corporate income tax on the subsidiary GM succession activities. Thus, I utilize the 
Tax Rate data from TaxFoundation.org (Farah, Elias, Chakravarty, & Beamish, 2021). Table 7 




Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Successions 0.25 0.43 1.00          
2.Subpar Performance 0.19 0.39 0.01 1.00         
3.FDI Inflow (10 billion) 6.10 8.43 0.02 0.01 1.00        
4.Competitors (sqrt) 4.98 2.80 0.01 -0.01 0.39 1.00       
5.Revenue Flows 0.21 0.31 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.09 1.00      
6.Expatriate Ratio 0.14 0.19 0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 1.00     
7.WOS 0.71 0.46 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.27 1.00    
8.Majority Owned IJV 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.14 -0.55 1.00   
9.Equally Owned IJV 0.04 0.20 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.33 -0.08 1.00  
10.Minority Owned IJV 0.14 0.35 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.10 -0.04 -0.17 -0.62 -0.14 -0.09 1.00 
11.PCN GM 0.81 0.40 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.38 -0.01 -0.17 -0.39 
12.Tenure (log) 0.90 0.69 0.13 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 
13.Subsidiary Age (log) 4.48 0.53 -0.03 -0.23 0.17 0.06 0.04 -0.13 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
14.Subsidiary Size (sqrt) 10.05 10.51 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.13 0.03 -0.40 -0.10 0.04 0.07 0.04 
15.Large MNE 0.75 0.43 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.61 -0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 
16.GDP Growth (%) 5.00 3.96 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.25 -0.03 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.07 0.04 
17.Unemployment Rate (%) 5.03 2.49 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.21 -0.06 0.09 0.14 -0.04 0.02 -0.17 
18.Human Capital Index 2.80 0.56 0.00 0.03 0.36 -0.04 0.06 0.24 0.31 -0.17 -0.05 -0.22 
19.Sister Subsidiaries (sqrt) 1.17 0.35 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.16 -0.19 -0.10 -0.13 0.06 0.10 0.06 
20.Regional HQs 0.03 0.17 0.00 -0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.05 0.16 0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
21.Tax Rate 31.82 7.16 -0.02 0.13 0.22 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 
 
  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11.PCN GM 1.00           
12.Tenure (log) -0.08 1.00          
13.Subsidiary Age (log) 0.02 0.27 1.00         
14.Subsidiary Size (sqrt) -0.04 0.07 0.15 1.00        
15.Large MNE -0.05 0.03 0.10 0.22 1.00       
16.GDP Growth -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.12 0.02 1.00      
17.Unemployment Rate (%) -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.03 -0.28 1.00     
18.Human Capital Index  0.03 0.02 0.19 -0.23 -0.01 -0.46 0.39 1.00    
19.Sister Subsidiaries (sqrt) -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.16 0.17 0.18 -0.04 -0.06 1.00   
20.Regional HQs 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.12 0.02 1.00  
21.Tax Rate -0.07 0.00 -0.12 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 0.34 0.39 0.08 0.04 1.00 







RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
To detect Type 1 errors (Kalnins, 2018), I reran Models 2 to 5 by excluding the 
Competitors variable. The sign and magnitude of the interaction term between Subpar 
Performance and FDI Inflow remained consistent. It is thus unlikely that multicollinearity is 
distorting results.  
As the key independent variables are introduced into the models hierarchically, I found 
consistent empirical supports to my Hypotheses. Table 8 shows the regression results. In models 
1 to 5, all beta coefficients are odds ratios. An odds ratio of 1 means there is no increase in the 
odds of an outcome with a given exposure, 2 means there is a 100 percent increase in the odds of 
an outcome with a given exposure, and 0.8 means there is a 20 percent decrease in the odds of an 















Table 8: Empirical Results for Hypotheses 1–4 (odds ratio) 










Dependent Variable: Successions           
Regressors:           
Control Variables:           
WOS Reference category 
Majority Owned IJV 1.07 (0.755) 1.00 (0.990) 0.99 (0.970) 0.99 (0.973) 0.99 (0.982) 
Equally Owned IJV 1.45 (0.329) 1.47 (0.368) 1.49 (0.357) 1.50 (0.342) 1.53 (0.325) 
Minority Owned IJV 2.10 (0.015) 2.26 (0.022) 2.26 (0.023) 2.31 (0.019) 2.34 (0.017) 
PCN GM 1.26 (0.100) 1.24 (0.170) 1.23 (0.195) 1.24 (0.175) 1.24 (0.165) 
Tenure 4.01 (0.000) 3.98 (0.000) 3.99 (0.000) 4.00 (0.000) 4.00 (0.000) 
Subsidiary Age 0.70 (0.873) 0.01 (0.091) 0.01 (0.096) 0.00 (0.086) 0.01 (0.108) 
Subsidiary Age Squared 0.93 (0.828) 1.92 (0.148) 1.90 (0.155) 1.93 (0.143) 1.84 (0.175) 
Subsidiary Size 1.01 (0.218) 1.00 (0.676) 1.00 (0.669) 1.00 (0.637) 1.00 (0.655) 
Large MNE 1.13 (0.474) 1.26 (0.234) 1.26 (0.227) 1.29 (0.192) 1.29 (0.194) 
GDP Growth 1.01 (0.472) 1.02 (0.172) 1.02 (0.163) 1.02 (0.164) 1.02 (0.156) 
Unemployment Rate 0.95 (0.080) 0.95 (0.098) 0.95 (0.114) 0.95 (0.110) 0.95 (0.121) 
Human Capital Index 1.74 (0.342) 0.94 (0.928) 0.93 (0.912) 0.91 (0.892) 0.94 (0.924) 
Sister Subsidiaries 1.21 (0.396) 1.33 (0.275) 1.36 (0.241) 1.35 (0.241) 1.34 (0.258) 
Regional HQs 0.43 (0.080) 0.34 (0.053) 0.32 (0.042) 0.31 (0.037) 0.30 (0.035) 
Tax Rate 1.01 (0.275) 1.01 (0.391) 1.01 (0.389) 1.01 (0.372) 1.01 (0.411) 
Key Predictors:           
Subpar Performance 1.21 (0.049) 1.31 (0.037) 0.90 (0.624) 0.80 (0.301) 0.70 (0.112) 
FDI Inflows   1.00 (0.712) 1.01 (0.472) 1.01 (0.472) 1.01 (0.470) 
Competitors   0.95 (0.220) 0.94 (0.158) 0.94 (0.156) 0.94 (0.139) 
Revenue Flows   1.58 (0.153) 1.61 (0.133) 1.31 (0.410) 1.29 (0.434) 
Expatriate Ratio    0.95 (0.886) 0.93 (0.848) 0.94 (0.870) 0.64 (0.253) 
Sub Performance × FDI Inflows   0.97 (0.025) 0.97 (0.004) 0.96 (0.003) 0.97 (0.004) 
Sub Performance × Competitors     1.09 (0.025) 1.08 (0.040) 1.07 (0.067) 
Sub Performance × Rev Flows       2.31 (0.011) 2.35 (0.009) 
Sub Performance × Expat Ratio         3.83 (0.015) 
Strategic Motives  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 9428  7412  7412  7412  7412  
Number of Subsidiaries 1,386  1,153  1,153  1,153  1,153  
Chi-squared  849.86         673.61         678.69         685.12         691.00  
Notes: All coefficients are odds ratios; P values in parentheses; Sub Performance refers to Subpar performance; Rev Flows refers 





In Model 1, the coefficient of the Subpar Performance variable is 1.21 and significant (p-
value = .049), supporting the baseline that when the subsidiary’s performance disappoints, the 
probability of changing the subsidiary GM will increase. In this case, the odds of GM succession 
will increase by a factor of 1.21. From Model 2 onward, the interaction term between Subpar 
Performance and the FDI Inflow remains below 1 and highly significant, supporting Hypothesis 
1—that GM successions becomes less likely to occur in the poorly performing subsidiary when 
the host country receives high FDI inflows. Taking Model 2 as an example, the beta coefficient 
of the interaction effect is 0.97 (p-value = .025), suggesting that there will be a three percent 
decrease in the odds of subsidiary GM succession with every US$ 10 Billion increase in FDI 
inflows. However, findings from Model 3 onward show that when there are many country-of-
origin competitors in the host country, subsidiary GM succession becomes more likely in the 
poorly performing subsidiary. In Model 3, for example, the interaction term between Subpar 
Performance and Competitors is above 1.09 and highly significant (p-value = .025), suggesting 
that even if there was only one country-of-origin competitor in the host country, the odds of GM 
succession in the poorly performing subsidiary would increase by a factor of 1.09, strongly 
supporting Hypothesis 2. 
With respect to the moderation effect of Revenue Flows, I found consistent support for 
Hypothesis 3—that GM succession is more likely to occur in the poorly performing subsidiary 
when it controls a high portion of MNE revenue. The beta coefficient of the interaction term 
between Subpar Performance and Revenue Flows in Model 4 is 2.31 and highly significant (p-
value = .011). In Model 5, the effect is even more significant and the effect size becomes slightly 
larger.  





interaction term between Subpar Performance and Revenue Flows in Model 5 is 3.83 and highly 
significant (p-value = .015), lending strong support to Hypothesis 4—that the higher the 
expatriate ratio, the more likely the subsidiary GM succession will occur in the poorly 
performing subsidiary
5
. However, in Model 5, the interaction effect between Subpar 




It is important to note that I cannot use the method of Flickinger et al (2016) or of Huang 
and Shields (2000) to evaluate the interaction terms as my model is a conditional logit (thus 
estimating the marginal effects is not meaningful here as the marginal effects depend on the 
value of the fixed effects) (Allison, 2009). However, I can use a recentering approach (Jeong, 
Siegel, Chen, & Newey, 2020) by subtracting from every value of Subpar Performance the data 
point of interest (i.e., 1 in this case). I then reran Model 5 and found that the coefficient of FDI 
Inflow is 0.97 (p-value = .020), the coefficient of Revenue Flows is 2.35 (p-value = .009), and the 
coefficient of Expatriate Ratio is 2.43 (p-value = .089). The coefficient of Competitors, however, 
was statistically insignificant.  
Replacing foreign subsidiary GMs potentially impacts subsidiary performance (Bebenroth 
& Froese, 2020; Beechler, Bird, & Taylor, 1998). My qualitative data support this view, as 
regional CEO 4 told us: “The sales turnover has increased three-fold after 3 years (since the 
change of the subsidiary GM)…and has become profitable.” Also, subsidiaries that receive MNE 
 
5
 As the cultural distance may also influence the staffing strategy of MNEs (Shin et al., 2017), I follow Kogut and 
Singh (1988)  to calculate the cultural distance between Japan and other host countries by using Hofstede’s indices. 
However, my fixed-effects model will drop this variable due to the variable’s time-invariant nature. I thus reran 
Model 5 by excluding host countries, of which the cultural distance from Japan is one standard deviation (4.03) 
above the mean (12.82). The results of the analysis support all my Hypotheses and are available upon request. 
 
6  I used non-parametric bootstrapping (100 times) to estimate the standard errors in Model 5, the p-value of the 





attention are found to perform better than their peers (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). To explore 
whether changing the GM in a poorly performing foreign subsidiary can turn around the 
subsidiary’s subpar performance, I trace the performance of the focal foreign subsidiary during 
the successor’s tenure. I do so by employing a fixed-effects logit model based on the same model 
structure as the full model used in Table 8. Specifically, I tested two dependent variables. The 
regression results are reported in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: Empirical Results of the Performance Model 




Dependent Variable: Subpar Performance Two-Year Consecutive Gain 
Regressors:     
Control Variables:  
WOS Reference category 
Majority Owned IJV -2.11 (0.032) 0.92 (0.169) 
Equally Owned IJV -2.65 (0.013) 0.02 (0.985) 
Minority Owned IJV -2.91 (0.049) 1.29 (0.187) 
PCN GM 0.91 (0.046) -0.49 (0.299) 
Subsidiary Age 14.76 (0.375) -12.41 (0.399) 
Subsidiary Age Squared -2.50 (0.273) 2.12 (0.291) 
Subsidiary Size -0.15 (0.000) 0.12 (0.000) 
Large MNE -0.28 (0.591) -0.50 (0.231) 
GDP Growth 0.01 (0.885) -0.02 (0.551) 
Unemployment Rate 0.04 (0.588) 0.12 (0.100) 
Human Capital Index -1.44 (0.439) 0.04 (0.980) 
Sister Subsidiaries 0.90 (0.208) 0.25 (0.677) 
Regional HQs 0.65 (0.629) 4.20 (0.003) 
Tax Rate -0.02 (0.663) -0.07 (0.045) 
FDI Inflows -0.05 (0.005) 0.02 (0.264) 
Competitors 0.22 (0.119) -0.22 (0.013) 
Revenue Flows 0.29 (0.745) 2.58 (0.001) 
Expatriate Ratio  -0.30 (0.709) -0.79 (0.440) 
Key Predictors:     
Successor  1.66 (0.000) -4.26 (0.000) 
Successor’s Tenure  -0.03 (0.651) -0.07 (0.144) 
Successor × Successor’s Tenure -0.45 (0.000) 0.57 (0.000) 
Strategic Motives  Yes  Yes  





Number of Subsidiaries 206  276  




Notes: P values in the parentheses. 
 





variable is Successor, which is a binary variable, where 1 refers to a successor whose 
predecessor left office when the subsidiary performance was poor, and 0 means otherwise. Prior 
studies (e.g., Ma & Seidl, 2018; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005) showed that due to 
time compressession diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), new leaders need time to make 
sense of the problem, develop organization-specific knowledge, configure the executive team, 
and take charge. My empirical observations also indicate the importance of time. As noted by 
Service manager 1, “At least five years tenure… is a precondition for the GM to really 
understand how to do business in this specific context.” When the tenure is too short, it is likely 
that I may not observe the performance turn-around. As Sales manager 2 explained: “They gave 
the subsidiary general managers too little time to turn around the performance of the 
subsidiary.”  I therefore investigate the interaction effect between Successor and the Successor’s 
Tenure. In Models 7, I change the dependent variable to the consecutive years of gain. It is coded 
as a binary variable. If the annual assessment of the subsidiary’s financial performance has 
shown a gain for two consecutive years, I code it as 1. I use 0 otherwise. 
The interaction term between Successor and the Successor’s Tenure in Model 6 has a beta 
coefficient -0.45 and is highly significant (p-value < .001) while the main effect of Successor is 
1.66 and highly significant (p-value < .001). The results suggest that new subsidiary GMs whose 
predecessor left office when the performance was subpar will likely experience a similar 
downturn in subsidiary performance initially. Two mechanisms can explain this phenomenon. 
First, given the strong organizational inertia developed during the predecessors’ time in the 
subsidiary (Shen & Cannella, 2002b), organizational change would not take place easily in this 
case (Hambrick, 2007). Second, if I observe performance too quickly after a succession event, I 





that successions disrupt routines, thus worsening firm performance (Grusky, 1960). 
Nevertheless, the results showed that new GMs, when given time, can turn around the poorly 
performing subsidiaries. For ease of interpretation of the estimated interaction effects, I reran 
Model 6 by using a fixed-effects linear probability model (LPM) while trimming the 
observations that violate the rule 	"# !" ∈ [0,1] (Damaraju & Makhija, 2018; Horrace & Oaxaca, 
2006; Wooldridge, 2016). The results show that new GMs can turn around the poorly performing 
subsidiaries after the third year of their tenure. I then reran Model 7 by using LPM and found 
that the foreign subsidiaries can even make consecutive years of gain after seven years since the 
successors took office.  
DISCUSSION  
By adopting a mixed-methods methodology, this study develops a more elaborated 
framework to systematically explain how strategic contingencies in the context of MNEs 
moderate the relationships between poor foreign subsidiary performance and subsidiary GM 
change. By integrating a market-based approach with an interdependence-based approach, my 
analysis, rooted in a critical realism view (Van de Ven, 2007), showed that the link between 
subpar subsidiary performance and subsidiary GM turnover is indeed not as direct as it seems, 
but it does not follow the predictions of the performance–power–succession model (Drazin & 
Rao, 1999). I found that in the presence of structural factors that can increase the level of MNE 
monitoring, the poor performance–GM succession relationship will be strengthened (though 
Competitors became only marginally significant in Model 5). In the presence of structural factors 
that can enhance the subsidiary GM power, however, the performance-succession relationship 
will not be necessarily decreased. Therefore, by examining the roles of MNE attention in the 





more cohesive understanding of GM successions in the setting of foreign subsidiaries.  
Meanwhile, this study improves our knowledge of the broader succession process. Extant 
studies tend to use longitudinal models to explore the continual GM change from within the 
organization (e.g., Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Beck et al., 
2008). My analysis complements these works, firstly, by accounting for the triggering event that 
is likely to set the path-building process in motion (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009); and 
secondly, by showing that both the internal structure of organizations and the external 
environment can influence organizational decision making (Argote & Greve, 2007) in relation to 
GM successions. 
Also, I address the call by Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008a) to explore the issue of 
negative headquarters’ attention. Although occasional anecdotal evidence has suggested that 
MNE attention may lead to an adverse effect for the subsidiary GM, to the best of my 
knowledge, the analysis is among the first to provide a theoretical angle on this issue. To develop 
the proper analytic tools, this study utilizes the distinctive MNE context and provides a more 
nuanced contextualization (Roth & Kostova, 2003). Although the level of FDI into a host 
country may correlate with the presence of country-of-origin competitors in the host country 
with respect to subsidiary GM power, the findings showed that these factors can produce 
opposite effects on subsidiary GM changes. My empirical observations and theory revealed that 
the former can impede MNE monitoring while the latter facilitates MNE monitoring, which then 
influence MNEs’ exploitation of hierarchical power.  
Furthermore, I theoretically and empirically contribute to the literature on the role of 
expatriate deployment in affecting MNEs’ attention. Plourde et al. (2014) found that expatriates 





extends their work by accounting for instances where expatriates can also enable the negative 
MNE attention in the subsidiary when the subsidiary encounters difficulties in sustaining a high 
subsidiary performance.  
At the same time, this study, based on two separate performance measures, presents a more 
promising picture of the role of subsidiary GM successors in turning around the poor 
performance of an ailing subsidiary. Changing subsidiary GMs is a strong form of managerial 
intervention, but the findings here showed the positive economic significance for this kind of 
intervention. Therefore, my analysis extends the line of inquiry on the benefit of headquarters’ 
involvement in general (e.g., Tran, Mahnke, & Ambos, 2010) and the benefit of gaining MNE 
attention (from the subsidiary’s perspective) in particular (e.g., Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010).  
Managerial Implications  
This study offers several implications relevant to practitioners. First, in an era when the 
risk of selecting the wrong candidate is greater than any time in the past (Donatiello, Larcker, & 
Tayan, 2018), lack of sufficient information on what the subsidiary is doing may introduce 
additional complexities into GM succession processes. As one informant from a large 
manufacturing MNE emphasized, “A lot of information we collected (from the subsidiary GM in 
the UK) might be wrong, so we have to ensure we have multiple sources of information.” I 
therefore suggest that senior MNE managers should be acutely aware of succession resistance. 
Two richer sources of information for MNE managers include the country-of-origin competitors 
in the host country and the expatriates within the subsidiary.  
Second, changing the GM in a poorly performing subsidiary can be an effective turnaround 
strategy. However, the successor needs time to take charge. MNE managers can thus be more 





but they also need to be patient on the other because managerial interventions as such will not 
lead to immediate payoffs. One informant (i.e., Director 3) told me that they normally give a 
“honeymoon period” (which is not simply a probation period) to the subsidiary GM successors. 
But many MNEs do not give subsidiary GMs more than three years to turn around their 
subsidiaries, as evidenced by the informants from several South Korean MNEs. One informant 
used the term “failure trap” to express his dissatisfaction with the HQs’ impatience. A sales 
manager from a US MNE similarly noted, “The subsidiary GMs here are only given two to three 
years…Immediately upon getting aboard they started to make strategic plans… and then they 
spent the other half of the time in planning to return home…This will never work.” 
Third and from the subsidiary GM’s perspective, receiving attention from HQs is not 
always desirable. To capture the upside potential of gaining MNE attention (Ambos & 
Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a), it is critical that subsidiary GMs should also 
find ways to avoid the downside risk associated with MNE attention. One possible way to do so, 
as suggested by subsidiary GM 6 in Brazil and subsidiary GM 7 in China, is that they should 
never “cover up problems” and communicate with the HQs frequently, transparently, and 
honestly. 
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
While this study identifies the performance–succession link unique to foreign subsidiary 
GMs, it clearly needs further exploration and validation. First, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I 
am not able to have close-up observations on site. I thus hope future work can utilize more 
refined qualitative approaches to produce more contextualized descriptions of succession 
decision making. Also, as headquarters may increase their monitoring efficacy through 





et al., 2012), it would be interesting to delineate how these monitoring mechanisms influence the 
process of changing subsidiary GMs. Future studies could also draw on the upper echelons 
perspective to explore how other micro-level conditions moderate the factors underlying my 
conceptualization. These conditions may include the predecessor and/or the successor’s human 
capital, religion, age, time horizon, social status, and origin (Belenzon, Shamshur, & Zarutskie, 
2019; Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Damaraju & Makhija, 2018; Flickinger et al., 2016; Georgakakis 
& Ruigrok, 2017; Karaevli, 2007; Matta & Beamish, 2008). 
Meanwhile, researchers should engage in more comparative cross-cultural studies of this 
topic (Bettis, Helfat, & Shaver, 2016). Although my qualitative inquiry probed into the process 
of subsidiary GM succession decision making in multiple home and host countries, the 
quantitative analysis only focused on a single home country, which may limit the generalizability 
of the findings. For example, as the Japanese firms have a preference for group structures both at 
home and abroad (Xu, Huang, & Pan, 2019), the effect of country-of-origin competitors on MNE 
monitoring might be stronger than that of MNEs from other home countries. But this speculation 
might be questionable, because some studies also pointed out that Japanese MNEs are not 
necessarily a passive recipient of the home-country “management practice model” (Meardi & 
Tóth, 2006; Milkman, 1991). Another limitation is that due to aging populations, finding 
sufficient numbers of expatriates is difficult for Japanese MNEs (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; 
Briscoe, Schuler, & Claus, 2009), which may render the change of subsidiary GMs less likely. 
Finally, the nature of the employment relationship in Japan (Sakano & Lewin, 1999), the 
deinstitutionalization tendency of permanent employment in Japanese companies (Ahmadjian & 
Robinson, 2001), and the lack of independent boards (Nakauchi & Wiersema, 2015) may further 






There is need for a more cohesive and contextualized theory to inform the change of 
subsidiary GMs. During challenging times (e.g., the COVID-19 Pandemic), the need becomes 
even more pressing. Adopting a multi-lens approach, this study provided a fresh look at the 
relationship between subsidiary performance and subsidiary GM succession. I juxtapose the 
empirical evidence and the MNE attention perspective against the strategic contingencies 
perspective to demonstrate how the MNE context necessitated a change in the underlying 
explanatory mechanism (Roth & Kostova, 2003). While extant literature has held that subsidiary 
GMs can accrue power from some strategic configurations to weaken the performance–
succession link, my framework, which is theoretically derived and empirically informed, 
demonstrated that senior MNE managers can also exploit the strategic configurations to 
strengthen the performance–succession link, which then results in the subsidiary’s positive 
economic significances. I conceptualize this as the performance–attention–succession model, 
which has the potential to provide a more complete and accurate account of subsidiary GM 







Field Research  
Along with the literature review and hypotheses formulation process, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with members of the top management team of each subsidiary. In this 
process, I adopted a participant frame of reference in order to gain a better understanding of the 
underlying reality through discourse with various stakeholders (Van de Ven, 2007). I remained 
less predetermined during all the interviews. The aim is to get the more active data which are 
associated with discovery (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). The goal is to strike a balance between rigor, 
creativity, and open-mindedness (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Same as in Essay 1, the 
informants are regional CEOs that supervise the subsidiaries, subsidiary general manager 
successors, and other members of the top management team who witnessed the succession 
process such as director corporate marketing from the HQs, corporate affairs managers based in 
the foreign subsidiaries. The reason to have interviews with multiple informants whenever 
possible is to triangulate the data (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Flick, 2014; Schotter & Beamish, 
2011). I developed the interview outline based on both the extant succession theories and my 
own experience, as I previously worked as a subsidiary GM. Bringing to light this point is 
important, as I believe that it is impossible to conceal the researcher’s voice (Suddaby, 2006). 
Interviews with members of the top management team of each subsidiary are the main data 
source. My secondary data sources, for the purpose of cross-checking information (Yin, 1994), 
were GMs’ resumes from LinkedIn, published cases, annual financial reports and media reports. 
Immediately after each interview, I prepared the extensive interview notes (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
the length of which was three to five pages. Following the approach of Caprar (2011), I 





was not in English) in order to preserve the specificity and meanings. Most of the interviews 
were video- or audio-recorded. The length of the recordings was 40 to 150 minutes. 
As the exploration unfolds, I gained critical background information and relevant quotes 
with respect to the subsidiary GM succession phenomenon. As a result, I believe this better 
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CHAPTER 4: GENERAL MANAGER SUCCESSORS IN LOCAL-MARKET-SEEKING 
SUBSIDIARIES OF MNES: A MULTIPLE-CASE ANALYSIS  
(ESSAY 3) 
INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) that excel in managing talent are likely to retain a 
competitive edge (Stahl et al., 2012). Yet understanding how to manage employees in foreign 
subsidiaries of MNEs has become increasingly critical (Björkman, Fey, & Park, 2007; Collings, 
Mellahi, & Cascio, 2019). Among foreign subsidiaries’ human assets, subsidiary general 
managers (GMs), whose role is intricate and challenging (Bartlett & Beamish, 2018), are 
growing in importance (e.g., Beechler, Bird, & Taylor, 1998; Dowling, Welch, & Schuler, 1999; 
O’Brien, Scott, Andersson, Ambos, & Fu, 2019; Schotter & Beamish, 2011). However, despite 
the fact that changing key managers will occur at some point within every organization 
(Haveman, 1993), decision makers in many MNEs do not know where and how to find the best 
subsidiary GM successors (Collings, Scullion, & Morley, 2007). The need for a better 
understanding of subsidiary GM change is pressing in this ever-changing climate.  
Although a substantial body of literature on international human resource management 
(IHRM) exists in general (for a review, see Collings, Scullion, & Dowling, 2009; see also Cooke 
et al., 2019), the topic of subsidiary GM succession has only received modest attention (For 
exceptions, see Bebenroth & Froese, 2019; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000; Selmer & de 
Leon, 1997; Selmer & Luk, 1995). One thematic focus in the existing IHRM literature is the 
critical issues faced by MNEs with regard to the employment of parent-country nationals 
(PCNs), third-country nationals (TCNs), and host-country nationals (HCNs) in filling key 





Collings, 2006). Arguably, nationality-based staffing decisions mainly reflect the attitude of 
MNE decision makers on subsidiary control and coordination (Harzing, 2001) and towards 
knowledge creation and transfer (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005). For example, researchers argue 
that HCNs can better respond to local demands and PCNs are better at integration (Harzing, 
2001; Harzing, Pudelko, & Reiche, 2016; O’Donnell, 2000; Tarique, Schuler, & Gong, 2006). 
Based on the broader IHRM literature, it thus follows that for foreign subsidiaries with a local-
market-seeking motive (Dunning & Lundan, 2008), an essential succession strategy would be to 
use an HCN GM to deal with host country business practices and cultures that may contrast 
markedly with those of the home country.  
However, the nationality-based terminology may be overly simplistic (Meyer, Li, & 
Schotter, 2020; Meyer & Xin, 2018; Rickley, 2019). An HCN GM successor can be either 
internally promoted from within the subsidiary, expatriated from the headquarters/other peer 
subsidiaries (Thite, Srinivasan, Harvey, & Valk, 2009), or externally hired (Morris, Snell, & 
Björkman, 2016). Their capabilities to respond to local market demands and their identifications 
with the MNE and the subsidiary may thus vary. Along this line, subsidiary GM succession 
decisions might not be only about the candidate’s nationality but also about whether the 
candidate comes from outside or inside the organization. However, we still know little about how 
MNE decision makers choose internal or external subsidiary GM successors. The lack of 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence is surprising, given that whether to fill job 
openings through internal or external hires “is one of the most fundamental staffing decisions 
organizations must make” (DeOrtentiis, Van Iddekinge, Ployhart, & Heetderks, 2018: 916). 
As “the risk of selecting the wrong candidate is greater than any time in the past” 





subsidiary survival at stake, there is need for a more granular theory to inform the choice of 
subsidiary GM successors. In this paper, I adopt the theory building from cases approach
7 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gehman et al., 2018) to address two 
questions. First, how are subsidiary GM succession decisions made by MNE decision makers? 
Second, how do the succession decisions link to subsidiary performance? By considering the 
nationality-based strategy and the origin-based strategy together, this paper aims to yield a more 
interpretable and theoretically intriguing pattern than either strategy would show us in isolation 
(Johns, 2006; Rousseau & Fried, 2001). To that end, I draw upon bounded reliability (BRel) 
(Kano & Verbeke, 2015, 2019; Lumineau & Verbeke, 2016; Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009) as 
both the micro-foundation and the theoretical thread throughout the theory elaboration process. 
Here BRel refers to economic actors being reliable, but only boundedly so.  
Based on theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989a), the setting is nine wholly owned local-
marketing-seeking foreign subsidiaries of four large manufacturing MNEs. Selecting cases with 
the same strategic motive allows me to control for the rival explanations (Luo, 2003) and better 
focus on the less-explored succession decision-making process. More importantly, I treat a local-
market-seeking motive as the context analytically rather than descriptively. The underlying logic 
is that because human capital is strategic only when it provides value to the firm and does so in a 
unique way (i.e., what makes human capital valuable for the firm is its alignment with strategic 
orientation) (Chung, Park, Lee, & Kim, 2015; Wright, Coff, & Moliterno, 2014), the findings 
 
7
 To avoid confusion and philosophical pitfalls, it is noteworthy that when inducting theory from cases, I subject 
them to critical realist assumptions and take a more pluralist stance. I am aware of the objective and positivist stance 
of the approach of Eisenhardt and colleagues (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gehman et al., 2018), which is 
different from the grounded theory building stemming from the treatises of Glaser and Strauss. But I don’t think that 
total objectivity on the part of the researcher is possible. Therefore, I do not conceal the role of the researcher (and 






here can be best described as a contextualised explanation. To test the analytical generalizability 
of the findings based on the selected cases, I proceeded to interview managers from another 11 
foreign subsidiaries, following both the theoretical and literal replication logic (Yin, 1994).  
The results reported here are six propositions complementing and challenging the 
traditional views of the nationality-based staffing decision. Moderated by the internal-external 
origin of the subsidiary GM successor, the empirical evidence shows that using HCN GMs is not 
always the best strategy for local-market-seeking subsidiaries. When the HCN GMs are hired 
from within the subsidiary, they are more likely to be given to opportunism which makes 
provision for self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1981), thus worsening subsidiary 
performance. But this is not opportunism ex ante. Rather, it emerges gradually due to the joint 
effects of the HCN GMs’ deep understanding of the local business practices, the dual 
identification challenge, and the dark side of trust (Anderson & Jap, 2005). I follow Kano and 
Verbeke (2015) to call it ex post opportunism as intentional deceit, which is viewed in the 
present context as relevant in only well-defined circumstances. 
To economize on ex post opportunism, the empirical observations show that MNE decision 
makers usually appoint an HCN GM from outside the local-market-seeking subsidiary or 
expatriate a PCN subsidiary GM. These solutions, however, may give rise to other facets of 
BRel: i.e., divided engagement resulting from the identity-based discordance; and right-minded 
regression, i.e., a strong attachment to existing practices due to the force of old habit (Kano & 
Verbeke, 2015). The data uncovered that these two BRel facets, rather than ex post opportunism, 
are more common reasons for the succession failure, but there exist effective managerial tools to 
manage these challenges. Specifically, MNE decision makers use ex ante socialization to ensure 





engagement. To address the challenges posted by right-minded regression, subsidiary GM 
successors are encouraged to use balanced local empowerment to motivate local managers in 
order to better harness market-seeking opportunities. These safeguards enable MNEs to leverage 
the human ability to take initiative and to cooperate, leading to good subsidiary performance.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Nationality-Based Staffing Strategy   
Some scholars suggest that when staffing managerial positions in foreign subsidiaries, 
MNEs can choose between HCNs, PCNs, and TCNs (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007). Each of 
these nationality-based staffing strategies is argued to be associated with a unique set of strategic 
purposes (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005). Tarique et al. (2006), for example, argue that PCNs may 
know more about the MNE’s culture, and thereby can facilitate communication with the 
headquarters and align the subsidiary’s operations with the interests of the MNE. The role of 
PCNs in controlling the subsidiary on behalf of the headquarters is also gaining increasing 
prominence in the literature (Collings et al., 2009; Shin, Hasse, & Schotter, 2017). In contrast, 
HCNs are viewed as being more familiar with the host-country environment, and being more 
effective in localizing the subsidiary’s operations (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991).  
More recently, researchers have begun to fine-tune the nationality-based staffing 
framework by either expanding the category of subsidiary GMs or bringing to the fore the 
importance of organizational and environmental contingencies (for a detailed list, see McNulty 
& Brewster, 2017). Examples demonstrating the former endeavor include studies on expatriates 
of host-country origin (Thite et al., 2009), the local employment of ex-HCNs (Tung & Lazarova, 
2006), the localization of expatriates (Tharenou & Harvey, 2006), and the employment of 





effects of institutional distance, cultural difference, headquarters and subsidiary characteristics, 
and intraorganizational relationships on the utilization of various nationality-based staffing 
strategies (e.g., Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003; Peng & Beamish, 2014; Rickley & Karim, 2018; 
Schotter & Beamish, 2011a). There are also some studies undertaking these two tasks 
simultaneously (e.g., Tarique et al., 2006). Of particular relevance to this study is the work of 
Chung et al. (2015), which proposes a strategic human resource alignment framework. The 
authors found that HCNs can more effectively maximize the performance-enhancing potential of 
a local-market-seeking strategy, while also finding positive utility functions of PCNs in export-
oriented subsidiaries. 
This research agenda has been established as one of the cornerstones of the field of IHRM 
(Thomas, Lazarova, & Inkson, 2005). But as noted earlier, the subsidiary GM successors’ 
nationality only tells half of the story, and the internal-external origin of GM successors has been 
largely neglected in IHRM. In contrast, the origin-based succession strategy has become a 
prominent issue on the agenda in strategic leadership research. A brief overview of this body of 
work follows. 
Internal Versus External Successor Type 
 As the selection of a new GM offers a great opportunity for decision makers to align their 
organization with the environment and with the interests of the board of directors (Friedman, 
2017; O’Brien et al., 2019; Ocasio, 1999), GM successor origin represents a well-researched 
topic in the field of strategic leadership. Considerable evidence exists that decisions on whether 
the new GM comes from outside or inside the organization can impact organizational 
performance significantly (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). The underlying 





such that external successors tend to pursue paths of strategic change (Wiersema, 1992). They 
bring new ties to the environment, new competencies and skills, and fresh strategic perspectives 
(Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Schepker, Kim, Patel, Thatcher, & Campion, 2017). But at the same 
time, outsiders often find it harder to get support from other executives within organizations 
(Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). In contrast, internal promotion may indicate the board’s desire to 
maintain the current strategic thrust (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Second, insiders have more 
established social ties to employees (Berns & Klarner, 2017) and have successfully managed 
political coalitions (Wiersema, 1992). Insiders possess more firm-specific knowledge and are 
more socialized into the organization’s culture (Schepker et al., 2017). These superior 
relationships, information, and power bases imply that insiders, relative to external successors, 
can leverage organizational resources more effectively. Third, to the extent that the board has 
more detailed information about insider successors, information asymmetry—and thereby the 
principal–agent problem—will be less severe (Zajac, 1990).  
These mechanisms have also been successfully applied to the study of other types of 
executive roles. Of particular interest is the study of DeOrtentiis et al. (2018) on subunit 
managers in domestic firms. Their results showed that internal candidates demanded lower 
starting salaries, even though their performance ratings were higher and their probability of 
promotion was lower. Consequently, the authors suggested that firms staff the subunit manager 
position with internal candidates whenever possible. 
These and related studies add greatly to our knowledge of GM successor’s origin. 
However, insights from this body of work might be too coarse to be directly applicable to foreign 
subsidiary GM successions in that the role of foreign subsidiary GMs is more intricate than the 





that there are at least three types of responsibilities that foreign subsidiary GMs must assume: 
enabling embeddedness in the host country, facilitating adaptability in the subsidiary, and 
championing alternatives within the MNE. Meanwhile, in the setting of MNEs there is a notion 
of nestedness of agency relationships (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). There are two types of insider 
GM successors, one is from within the subsidiary and the other expatriated from within the MNE 
but outside the subsidiary. Therefore, the subsidiary GM successors might be closer to the 
subsidiary or closer to the HQs depending on where they are from. 
METHODS 
The foregoing elaboration of theoretical underpinnings enabled me to formulate a 
preliminary analytical framework. But this framework was not fully stipulated and was subject to 
future refinement. The initial process can be best described as “abductive” (Gehman et al., 2018) 
because the propositions formulated then were primarily based on both my subjective view on 
subsidiary GM successions and were derived from the prior literature. Given the iterative nature 
of explanation-building (Yin, 1994), I constantly went back and forth between theory and data. 
As a result, the propositions evolved, which, in turn, directed my search for new theories as well 
as new empirical observations. In this continuous process of systematic combining (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002) or progressive focusing (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012), I developed theoretical 
arguments from cases (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).   
Research Setting 
I adopt a multiple-case design and treat each case as an experiment (Yin, 1994). I then use 
the series of cases, collected in a theoretical sampling manner (Eisenhardt, 1989a), to test the 
observations. The underlying logic, therefore, is literal replication within groups of cases and 





noted by Eisenhardt et al. (2016), is to enable meaningful comparisons. My unit of analysis is 
nine wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries with a local-market-seeking motive. These subsidiaries 
are from four large, established manufacturing MNEs that are technical and market leaders. I 
named these subsidiaries and their MNEs for their primary technological area (e.g., Electronics). 
The characteristics of these foreign subsidiaries and the MNEs are shown in Table 10.  
TABLE 10: Descriptions of Manufacturing MNEs 












Water A Water Israel China >500 ~100 3 
Water B Water Israel India >500 ~30 2 
Water C  Water Israel Brazil >500 ~90 2 
Agriculture A Agriculture  Israel China >500 ~200 4 
Agriculture B Agriculture  Israel Brazil >500 ~150 3 
Paper A Paper  Singapore China >500 >500 4 
Paper B Paper  Singapore China >500 >500 4 
Electronics A Electronics  China UK >500 ~600 2 
Electronics B Electronics  China Pakistan >500 >500 2 
Note: In line with the Letter of Information, the number of employees illustrated in this table is intended to be vague in 
order to keep the MNEs unidentifiable. 
I chose these foreign subsidiaries for three reasons. First, for foreign subsidiaries whose 
mandate portfolios are primarily local-market-seeking, the need to be responsive to local 
demands will be higher (Benito, 2015; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), which may increase the 
importance of subsidiary GM successors’ local knowledge and networks. Yet, for these same 
subsidiaries, their dependency upon resource support from the MNEs may also increase in order 
to overcome the liability of foreignness (Lee, Chung, & Beamish, 2019). This suggests that the 
subsidiary GM successors’ internal relationship with the MNEs will also be critical. Therefore, 
these are precisely the research conditions that may hinge on both the nationality-based staffing 





the role of subsidiary GM successors
8
, singling out one motive enables me to partial out 
variations that are nonessential to this inquiry and consequently to focus attention on the 
variation of interest (Gehman et al., 2018; Luo, 2003). Third, given the multiple sources of 
identity in the context of international joint ventures (IJVs) (Salk & Shenkar, 2001), the 
organizational culture and the succession decisions may emerge differently in IJVs vis-à-vis in 
wholly owned subsidiaries. The unique IJV microprocesses, albeit intriguing, is not essential to 
my inquiry here and thus should be patriated out.  
Data Sources and Analysis Process 
Because I collected and analyzed data simultaneously (i.e., constant comparison) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), I report data sources and the data analysis process in the same subsection as 
well. But I present them in a sequential manner here only for the sake of clarity. Meanwhile, to 
make the researcher voice more explicit here (Bansal & Corley, 2011), it should be noted that I 
previously worked as a foreign subsidiary GM (an HCN GM who was internally promoted from 
within the subsidiary). I therefore developed the preliminary interview outline not only based on 
the prior literature, but also on my personal experiences (i.e., subjectivist worldview). 
Mentioning this is important, as I believe that, though grounded in extant theory, what I will 
observe is also a function of who I am and what I hope to see (Suddaby, 2006). In this sense, 
therefore, the philosophical underpinning of my methodology is not positivism, but critical 
realism (Van de Ven, 2007; Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). 
 
8
 As this essay is part of a larger research program on foreign subsidiary GM successions, it should be noted that I 
conducted many other interviews with subsidiaries that are not local-market-seeking. Compared with those 
interviews that are excluded from this study, I can conclude that the strategic motive can significantly influence the 
succession decision making. Therefore, controlling for this extraneous variation is warranted. Nevertheless, I also 
acknowledge that the local embeddedness can be critical to some subsidiaries with other strategic motives. 







To gain access to the MNEs, I relied on my personal network of professionals working in 
these MNEs. I conducted interviews with members of the top management team of each 
subsidiary and the HQs. Given my decade long subsidiary GM experiences, I intentionally 
remained passive and less predetermined during all the interviews in order to come across the 
“active” data which is associated with discovery (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). My informants are 
Vice Presidents, Regional CEOs, subsidiary GMs, and other members of the top management 
team who were well-positioned to offer detailed knowledge of the succession process such as 
director corporate marketing from the HQs, sales manager and corporate affairs managers in the 
foreign subsidiaries. Following prior research (e.g., Gilbert, 2005; Schotter & Beamish, 2011b), 
the rationale to involve multiple informants is to triangulate the interview data (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002; Flick, 2014). Meanwhile, to motivate informants’ accuracy, I promised confidentiality.   
Same as in the previous essays, the main data source is semi-structured interviews, which 
are deemed suitable for interviewing managers who cannot be reached on many separate 
occasions (Bernard, 2000). I used the secondary sources such as annual reports, published cases, 
media reports, and subsidiary GM resumes from LinkedIn to cross-check information. The 
information about subsidiary performance is based on the informants’ subjective assessments 
(i.e., comparing the post-succession performance to their expectations) (Slangen & Hennart, 
2008). I do so in order to ensure the dependent variable is contextually sensitive (Johns, 2006), 
as different informants define unsatisfactory subsidiary performance differently and these 
managers (e.g., Regional CEOs of Electronics, Water, and Agriculture; Directors of Paper and 
Agriculture, among others) told me that they have to tease out the factors (e.g., time trend, 
macro-economy, political changes) that influence subsidiary performance but have nothing to do 





performance information. I also had one interview with a global leadership expert in order to 
investigate the subsidiary GM succession issues from the outsider perspective.  
I took copious notes during the interviews. Immediately after each interview, I then 
prepared the detailed and extensive interview notes in the form of an electronic document, 
following the “24-hour rule” (Eisenhardt, 1989b). The length of each final note was three to five 
pages. I also video- or audio-recorded most of the interviews, the length of which was 40 to 150 
minutes. Following the approach of Caprar (2011), I transcribed all recorded interviews in the 
original language with no immediate translation (if it was not in English) in order to preserve the 
specificity and meanings. In total, I have prepared over 400 pages of transcriptions, and over 110 
pages of notes in the form of an electric document. Similar to prior research (e.g., Gilbert, 2005), 
I also conducted nine follow-on telephone interviews (20-40 minutes each) to further expand on 
the specific research questions that were not completely emerged during the initial interviews. 
The purpose of this interview data collection stage is to generate a more parsimonious theory. 
Along with the fluid and nonlinear process, I conducted additional interviews with 
managers from 11 other subsidiaries to assess the analytical power and the external validity of 
my model (Yin, 1994). Table 11 describes the data sources. Finally, as a validating procedure, I 
discussed the initial findings with my informants to evaluate the accuracy of the study (i.e., 
member checking) (Yin, 1994). More than 90 percent of informants during the follow-on 
interviews told me that my conclusions were entirely accurate. For instance, the Regional CEO 
of Agriculture responded, “I must tell you that from my experience, all the points that you 







Table 11: Sources of Data 
 Interviews 
 Secondary Documents  Successions 
Subsidiary MNE Subsidiary Total Number Examples   Number 






















































n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. n.a. 
 
n.a. 
        
Total 16(3) 20(6) 36(9) 32     47 
Note: The follow-on interviews are shown in parentheses; The follow-on interview with Agriculture B is done 
through E-email instead of virtual meeting; The number of successions is the number of events the informants 
discussed about in details during the interviews.   
 
Following the coding approach of Maznevski and Chudoba (2000), I have, in a manner of 
“analytic induction” (Suddaby, 2006), tentatively coded the categories of variables according to 





(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), as a preparation for reconceptualization. This initial template 
was largely guided by the micro-foundations underpinning the issue of  agency problems within 
MNEs (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015), i.e., bounded rationality and opportunism. However, my data 
gradually showed that the assumption of opportunism is only a situational occurrence. Instead, I 
found the emergence of various facets of BRel (Kano & Verbeke, 2015), which turned out to be 
the “central characters” cohering into the story (Pratt, 2009). This then inspired a new round of 
literature review.  
Subsequently, following the iterative and dynamic approach (Gehman et al., 2018), my 
research questions were refined and I developed a new set of formally stated observations. 
Grounding the research question in reality is a crucial step of problem formulation process (Van 
de Ven, 2007). Along with the continuous modifying and updating processes, my direction for 
data collection also changed accordingly (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). As the study progressed, I 
redirected my focus to the subtleties of BRel expressions so as to draw on the complete sources 
of data and encompass all nuances. In this process, I found three particular facets of BRel 
informed by the qualitative data
9
. I also discerned surprising relationships among these facets of 
BRel, which are not addressed by existing theoretical and empirical work. I then reduced fuzzy 
categories into fewer and clearer structures, and wove into the model an emergent category of 
variables I call economizing mechanisms. The revealed BRel (and the inter-links) and the 
economizing mechanisms (or lack thereof) jointly inform succession decision making and link to 
subsidiary performance. These larger patterns unveil complex social processes, thus enabling the 
theory elaboration.  
In the next section, I present these formal observations in the form of propositions and 
 
9 While Kano and Verbeke (2015) also discussed about other dimensions of BRel, my data did not reveal ex-ante 





incorporate a set of relevant literatures (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Consistent with critical realism, I 
adopt the process tracing technique to formulate the propositions (Welch et al., 2011), which 
involves a careful construction of causal chains of events. Each chain of causal events is 
regarded as a unique causal pathway. 
RESULTS 
Insider HCNs and Ex Post Opportunism  
As mentioned previously, extant research on the nationality of subsidiary managers has 
held that HCNs are more familiar with the host-country environment and can more effectively 
maximize the performance-enhancing potential of a local-market-seeking strategy (Chung et al., 
2015; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). Meanwhile in the field of strategic leadership, recent works 
on the origin of subunit manager successors showed that as internal candidates have higher 
performance ratings, it is sensible to staff the subunit manager position with internal candidates 
(DeOrtentiis et al., 2018). Based on these parallel literatures, therefore, it follows that for local-
market-seeking subsidiaries, the logical succession strategy is to appoint an HCN GM who is 
promoted from within the subsidiary (hereafter insider HCN GMs). This is also the preliminary 
proposition I tentatively formulated before data collection.   
My empirical observations, however, indicate a contrasting view. Given that the HCN 
perspective is not homogenous (Caligiuri & Bonache, 2016), and agency relationships inside 
MNEs are multi-tiered (Ambos, Kunisch, Leicht-Deobald, & Steinberg, 2019), on certain 
occasions, the use of HCN subsidiary GM successors was actually regarded by MNE decision 
makers as the worst succession strategy. Although HCN subsidiary GM successors are familiar 
with the host country environment, it does not ensure that these successors will necessarily align 





successor is from within the subsidiary, the successor’s familiarity with the local market and 
with the subsidiary operations, coupled with the role stress in the face of conflicting goals, and 
the reduced alertness of the MNE decision makers, can lead to ex post opportunism. As a result, 
the subsidiary performance is less likely to be satisfactory. In formal terms,  
Proposition 1: Internally promoting an HCN GM successor from within the local-market-
seeking subsidiary may lead to ex post opportunism that renders subsidiary performance 
unsatisfactory.  
The empirical evidence is shown in Table 12. Some subsidiaries in my observations have 
never used this specific type of candidates for the reasons such as “lack of trust” or “lack of 
qualified international managers”. I thus corroborated the qualitative assessments with 
additional interviews with managers that have worked with insider HCN subsidiary GM 
successors (from the group I call compared subsidiaries). I also included the opinion from a 





Table 12: Insider HCN GMs and Ex Post Opportunism 










      
Water A n.a. Theoretical No Yes n.a. Regional CEO: "If possible, I would prefer to 
use local GMs…But it takes time to know the 
local GM…And we had problems in Peru 
before, luckily we found the (insider HCN) 
GM's fraud issue at the last minute." 
Water B n.a. Theoretical No Yes n.a. Subsidiary GM: "People here are not very 
trustworthy...I fired the (HCN) business 
manager 3 years ago though he was very 
capable." 
Water C n.a. n.a. No n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Agriculture A GM 2 Literal Yes Yes Unsatisfactory Subsidiary GM: "Here is a code of conduct 
issue, regardless of his capability. The 
predecessor opened his own company while 
working as the GM here. He then used his 
local networks and teamed up with several of 
our employees to develop business for his 
own company and then sold products to our 
subsidiary."  
Regional CEO: "We had 42 people in the 
subsidiary…We had to replace 35 people 
there." 
Agriculture B n.a. Theoretical No No n.a. Director: "The predecessor and successor are 
both external hires…I haven’t seen 
disloyalties." 
Paper A n.a. Theoretical no Yes n.a. Corporate Affairs Manager: "We don’t 
appoint (HCN) subsidiary GMs from within 
the factory nowadays, because we are 
concerned about the entrenchment and office 
politics the internal candidate might create." 





Electronics A GM2 Literal Yes Yes Unsatisfactory Deputy GM: "The (insider HCN) predecessor 
didn’t go to the office often, and was involved 
in many fraud issues, which remained 
unnoticed until I was expatriated to the 
subsidiary." 
Electronics B n.a. Theoretical No Yes n.a. Regional CEO: "We don’t have many 
qualified international managers." 
Compared 
Subsidiary 1 
GM 1 Literal Yes Yes Unsatisfactory  HR: "The (insider HCN) predecessor GM is 
too local, he had some under the table deals 






Literal Yes Yes Unsatisfactory  Sales Manager: "At the beginning, the 
performance was good. But the (insider HCN) 
GM started to make the same problems…He 
left the subsidiary prematurely, leaving again 
a huge amount of inventories in the 




GM 3 Literal Yes No Satisfactory Subsidiary GM: "I was then ‘informally’ 
trained by the HQs (for two years) to become 
the GM successor candidate." 
Compared 
Subsidiary 8 
GM 1 Literal Yes Yes Unsatisfactory  Sales Director: "At the outset, the GM was 
very trustworthy. But over time, as the 
business grew very quickly, the GM started to 
build his empire and began to fight against the 
requirement from the HQs…It is a trust decay 
process." 
Expert  n.a. Theoretical  No Yes n.a. Expert: "According to my experiences, MNEs 
nowadays still prefer to use expatriate GMs in 






Surprisingly, I found that in most subsidiaries that have previously ever used insider HCN 
GMs, the subsidiary performance deteriorated during the tenure of the GMs. Why does the use of 
insider HCN GM successors lead to unsatisfactory subsidiary performance? I concluded that 
there are three reasons10. First, the primary location of employment may explain the differences 
in organizational commitment (cf. Banai & Reisel, 1993). The organizational commitment here 
refers to the psychological identification with the organization (Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). But 
along with the internal selection and promotion process, the subsidiary GM may gradually 
develop dual identifications with both the subsidiary and the MNE (Vora & Kostova, 2007), as 
these GMs are chosen by and get closer to the MNE decision makers during the promotion 
process. But for these insider GM successors, a sense of internal conflict may arise in the face of 
conflicting goals. One dysfunctional effect of the role stress is that these GMs may lose a sense 
of affiliation with both entities (Gregersen & Black, 1992; Vora, Kostova, & Roth, 2007). Thus, 
agency issues may loom large. The insider HCN GMs are also more able to behave 
opportunistically given their entrenchment in the subsidiary. Therefore, as the informant from 
Paper A explained, “We don’t appoint (HCN) subsidiary GM from within the factory nowadays, 
because we are concerned about the entrenchment and office politics the internal candidate 
might create.” By politics, I believe that he meant the “activities taken within organizations to 
acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to obtain one’s preferred outcomes” 
(Pfeffer, 1981: 7). These outcomes, however, might not necessarily comply with directives of the 
 
10 Given the small sample, I concur that what I have observed here might not be perceived as a solid relationship. 
However, the “statistical” power argument does not apply to the methodology and the nature of the data in the 
present context (Yin, 1994). Although I stopped collecting interview data when I believe that the “category 
saturation” was achieved (when new interviews yielded little new information), I can still make some tentative 
inferences, and my goal is to ensure the “analytical” power. This orienting principle underlies the whole theory 







Second, being successfully promoted from within the subsidiary may indicate that the new 
subsidiary GM has proven capabilities in dealing with environmental contingencies, which has 
enabled the GM to gain trust from the MNE decision makers (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995). Here, trust refers to the trustor’s (i.e., MNE decision maker’s) psychological state 
comprising the willingness to be vulnerable based on positive expectations of the behavior of the 
trustee (i.e., subsidiary GM successor) (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). However, 
there is a dark side of trust (Kano & Verbeke, 2015). As the deputy manager of Electronics A 
stressed, the “fraud issue” remained unnoticed for years. In retrospect after several succession 
failures, the Regional CEO of Agriculture told us, “Even though the GMs are very capable in 
terms of experience (in the field), they will not be fully loyal to you.” In a follow-on interview, 
this Regional CEO further noted, “The (promoted) GM was a great salesman, bright, very very 
good, but when he became a manager, because I cannot control him 24 hours a day, seven days 
a week, then he made me disappointed…He didn’t expand his mind to the managerial level.” 
This suggests that: first, the initial trust given to the insider successor can reduce the alertness 
needed (Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009); second, when a breach in trust is suspected, it is hard to 
prove (Anderson & Jap, 2005); and third, the trust dynamic has potential for contraction 
(Rousseau et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, deep understanding of the local practices and the subsidiary operations is a 
double-edged sword in a sense that, as suggested by extant literature, it can enable the GM to 
bolster subsidiary performance, but as suggested by the data, it can also paradoxically enable the 
subsidiary GM to better pursue self-interest with deceitfulness. A telling example is given by the 





predecessor established his own company while working as the GM here. He then used his local 
networks and teamed up with several of our employees to develop business for his own company 
and then sold products to our subsidiary.” I summarized that the successor has the needed 
embeddedness to do so given his local knowledge and networks; the authority to do so given his 
rank in the hierarchy; and the  latitude to do so given his established social ties to local 
employees (Berns & Klarner, 2017). 
I proceeded to assess the validity of the proposition by interviewing informants from other 
local-market-seeking subsidiaries. The foregoing behavioral pattern was found in most cases. In 
the compared subsidiary 1, for example, there were “under the table deals (by GM 1), which the 
HQs suspected but had no proof.” I then asked the HR manager why GM 1 did that. She 
explained: “He actually did not want to be the GM.” I concluded that this attitude is clearly 
symptomatic of the role stress. Similarly, as witnessed by the informants from the compared 
subsidiaries 2 and 8, the “trust decay” only became recognizable gradually. The only exception I 
found is the insider GM 3 of the compared subsidiary 4, who did not demonstrate ex post 
opportunism. He successfully turned around the subsidiary performance. The GM did not 
experience the role stress because the decision makers in the HQs had spent two years in the 
candidate’s leadership development (albeit informally) prior to his promotion, in order to elicit 
the GM’s dual organizational identifications. 
Expatriated HCNs and Economizing on Opportunism  
The above findings thus lead to the next question, how do MNE decision makers impose 
limits that assure localization of the operations by the HCN subsidiary GM is consistent with the 
MNE’s best interests? Prior research argued that succession decisions that are based on utilizing 





(Tan & Mahoney, 2006). Then, could the MNE decision makers find the most capable subsidiary 
GMs who can also behave less opportunistically? I found that to achieve this goal, some MNEs 
expatriated HCN GMs from within the MNE but outside the subsidiary. 
Although the IHRM literature suggested that establishing criteria for expatriate selection 
remains problematic (Dowling et al., 1999), and strategic leadership research reminded us that 
the choice of an outsider as a new leader is a highly charged decision, as it may violate implicit 
deals with some internal movers (Finkelstein et al., 2009), the empirical observations indicated 
that the expatriated HCN subsidiary GMs’ strong identification with the MNE significantly 
reduced their willingness to engage in ex post opportunism. As a result, these GMs’ stock of 
local knowledge was mainly used to find opportunities for increased local embeddedness rather 
than to serve the GMs’ self-interest. Formally,  
Proposition 2: Expatriating an HCN GM successor from within the MNE to the local-
market-seeking subsidiary reduces ex post opportunism.  
The data indicated that the expatriated HCN GMs, such as those in Paper A and B, are 
close to MNE decision makers, which is consistent with prior studies on expatriation (e.g., Ishii, 
2012; Michailova et al., 2016; Williams, Colovic, & Zhu, 2017). They have worked for the MNE 
for many years in various subsidiaries and business sectors. This pattern shows that they have 
strong desire to maintain membership and continue affiliation in the MNE, which is an 
embodiment of loyalty (Banai & Reisel, 1993). Both the director and the corporate 
communication manager of Paper call these expatriated HCN GMs “old boys” and “fire 
captains”, implying that these GMs are not only trustworthy but also capable of taking risks in 
confronting unanticipated environmental challenges. The corporate affairs manager from Paper 





because he knows that even if he makes some mistakes in this process, the president will 
understand him.” Moreover, these subsidiary GMs are very committed, as pointed out by the 
corporate communication manager of Paper, “The GM (16) is always the last one to leave the 
subsidiary.” 
Meanwhile, the data indicated that these HCN expatriates do not necessarily divorce 
themselves socially from local people in the subsidiary, which seems inconsistent with many 
writings on the “expatriate syndromes” (Harvey & Moeller, 2009; March, 1992; Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2008). As suggested by the following quote from the informant in 
Paper B, “The GM (16) always likes to communicate with all levels of employees.” Similarly, the 
corporate communication manager of Paper told us, “The GM (15) in Paper A proposed the 
‘care and love of the employees’ initiative… greatly improved the employees’ morale and the 
GM’s credibility.” My explanation is that both the “linguistic ability” and the deep appreciation 
of the host country culture can render these expatriated HCN GMs very capable of effective 
communication with local people, fostering organizational identification (Ishii, 2012) and in-
group favoritism (Olsen & Martins, 2009). Meanwhile, because effective communication with 
the subsidiary is instrumental in ensuring the implementation of the local-market-seeking 
strategy, getting socially closer to the subsidiary can in effect allow the expatriated HCN GMs to 
better fulfill their commitment to the MNE. In this sense, the subsidiary identification can be best 
described as nested within the MNE. As a result, the risk of role conflict will be low (Vora & 
Kostova, 2007).  
Therefore, these expatriated HCN subsidiary GMs can overcome the dual identification 
challenge, effectively address ex post opportunism, and thus render the unsatisfactory subsidiary 





2015). Indeed, expatriates are often in short supply  (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; Collings, 
Scullion, & Morley, 2007), let alone the HCN expatriates who have prolonged exposure to the 
particular MNE’s setting. Thus, I found that a more common approach adopted by the MNEs is 
to externally hire HCN subsidiary GM successors, the strategy to which I now turn.  
Outsider HCNs and Divided Engagement  
As mentioned earlier, an outsider may lack firm-specific human capital (Chan, 2006). 
Moreover, it is likely that there exists information asymmetry between the firm and the outsider 
candidate, which may lead to a less-than-optimal selection (i.e., adverse selection) (Zhang, 
2008). Similarly, as noted by DeOrtentiis et al. (2018), using external hires at the sub-unit level 
may lead to poor person-job/organization fit with respect to skills and abilities. My empirical 
observations, however, are startling in that adverse selection was not a major concern for MNE 
decision makers when deploying outsider HCNs. There was only one exception that 
demonstrated the adverse selection problem, that is, the predecessor GM of the compared 
subsidiary 6. However, due to the saliency of the GM role, it seems relatively easier for MNE 
decision makers to identify the GM’s lack of needed skills and abilities, and thus quickly fix it. 
In the case of the compared subsidiary 6, for instance, the predecessor had a very short tenure 
and was fired immediately after a more appropriate candidate was found. Furthermore, because 
the outsider HCN GMs do not have the entrenchment problem and their activities are under 
scrutiny of the MNE decision makers and the subordinates, I found that they are also less likely 
to engage in ex post opportunism in the form of moral hazards. But some other behavioral 
problems emerged, to which I now turn.  
After the new comers take office, their managerial attention is primarily focused on 





descriptions, or provisions in the contractual agreement. As time goes by, the outsider HCN 
subsidiary GMs started to gain some exposure to the MNE’s overall mission and goals which are 
often embedded (implicitly) in the corporate culture, i.e., the pattern of beliefs and expectations 
shared by the members of the MNEs (Stahl & Tung, 2015). But some of these GMs took issue 
with the mission and goals. This is evidenced by the following quote from the corporate 
communication manager of Paper, “We have well-established managerial procedures, and the 
external candidate thought, OK, let me just follow them. But in fact, we have a set of implicit 
rules to follow...It is frustrating.” The same frustration is found in the case of Agriculture B, 
“The GM used to be an important manager of ST (a related MNE, so the GM believes that he fits 
with the job description). But we need to be hands-on. Different from an exact job description 
that tells you need to do just this and that here, we need to do lots of things.” This is 
problematic, because subsidiary GMs, by virtue of this position, hold multiple roles (Vora et al., 
2007). Some expectations do come from the subsidiary, but there are also expectations from the 
MNE as a whole. Failing to fulfill the MNEs’ expectations will lead to what Kano and Verbeke 
(2015) termed divided engagement. In formal terms,  
Proposition 3: Externally hiring an HCN GM successor for the local-market-seeking 
subsidiary may lead to divided engagement that renders subsidiary performance unsatisfactory. 
As just mentioned, while I concur the development of the overall commitment to the MNE 
can be difficult (García-Cabrera & García-Soto, 2012), the opportunism assumption is not 
necessary here. I found that the use of external hires, due to its high charged nature (Finkelstein 
et al., 2009), can increase, not decrease, the vigilance of the MNE decision makers. Because new 
beginnings are powerful incentives to establish or change the way work is accomplished 





have a characteristic of higher-level learning (Saka-Helmhout, 2010). For instance, as noted by 
the corporate affairs manager of Paper B: “The predecessor had a huge pressure to deliver the 
budget under the (daily) supervision of the president.” At the same time, without local political 
coalitions in place, the subsidiary employees would also function as monitoring apparatus, 
providing “credible information” about the new-comer (Rousseau et al., 1998). As the corporate 
communication manager of Paper explained, “There are many monitoring apparatuses around 
the external hire. Sometimes, when the GM said something to his subordinates, the subordinates 
would immediately send emails to the president…Even the secretary is not his guy.” In this case, 
therefore, pursuing self-interest with guile is hard for the outsider HCN GM (Eisenhardt, 1989c).  
Although the opportunism here is curbed, however, some outsider HCN GMs still do not 
always perform to the expectations of the MNEs due to role ambiguity. For example, the 
corporate affairs manager of Paper B noted: “The predecessor was focused too much on 
financial numbers, resulting in problems on customers’ end and on our ends…Although the 
company only started operation since 2012, and it started to be profitable since 2013. The 
president’s expectation was higher than the real performance...This is an important market.” 
The director of Paper explained the president’s expectation to us, “Our president hopes they 
exhausted all possible paths to grow...This is our culture.” Somewhat similar evidence was given 
by the deputy GM of Electronics A: “The GM is too much detail-oriented, which inevitability 
hinders him to engage in holistic strategic thinking. He is from a very centralized MNE, which is 
different from ours…I hope he can be a business owner, not a manager.” The interview data 
showed that these outsider HCN subsidiary GMs kept following the contractual norms to 
develop local business, and both Paper B and Electronics A returned to profitability, which 





can eventually lead to the subsidiary GMs’ unilateral commitment to the subsidiary and lack of 
commitment to the MNE as a whole (Gregersen & Black, 1992). As a result, though absent 
opportunism, their efforts may gradually deviate from the MNEs’ overall goals. Along with a 
prolonged exposure to the MNE’s overall setting, a poor person–organization fit would start to 
surface.  
Economizing Mechanism: Ex Ante Socialization  
Meanwhile, there are some externally hired HCN GMs in the data striving to resolve the 
divided engagement issue. Taking GM 2 of Water C as an example, he told me, “As a GM, 
sometimes you have to make a decision that might not be the best for your subsidiary. It’s a 
decision made by the HQs. You have to balance that.” I found that the divided engagement issue 
is effectively addressed in MNEs where both the MNE decision markers make an effort to 
socialize ex ante the appropriate HCN candidate into the corporate culture11, and the subsidiary 
GM candidate also mindfully searched for the person-organization fit before joining the 
subsidiary. As noted by DeOrtentiis et al. (2018), in addition to skills and abilities, the person–
organization fit is also based on the match between what the candidate values and what the 
values of the organization are perceived to be. My data mirror the value-match supposition here. 
For example, GM 4 in Agriculture A pointed out that the specific values of the organization he 
was looking for prior to joining the subsidiary include “integrity”, “customer centricity”, and 
“partnership”. The data, therefore, suggest that effective socialization can take place prior to 
successions, which is inconsistent with the assumption that it only marks the beginning of 
socialization when the subsidiary GM is hired (Moreland & Levine, 2002). I call this BRel 
 
11
 In this essay, the meaning of the term corporate culture includes both organizational climate and organizational 
culture, given that the differences between these two constructs are quite small (Fey & Beamish, 2000). Therefore, 
corporate culture here is both value-oriented and practice oriented. This is also consistent with how the informants in 





economizing mechanism ex ante socialization. In formal terms,  
Proposition 4: Ex ante socialization enables the externally hired HCN GM successors in 
local-market-seeking subsidiaries to reduce the likelihood of divided engagement. 
Table 13 summarizes this study’s evidence on the link between ex ante socialization (or 





Table 13: External HCNs, Divided Engagement, and Ex Ante Socialization 












          
Water C GM 2 Theoretical Outsider 
HCN 
Satisfactory  No Ex Ante 
Socialization 
Subsidiary GM: "I worked as a customer 
of this company for many years, so I 
know them...I had several conversations 
with those who work in this company in 
order to gain more insiders’ views. The 
company then flew me to Israel. I spent 
almost three full days being interviewed." 
Regional CEO: “Socialization is 
important because of trust. Teaching him 
about the company (ex post) is hard.” 




Yes Ex Ante 
Socialization 
Subsidiary GM: "Israeli companies are 
innovative... entrepreneurial…Her 
strategy is to stabilize the business 
only…Our new Regional CEO thought 
she couldn’t make any changes." 
Previous Regional CEO: “She did not 
have much experience in (this field). But 
she had worked for me for some time in 
another firm and was familiar with the 
culture.”  
GM 4 Theoretical Outsider 
HCN 
Satisfactory  No Ex Ante 
Socialization 
Subsidiary GM: "My boss who used to be 
the GM of (another MNE) joined this 
MNE as the VP International and then 
Asian Region President. I identified with 
him a lot as we worked together for many 
years. He invited me to join this 
subsidiary...The MNE's culture is similar 
to that of MNEs where I worked before." 
Agriculture B GM 5 Theoretical Outsider 
HCN 
Satisfactory  No Ex Ante 
Socialization 
Director: "Many people know who you 









Yes None Corporate Communication Manager: "He 
has a great ambition…But nothing has 
been changed, we have our own ways of 
doing things...After two months, he was 
fired." 




Yes None Corporate Affairs Manager: "The 
predecessor was focused too much on 
numbers, leading to problems on both 
customers’ end and our end. He had a 
huge pressure to deliver the budget under 
the supervision of the president, and thus 
being very risk-averse...Although the 
company only started operation since 
2012, and it started to be profitable since 
2013, the president’s expectation was 
higher than the real performance…This is 
an important market." 
       Director: "Only profitability is not 
enough, sometimes 50% profit margin is 
not good enough…Our president wants to 
know whether you have tired all possible 
solutions and exhausted all possible paths 
to grow." 




Yes Acculturation Deputy GM: "The incumbent GM worked 
in the previous company for over 30 
years…He said that he had difficulties in 
adjusting his mindset to suit our culture." 
Compared 
Subsidiary 1 
GM 2  Theoretical Outsider 
HCN 
Satisfactory  No Ex Ante 
Socialization 
HR Manager: "We did lots of evaluations 
regarding the person-organization fit, 
especially the match of values, such as 
integrity and corporate culture…Our 
MNE has many things similar to the 






As shown in Table 13, I found that most of the subsidiary successors can avoid the divided 
engagement problem if they have gone through an ex ante socialization process before joining 
the subsidiary. As GM 2 of Water C noted, “Don’t marry right away…I worked as a customer of 
this company for many years, so I know them...Before joining (Water) I had several 
conversations with those who work in this company in order to gain more insider views. The 
company then flew me to Israel. I spent almost three full days being interviewed.” The same 
“deep interview” is also found in Agriculture B’s hiring process of GM 5. I thus concluded that 
economizing on this facet of BRel leads to the alignment of expectations and in turn, increases 
goal clarity and buy-in from the parties involved (Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009). As noted by 
Kano and Verbeke (2015), the clear perceptions of “who they are and what they stand for” are a 
strong factor in the managers’ commitment to organizational action.   
Moreover, once the relational foundation is in place, the open and transparent 
communications between the outsider HCN subsidiary GM and the MNE decision makers will 
be more likely to occur, when can in turn reduce the uncertainty about the way in which future 
contingencies will be addressed. O'Donnell (2000) viewed this as a vertical integrating 
mechanism. As GM 2 of Water C noted, “I communicate everything in a very transparent 
manner to the HQs… Informing doesn’t mean you are controlling…Don’t call only when you 
have a problem, but inform when you have good news.” Somewhat similar evidence was given 
by the informant from Agriculture A, “I develop sales according to the corporate’s overall goal. 
I maintain this good relationship through open and honest communications with the HQs… and 
never cover up problems. My boss also tells me every day what he heard. Trust and confidence 
are the foundation here.” On this basis, I see ex ante socialization as an antecedent of the 





Only one GM successor in my data (i.e., GM 4 in Electronics A) went through an ex post 
acculturation process through cultural conflict management training. However, although the 
Regional CEO thought the acculturation process works, the deputy GM who works closely with 
the successor told us: “It is difficult to change his mindset.” In the follow-on interview, this 
informant further noted, “The on-the-job training doesn’t work.” I view this as symptomatic of 
genuine difficulties in culture unlearning (Kano & Verbeke, 2015). In combination, the 
foregoing discussion thus suggests that organizational cultures are not only shaped essentially 
through an internal process (Johns, 2006), they can also be similar across MNEs. Therefore, 
subsidiary GM candidates can proactively choose the one which suits them the best, and thus 
avoiding the tenuous cultural unlearning process. It also allows the MNE to choose the 
candidates who are “hyper-normal” towards its organizational culture (Caprar, 2011).  
One exception is the GM 3 of Agriculture A. She had gone through an ex ante socialization 
process and developed close social ties to the previous Regional CEO before working for 
Agriculture A. In the first several years, her performance was also fairly satisfactory. However, 
after the new Regional CEO took office, the organizational culture changed significantly. The 
incumbent subsidiary GM from Agriculture A said: “Israeli companies are innovative and 
entrepreneurial…Her strategy, however, is to stabilize the subsidiary business only…Our new 
Regional CEO thought she could not make any changes.” Based on this anomaly, I can conclude 
that: first, culture unlearning is indeed difficult; and second, a boundary condition of my theory 
is that ex ante socialization may only work when the corporate culture itself is relatively stable. 
The HR manager of the compared subsidiary 1 told me the similar strategy her company 
adopted, further corroborating the validity of Proposition 4. Specifically, she emphasized the 





is very similar to that of his previous employer.  
Expatriated PCNs and Right-Minded Regression  
Many MNEs tend to expatriate PCN GMs to manage their foreign subsidiaries (Tungli & 
Peiperl, 2009), and it seems to still be the case today, as evidenced by the informant who was a 
global leadership expert. Indeed, there exist some advantages of appointing PCN subsidiary 
GMs. As mentioned earlier, PCNs might be closer to headquarters (Michailova et al., 2016), and 
know more about the MNE’s culture (Tarique et al., 2006). Their identification with the MNE 
decision makers can therefore be stronger, reducing their willingness to engage in ex post 
opportunism. Also, given that local-market-seeking-subsidiaries need more resource support 
from the MNEs to overcome the liabilities of foreignness (Lee, Chung, & Beamish, 2019), using 
PCN GMs would allow the subsidiary to better access the needed resources to further capitalize 
on the performance-enhancing potential of the market-seeking strategy.  
But existing studies also hold that PCNs are associated with a higher failure rate (Harvey & 
Moeller, 2009). When using PCNs, strategic planning often fails at the operational level 
(Collings et al., 2007). To add another level of uncertainty, my data showed that while 
expatriating PCN subsidiary GMs can curb ex post opportunism, this strategy may beget a new 
facet of BRel, which can ultimately reduce the subsidiary GM’s local market expansion 
capabilities. Specifically, I found that some PCN subsidiary GMs, albeit well-intentioned, have a 
strong attachment to existing practices. As a result, they tend to not delegate authority to the 
local managers, hindering market knowledge acquisition which is the corner stone of successful 
internationalization, and leading to unsatisfactory subsidiary performance. Neeley and Reiche 
(2020) revealed a somewhat similar case that some global leaders from HQs are directive such 





Kano and Verbeke (2015) term this expression of BRel right-minded regression (i.e., the 
tendency to surrender to the force of old habit). In formal terms,  
Proposition 5: Expatriating a PCN subsidiary GM successor to the local-market-seeking 
subsidiary may lead to right-minded regression that renders subsidiary performance 
unsatisfactory. 
For example, in Water A, the Regional CEO said: “I had to ask the GM to dedicate 
authority to segment managers, but it took three years for him to realize the change.” This 
Regional CEO thought the subsidiary GM was not “confident enough” (though in good faith) in 
making changes. Similarly, as the corporate communication manager of Paper noted, “When the 
local guy tried to explain it to them, the GMs only used their own way of thinking to understand 
the local situation.” Somewhat similar evidence is found in Agriculture B, as the informant 
explained, “The (PCN) GM was dreaming crazy…I didn’t get access to this guy…He was 
thinking at a very high level, he was not moving down.”  
An alternative explanation is that the foregoing behaviors of the PCN subsidiary GMs 
might be conceived of as moral hazard due to the different goals in the pursuit of self-interests 
and the information asymmetry (Hölmstrom, 1979). Thus opportunism might be the underlying 
micro-foundation. I was also told by the informant from one compared subsidiary (of a US 
MNE) that some PCN GMs in his subsidiary did behave opportunistically, because the length of 
their assignment was only two to three years, so they spent “half of the time in planning to return 
home.” This seems in line with Tung’s (1988) observations on some US MNEs. Most of my 
observations here, however, suggest that the PCN subsidiary GMs, on the contrary, are fully 
committed to their work in the subsidiary, challenging the moral hazard assumption. It thus 





HCNs, is nested within the MNE, rendering role conflicts (and thus opportunism) less likely. But 
the right-minded regression still renders these GMs ill-equipped to make accurate 
implementation plans that fit the host country specificities, despite the fact that their business 
strategy might be appropriate (Vance, Vaiman, & Andersen, 2009). Bringing to light the accurate 
micro-foundation is important in that opportunism and right-minded regression would need 
different remedies.  
The evidence I collected from the additional interviews with the informants of the 
compared subsidiaries further bolstered the inference. For example, the sales manager from the 
compared subsidiary 3 said: “(PCN) GMs don’t listen, they put the requests from the HQs to the 
local team...They do not take the local situation into consideration…There are seemingly two 
systems running in parallel, the Chinese versus the Korean.” Regression may also lead to a slow 
decision-making process. As the sales manager of the compared subsidiary 11 explained, “(The 
PCN GM) lacks the sense of safety and intervenes too much and the result is that no one in the 
subsidiary would like to make decisions, because they know it is only the boss who makes the 
decision, it is too inefficient.”  
Economizing Mechanism: Balanced Local Empowerment   
At the same time, however, the interviews showed that there are also PCN subsidiary GMs 
who effectively turned around the subsidiary’s poor performance (e.g., GM 2 of Electronics B 
and GM 2 of Water B) and who achieved a fast growth in local sales (GM 3 of Electronics B). I 
concluded, as the data suggested, that a universal safeguard enacted by these GMs to address 
right-minded regression was that these PCN subsidiary GMs were willing to delegate power to 
local managers to develop business while balancing hierarchy and flexibility. Here, delegation is 





the subsidiary (Leana, 1987), but in a controlled and dynamic manner. Indeed, the downward 
deference model formulated by Neely and Reiche (2020) suggested that novelty and 
unfamiliarity of the host country context can motivate people with hierarchical power to improve 
their perception of those in lower ranks to lead the charge locally. However, as the deputy GM 
(who is a PCN) of Electronics A summarized, “After you immersed yourself into the local 
context for a while, you would then know that not everything the local team said is correct.” 
Given that the inherent function of the expatriated GM is to give strategic direction on behalf of 
the HQs, therefore, one Regional CEO of Electronics told us, “The level of delegation has to be 
appropriate.” As such, my model departs from the downward deference model by accounting 
for the effect of the dynamic change of the PCN GM’s local-knowledge base on the level of 
delegation. I call this BRel economizing mechanism balanced local empowerment. Formally,  
Proposition 6: Balanced local empowerment enables the PCN subsidiary GM successors 
in local-market-seeking subsidiaries to reduce the likelihood of right-minded regression. 
Table 14 shows this study’s evidence on the link between balanced local empowerment (or 






Table 14: PCNs, Right-Minded Regression, and Balanced Local Empowerment 













          
Water A GM 1 Literal PCNs Not satisfactory  Yes None Regional CEO: "The subsidiary in 
China was very slow…I had to ask 
the GM to dedicate authority to 
segment managers, but it took three 
years for him to realize the change."  
GM 2 Theoretical PCNs Satisfactory No Empowerment Subsidiary GM: "I promoted synergy 
among different segments...you 
should have people in place and give 
them more autonomy. I have a 
different perception about how the 
firm works from the predecessor." 
Water B GM 2 Theoretical PCNs Satisfactory No Empowerment Subsidiary GM: "I need someone 
who really knows the market...I plan 
to appoint my subordinate (an India) 
to be my successor." 
Electronics B GM 3 Theoretical PCNs Satisfactory No Empowerment Regional CEO: "At the end of day, it 
is a team work...we have strong 
incentives to motivate the local 
people…Don’t doubt the man you 
use." 
Compared Subsidiary 3 n.a. Literal PCNs Not satisfactory  Yes None Sales Manager: "Sometimes the 
(PCN) GMs don’t listen, they only 
put the requests from HQs to the 
local team...Sometimes expatriate 
GMs do not take the local situation 
into consideration…There are 
seemingly two systems running in 






Compared Subsidiary 4 GM 2 Literal PCNs Not satisfactory  Yes None Incumbent Subsidiary GM: "He was 
hard to read... He chose not to side 
with the Chinese team." 
Compared Subsidiary 9 GM 2 Theoretical PCNs Satisfactory No Empowerment Subsidiary CFO: "In order to achieve 
localization, we use a local sales 
manager who report to the GM." 
Compared Subsidiary 
10 
GM 1 Theoretical PCNs Satisfactory No Empowerment Subsidiary GM: "My solution is to 
rely on my ‘right’ hand, Yu (local 






It is straightforward that the HCN employees are more locally embedded. Relative to the 
PCN subsidiary GMs, they have spent more time in the host country and know the language and 
culture. Therefore, they have more accurate information upon which to base sound business 
decisions and are more able to harnesses local-market-seeking opportunities (Chung et al., 2015). 
In support of this view, the subsidiary GM of Water B who is an Israeli told us: “I cannot say 
that I knew everything…We are an ‘Indian’ Company...We are taking projects in a way that is 
not common in Israel…So you cannot 100% control. You only need to control the bigger 
picture.” More importantly, this approach also motivated local managers to put in effort to 
localize the operations. Tight control normally signals a lack of adequate trust (Inkpen & Currall, 
2004; Rousseau et al., 1998). In contrast, delegating the authority to the employees demonstrates 
the PCN GM’s belief in the positive intensions and trustworthiness of these employees (Leana, 
1987), which will in turn enhance the employees’ commitment to the subsidiary. This is 
consistent with the basic thesis of Vroom and Jago (1988) that under certain circumstances 
delegation will allow managers to gain both more information and increased support from the 
subordinates.   
Indeed, Luo (2003) stressed that in market-seeking subsidiaries, local managers do not 
want unnecessary levels of control. To be innovative, adaptive, and entrepreneurial, local 
managers need to be motivated. This also explains why GM 3 of Electronics B relies heavily on 
incentives to motivate the local managers in order to nourish operations in the host country. 
Empowerment here is conceived of as an incentive. The informant noted: “At the end of the day, 
it is a team work…Don’t doubt the man you use.” This point is also corroborated by the GM 
successor of the informant. “Empowerment will motivate them. This is very critical, because they 





control everything, I will be worn out. They will be worn out as well (laugh).” In this regard, 
then, the local empowerment should not be simply viewed as (normative and structural) means 
of allocating jobs. It is a trust building and motivating process based on interactive dynamics. 
This mechanism is, to a certain extent, personal and informal. Furthermore, Gregersen and Black 
(1992) found that such interactive dynamics can then further increase the PCN managers’ sense 
of dual citizenship. The interview data echo this argument.  
However, local empowerment in the present context does not suggest that the flexibility is 
unchecked and the general usefulness of a hierarchy is dismissed (cf. Neeley & Reiche, 2020). 
On the surface, control and empowerment might seem to conflict. But the interview data show 
that the PCN subsidiary GMs take efforts to ensure that the local team’s work accord with the 
organizational requirement. As evidenced by the following quote from the GM of Water B, “We 
need to put some limitations and follow some corporate standards…We need to show our 
management that we are able to collect the money back. It is an accumulated experience. We 
made some mistakes in the beginning.” The incumbent GM of Electronics B (who was 
expatriated to the host country since 2007) put it this way, “Empowerment only occurs within the 
established rules, which I established together with the local team. For example, before signing 
a contract with distributor, we have to communicate thoroughly internally what the targeted goal 
and the rebate level are. Within this frame then, I just let them have the power to make their own 
decisions.” In this sense, local empowerment here mirrors the notion of dynamic delegation such 
that GMs relinquish possession of the baton to the subordinates, but they are likely to stay at 
arm’s length from possession of the baton (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006). Indeed, in 
Electronics A, the deputy GM told us, “We use to have full delegation here in Europe, but now 





withdraw delegation when based on their expertise, they perceive the magnitude of errors that 
the subordinates might commit is too great, my interview data suggest that PCN subsidiary GMs 
take back some control when their understanding of the local situation improves.    
In my interview data, there is only one PCN (i.e., GM 2 of Water A) who is not an 
expatriate (as he was hired in the host country labor market). This GM, however, also 
emphasized the importance of local empowerment, even though he has been in China for 12 
years. This GM summarized: “I never say I know everything about China. Every day you 
encounter something new.” I also found the similar local empowerment mechanism adopted in 
the compared subsidiaries 9 and 10. Specifically, the PCN GM of the subsidiary 10 who had 
stayed in China for over nine years told us, “I will always be a foreigner there and I know it.” 
This mind-set explains why he would be willing to rely on his local subordinate to enhance the 
subsidiary’s responsiveness, and thus further bolstering the inference.  
DISCUSSION 
I re-examined the roles of subsidiary GMs, which are often oversimplified or obscured by 
GMs’ nationalities (Meyer et al., 2020). In-depth queries of rich data afforded me a well-
integrated understanding of how subsidiary GM succession decision making unfolds within a set 
of MNEs. In this process, to use McNulty and Brewster’s (2017) phrasing, I disrupted the 
assumptions of the “nationality” paradigm by elaborating a nuanced categorization of subsidiary 
GM successors. The essential point made in this paper is that the origin of the subsidiary GM 
successors has both subtle and powerful effects on the efficacy of the nationality-based strategy.  
This paper contributes to the strategic leadership literature as well. Anchoring the origin-
based succession strategy in the setting of foreign subsidiaries enabled me to shed additional 





alone is overly simplistic to inform subsidiary GM successions. When lacking theoretical 
nuances, they may yield misleading prescriptions for behavioral strategy in specific contexts. I 
offered alternative ways of looking at the successor origin issue and provided unexpected 
insights. Promoting from within the subsidiary does not strictly determine a priori whether the 
new GM will act in the best interests of the subsidiary or the MNE as a whole. On the other 
hand, using outsider candidates does not necessarily lead to information asymmetry and agency 
problem. I thus conclude that to more fully explain the implications of successor origin, a 
dynamic and integrative perspective is warranted. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, I used the empirical observations, formulated as Propositions 1 
to 6, to develop a micro-foundational model that maps how the BRel and the economizing 
mechanisms link the subsidiary GM succession strategies to subsidiary performance. By using an 
improved categorization scheme, this model can account for both the empirical anomalies 
identified here and the prior associations of attributes (i.e., successor nationality or origin) and 






Figure 2: The Model of Subsidiary GM Successions and Effectiveness 
This study responds to the calls for incorporating the nationality of the subsidiary GM into 
the conceptualization of dual identification and the calls for exploring the negative consequences 
of dual identification (Vora et al., 2007). In contrast with generally tenable inferences, my data 
“reversed the signs” (Johns, 2006) and demonstrated that appointing HCN GM successors is not 
always the best strategy for local-market-seeking subsidiaries. Because trust can have a dark 
side, which will reduce the alertness needed (Anderson & Jap, 2005), and because dual 
identification may open up opportunities for role stress in the face of conflicting goals, which can 
in turn reduce the subsidiary GMs’ sense of affiliation to both the MNE and the subsidiary (Vora 
et al., 2007), it is likely that some insider HCN subsidiary GM successors are both able and 
willing to leverage their local knowledge and social ties to pursue self-interest with deceitfulness 
after they take office. Ex post opportunism, therefore, may ultimately arise and lead to 
unsatisfactory subsidiary performance.  
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important role in influencing the international staffing decision (Tan & Mahoney, 2006), I found 
that opportunism in the present context is a situational occurrence (Lumineau & Verbeke, 2016). 
To economize on opportunism, some MNE decision makers expatriated HCN subsidiary GMs 
from within the MNE but outside the subsidiary. These expatriated GMs did not tend to spend 
less time with local people (c.f March, 1992). In contrast, they can simultaneously realize dual 
identification while being equipped with a sufficient level of local knowledge to improve the 
subsidiary’s local responsiveness. This finding thus calls into the question the argument that 
those GMs whose talent most fits the position might also be the ones that the MNE will incur 
substantial costs in controlling their behaviour (Tan & Mahoney, 2006).  
But expatriated HCN GM candidates as such are not always readily available. The more 
common approaches identified here are that MNE decision makers deploy outsider HCN 
subsidiary GMs or use PCN subsidiary GMs, both of which can also effectively limit ex post 
opportunism. However, the interview data revealed that these succession strategies would entail 
new facets of BRel. To address divided the engagement problem, Proposition 5 suggests the use 
of ex ante socialization. Although prior studies showed that ex post acculturation may also 
nurture common identity, the empirical reality here suggested a dynamic view, highlighting the 
importance of socialization timing, inter alia, in the face of difficulties in cultural unlearning. I 
thus extend the work of Caprar (2011) by adding that cultural alteration of the HCNs can occur 
prior to the successions.  
To economize on right-minded regression, on the other hand, Proposition 6 suggests the 
use of balanced local empowerment. This is consistent with the instrumental understanding of 
downward deference (Neeley & Reiche, 2020) and underscores the notion that local flexibility is 





(Luo, 2003). But I add to these views by revealing that, at least for PCN GMs in local-market-
subsidiaries of manufacturing MNEs, local empowerment does not suggest that the flexibility is 
unconstrained and hierarchy is disregarded. The expatriated PCN GMs, due to their lack of local 
knowledge, tend to rely on the local team. However, they also need to ensure that the local 
operation is in line with the MNE’s overall goal. The effective solution, thus, seems to be a 
hybrid mechanism consisting of both delegation and control, which enhances flexibility, allows 
for small errors, while providing sufficient order.  
In sum, both safeguards mentioned above are interpersonal processes, facilitating 
cooperative and open relationships. These revealed safeguards comply with the core tenet of 
evolutionary theory that the goal of the MNE is to develop a harmonious social community 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993). By showing a positive strategic value derived from dual commitments 
(Gregersen & Black, 1992), we empirically corroborate the argument of O’Donnell (2000) that 
the design of organizational control system should be more involved than the limited solutions 
prescribed by agency theory.  
The foregoing efforts to equip theory with managerial relevance also allow me to address 
the call by Kano and Verbeke (2015) to examine the various expressions of BRel in large MNEs, 
focusing on both their antecedents and consequences. In so doing, I corroborated the value of 
BRel as a standard micro-foundation in international management research. More deeply, the 
analysis made a strong case for the need to consider the different facets of BRel in an integrated 
manner, because the strategy to address one BRel challenge may inadvertently lead to another 
BRel challenge.  
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 





would be fruitful to further add nuance to the model formulated here. One possible direction is to 
draw a clear distinction between relay and non-relay succession (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), 
as it may engender different bases of subsidiary GM power, and different social ties of the 
subsidiary GM. Also, future research could incorporate the missions of the expatriated subsidiary 
GMs. Not all expatriate assignments are the same (Caligiuri & Bonache, 2016). Some expatriates 
represent the long arm of the headquarters, whereas others build informal communication 
networks or transfer organizational culture (Harzing, 2001; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). Some 
expatriates are selected for postings, while others are self-initiated (Cerdin & Selmer, 2014; 
Suutari & Brewster, 2000). The duration of international assignments can also vary (Starr & 
Currie, 2009), which may influence the BRel of the subsidiary GMs. Relatedly, future research 
can also investigate other facets of BRel, thus extending the model formulated here.  
Given the absence of inpatriates in the data, another promising research avenue would be 
to investigate whether being an inpatriate can moderate the effect of being an insider HCN 
subsidiary GM on subsidiary performance. As inpatriates are more likely to develop a global 
mindset (Harvey, Speier, & Novicevic, 1999), and some MNEs use inpatriation to develop 
subsidiary managers (Tharenou & Harvey, 2006), it seems likely that when inpatriates return to 
the host country, they can undertake both localization and integration more effectively (Sarabi, 
Froese, & Hamori, 2017) and develop the strong sense of dual identification quickly (Vora et al., 
2007). This line of reasoning may also apply to returnees, who have gone abroad to study or 
work, then return to their home country (Roberts & Beamish, 2017). Therefore, I hope future 
research can add meaningful observations to our model by exploring whether ex post 
opportunism would still arise in those cases. Also, it would be fruitful to further explore the 





Meanwhile, as the subsidiary GM successor’ personality characteristics, can also affect the 
MNE’s decision to “buy versus make” global leaders (Caligiuri, 2006), future research on this 
topic could explore how successors’ personality traits moderate the relationships I formulated. 
Finally, and at a more macro-level, for a better alignment between management practices and 
academic descriptions, future studies can account for the environmental forces that moderate the 
factors underlying my model. Contingencies in this regard may include national cultures (Toh & 
DeNisi, 2003), institutions (Tao, Liu, Gao, & Xia, 2018), economy (Sonkova, 2015), and 
environmental turbulence (Williams et al., 2017). 
Managerial Implications 
This study provides several implications for practitioners. First, although it seems unwise 
to play down the talents of insiders (Mellahi & Collings, 2010), I caution against the use of 
insider HCN subsidiary GM successors as a way of fully achieving the subsidiary’s local-
market-seeking role. In the middle of the dual identification development process, the insider 
HCN subsidiary GM successors may be pulled in two directions, thus losing the sense of 
affiliation to both entities. This can be problematic. A remedy is to expatriate an HCN GM, who 
is equally capable yet may behave less opportunistically. The challenge for MNE decision 
makers then becomes building a cadre of such competent talents. This is exactly what Water is 
doing nowadays.  
Second, given that “competition for global leaders to manage overseas operations will 
steadily intensify” (Collings et al., 2007: 201), and that individuals are often reluctant to relocate 
internationally (Minbaeva & Collings, 2013), spotting external talent in the host country makes 
good business sense. This is also a timely solution, considering that the COVID-19 pandemic 





Minbaeva, Verbeke, & Zimmermann, 2020). However, it is critical to ensure the common goals 
that chart the course have already been in place when the outsider HCN GM takes office. Such 
appropriate antecedent conditions, enabled by trusting, prior interactions, seem more germane 
than on-the-job acculturation. To that end, patience is crucial, as stressed by two Regional CEOs 
in the interview data, “Don’t make the choice under pressure.” 
Third, while I concur that PCN assignment contains control elements (Collings et al., 2009; 
Harzing, 2001), these managers might, though absent opportunism, surrender to the force of their 
old habit, thus exerting unnecessary levels of control or even interference to local managers. This 
approach can generate rigidity (García-Cabrera & García-Soto, 2012). In contrast, encouraging 
the PCN GMs in a hierarchical bureaucracy to proactively delegate authority to the local 
managers will have a profound effect on motivating the local managers. 
CONCLUSION 
Grounded in both the extant literature and a qualitative inquiry, this essay developed a 
model of local-market-seeking subsidiary GM successions and effectiveness. The central 
message from my study is that we need to consider in an integrated way the choice of GM 
successors which has been studied by separate paradigms. The results underscored the 
continuing relevance of contingency models of GM successions. Delving into the micro-
foundations, I concluded that effective GM successors for local-market-seeking subsidiaries need 
to be able to simultaneously address various facets of BRel. I delineated several safeguards that 
can enable these subsidiary GM successors to reduce BRel. If the propositions formulated in this 
study can survive future empirical tests, they can be viewed as a major step forward in our 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
While a sizeable body of work on subsidiary staffing exists within international 
management (e.g., Delios & Björkman, 2000; Fang, Jiang, Makino, & Beamish, 2010; Gaur, 
Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Tarique, Schuler, & Gong, 2006), there is a paucity of 
theoretical and empirical research on subsidiary GM changes (For exceptions, see Bebenroth & 
Froese, 2020; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000; Selmer & de Leon, 1997; Selmer & Luk, 1995). 
The lack of scholarly attention on this topic is unfortunate, because GM succession potentially 
strongly impacts subsidiary outcomes (Colakoglu, Tarique, & Caligiuri, 2009). This dissertation, 
aiming to meet the dual hurdles of relevance and rigor (Van de Ven, 2007), provides a systematic 
understanding of subsidiary GM successions, by examining multiple subsidiary GM changes, 
individual succession events, and micro-level succession decision making processes. This 
undertaking is not only theoretically important, but also relevant and timely to practitioners, 
because today the risk of selecting the wrong manager is greater than any time in the past 
(Donatiello, Larcker, & Tayan, 2018) and the COVID-19 pandemic adds additional complexities 
to subsidiary GM deployment (Caligiuri, De Cieri, Minbaeva, Verbeke, & Zimmermann, 2020). 
Essay 1 applies evolutionary theory (Kogut & Zander, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2003) in the 
context of subsidiary GM changes, and thus extends received theory in fruitful ways (Makadok, 
Burton, & Barney, 2018). This essay also brings to the fore the parenting role of MNEs, which 
seems arguably more or less absent in evolutionary theory (Forsgren, 2017; Foss & Pedersen, 
2019). As a result, Essay 1 further enhances evolutionary theory’s relevance to practice. More 
importantly, I show that evolutionary theory can be used to address the inconsistencies in the 
extant succession literature. On this basis, I develop a temporal model that investigates long-term 





staffing (e.g., Harzing, 2001a; Peng & Beamish, 2007; Schotter & Beamish, 2011) towards a 
dynamic perspective. Essay 1 develops a process-based theory that links individuals in 
leadership with various subsidiary-level outcomes (Meyer, Li, & Schotter, 2020). To the best of 
my knowledge this is among the first studies to theoretically and empirically investigate the 
longitudinal dynamics of subsidiary GM changes, thus improving our knowledge of the broader 
succession process (Berns & Klarner, 2017).  
While Essay 1 explores the continual GM change within the organization, Essay 2 
complements Essay 1 by accounting for the individual triggering event that is likely to set the 
path-building process in motion (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009) and by showing that both 
the internal structure of organizations and the external environment can influence organizational 
decision making (Argote & Greve, 2007) in relation to GM successions. Essay 2 provides a fresh 
look at the relationship between subsidiary performance and subsidiary GM succession. I 
challenge the performance–power–succession model (Drazin & Rao, 1999), which has been 
developed in a domestic setting, by demonstrating the intriguing double effect of strategic 
configurations. Therefore, Essay 2 advances theory by using an alternative explanatory 
mechanism (Roth & Kostova, 2003) to explain more fully the subsidiary performance–GM 
succession association in the unique context of MNEs. Also, I address the call to theoretically 
and empirically investigate the issue of negative headquarters attention (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
2008). Furthermore, by using temporal progressions of activities as elements of explanation 
(Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013), Essay 2 empirically shows that how this 
negative headquarters intervention can turn an ailing subsidiary around.  
Essay 3 complements Essays 1 and 2 by providing detailed descriptions of succession 





successions and effectiveness. The findings challenge the argument that those GMs whose talent 
most fits the position might also be the ones that the MNE will incur substantial costs in 
controlling their behaviour (Tan & Mahoney, 2006). Focusing on micro-processes enables me to 
move away from the narrow category of expatriate managers to a more differentiated 
categorization (De Cieri, Cox, & Fenwick, 2007) and to re-examine the roles of subsidiary GMs, 
which are often oversimplified or obscured by GMs’ nationalities (Meyer et al., 2020). I show 
that it is useful to consider in an integrated manner the choice of GM successors, which has been 
studied by parallel research domains (IM and strategic leadership) (e.g., Chung, Park, Lee, & 
Kim, 2015; DeOrtentiis, Iddekinge, Ployhart, & Heetderks, 2018; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2009). Also, I address the call by Kano and Verbeke (2015) to examine the various 
expressions of BRel in large MNEs, focusing on both their antecedents and consequences. In so 
doing, I corroborate the value of BRel as a standard micro-foundation in IM research in general, 
and in succession research in particular. Moreover, I sharpen this micro-foundation by bringing 
to light the inter-links among the distinct facets of BRel, because the observations showed that 
the strategy to address one BRel challenge may inadvertently lead to another BRel challenge. 
In sum, the dissertation generates important insights into subsidiary GM successions, and 
includes a number of timely implications for practitioners, which I have summarized at the end 
of each essay. My research advances theory in three ways. First, I use received theory within IM 
to address a new phenomenon. Second, I leverage the distinctiveness of MNEs and contexts to 
reconcile inconsistencies in the extant succession literature. And third, I contrast theories from 
separate paradigms to offer a more complete and accurate account of subsidiary GM successions. 
If the findings presented here can survive future empirical tests, this dissertation can be viewed 
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